Convinced at last of the strength of the Allied trench-barrier, Falkenhayn took the momentous decision to stand on the de fensive in the West. But his object in so doing seems to have been vague. His feeling that the war must ultimately be decided in France led him to distrust the value, as he doubted the possi bility, of a decision against Russia. Hence while he realized that the Eastern front was the only practicable theatre for operations in the near future, he withheld the necessary reinforcements until forced to do so by the threatening situation of the Austro-Hun garian front. And even then he doled out reserves reluctantly and meagrely, enough to secure success but never in the quantity and the time for decisive victory.
It is to his credit, however, that he realized a long war was now inevitable, and that he set to work to develop Germany's resources for such a warfare of attrition. The technique of field entrenchment was carried to a higher pitch than with any other country, the military railways were expanded for the lateral move ment of reserves, the supply of munitions and of the raw material for their manufacture was tackled so energetically and compre hensively, that an ample flow was ensured from the spring of 1915 onwards—a time when the British were only awakening to the problem. Here were laid the foundations of that economic organization and utilization of resources which was to be the secret of Germany's resisting power to the pressure of the Brit ish blockade. For the scientific grasp of the economic sphere in war Germany owed much to Dr. Walter Rathenau, a brilliant captain of industry. She was also a pioneer in the psychological sphere, for as early as the autumn of 1914, she launched a vast scheme of propaganda in Asia, to undermine British prestige and the loyalty of Britain's Mohammedan subjects. The defect of her propaganda, its crudeness, was less apparent when directed to primitive people than when applied to the civilized peoples of Europe and America.
The same period witnessed also the one great success for Ger man diplomacy, the entry of Turkey into the war, although this was fundamentally due to a combination of pre-war causes with military events. Since 1909 the country had been under the con trol of the Young Turk party, to whom traditions, including that of friendship with Britain, were abhorrent. Germany, filled with her own dream of a Germanic Middle East—of which the Bagh dad railway was the symbol, had skilfully exploited the oppor tunity to gain a dominating influence over the new rulers of Tur key. Their leader, Enver Pasha, had been military attache in Ber lin, German instructors permeated the Turkish army, and a defi nite understanding existed between Germany and the Young Turk leaders as to common military action—urged by the com mon bond of necessary safeguard against danger from Russia.
The arrival of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" reinforced the moral pressure of Wangenheim, the German ambassador, and eventually on Oct. 29 the Turks committed definite acts of war, at Odessa against Russia, and in Sinai against Britain.
Falkenhayn has shown "the decisive importance of Turkey joining in the struggle"—first as a barrier across the channel of munition supply to Russia, and secondly as a distraction to the military strength of Britain and Russia. Under German dictation, Turkey struck as early as mid-December against the Russians in the Caucasus (q.v.), but Enver's over-ambitious plan ended in disaster at the battle of Sarikamish. Turkey was no more for tunate in her next venture ; to cut Britain's Suez canal artery with the East. The Sinai desert was a check on an invasion in strength, and the two small detachments which got across were easily repulsed, at Ismailia and El Kantara, although allowed to make good their retreat. But if both these offensives were tactical failures, they were of great strategic value to Germany by pinning down large Russian and British forces.
As an offset to Turkey joining the Central Powers, Italy defi nitely threw over the artificial ties of the old Triple Alliance and joined the Entente. On May 24 she declared war on Austria— her hereditary enemy—although avoiding an open breach with Germany. If her main object was to seize the chance of redeem ing her kinsmen in Trieste and the Trentino from Austrian rule, there was also a spiritual desire to reassert her historic traditions. Militarily, however, her aid could not have an early or great effect on the situation, for her army was unready to deliver a prompt blow, and the Austrian frontier was a mountainous ob stacle of great natural strength.