The Menace to Russia.—While the British were striving to unlock the back door to Russia, the Germanic Powers were ham mering their Russian allies, whose resistance was collapsing in large measure from a lack of munitions which could only be made good by foreign supplies through that locked entrance, the Dar danelles. On the Eastern front, the campaign of 1914 had shown that a German force could count on defeating any larger Russian force, but that when Russians and Austrians met on an equality victory rested with the Russians. Falkenhayn was forced, re luctantly, to despatch German reinforcements as a stiffening to the Austrians, and thus was dragged into an offensive in the East rather than adopting it as a clearly defined plan. Ludendorff, in contrast, had his eyes firmly fixed on the ultimate object, and from now 9n advocated unceasingly a whole-hearted effort to break Russia. Ludendorff's was a strategy of decision, Falken hayn's a strategy of attrition.
In the conflict of wills between these two men lies the clue to the resultant strategy of Germany—highly effective, yet not de cisive. On the other side the fresh Russian plan embodied the lessons of experience and was soundly conceived, but the means were lacking and the instrument defective. The Grand Duke Nicholas aimed to secure both his flanks solidly before attempt ing a fresh blow towards Silesia. From January until April, under bitter winter conditions, the Russian forces on the southern flank of the Polish salient strove to gain possession of the Carpathians and the gateways into the Hungarian plain. But the Austrians, with a German infusion, parried their efforts, and the loss was disproportionate to the small gains. The long-besieged fortress of Przemysl (q.v.), however, at last fell into their hands on March 2 2. In northern Poland the Russians were preparing to strike upwards at East Prussia, when they were forestalled by a fresh Ludendorff stroke eastwards towards the frontier of Russia proper. The blow was launched on Feb. 7, over snow-buried roads and frozen swamps, and was distinguished by the envelopment of four Russian divisions in the Augustovo forests. (See MA SURIAN LAKES.) Moreover, it extracted the sting from the Rus sian attack further west.
These moves were, however, merely a "curtain-raiser" to the real drama of 1915. But before turning to this it is necessary to glance at events on the Western front, the importance of which is partly as a signpost to the future and partly because of their reaction on the Eastern front.
The Western Front.—While a way round the trench barrier was being sought in Gallipoli and experiments with a novel key were being carried out in England, the Allied ,commands in France were trying more orthodox solutions. The most signifi cant was the British attack at Neuve Chapelle (q.v.) on March lc). Save as a pure experiment the attempt stood self-condemned. For it was an isolated attempt on a small front with inadequate resources. The arrival in France of several new regular divisions
made up from foreign garrisons, of the Indian Corps, and the 1st Canadian Division had brought the British strength up to 13 divisions and 5 cavalry divisions, besides a number of selected territorial battalions. This increase enabled French to divide his forces into two armies and gradually to extend his share of the front. But Joffre was insistent that he should relieve the French of the Ypres salient, which they had taken over in November, and made the intended French attack contingent on this relief. Sir John French considered that he had not sufficient troops for both purposes, and so decided to carry out the attack single handed. An additional motive was his resentment of the constant French criticisms that the British were not "pulling their weight." In design, however, the attack, entrusted to Haig's 1st Army, was both original and well thought out. After an intense born bardment of 35 minutes duration on a 2,000 yd. frontage, the artillery lengthened their range and dropped a curtain of fire to prevent the reinforcement of the enemy's battered trenches, which were rapidly overrun by the infantry.
Complete surprise was attained and most of the first positions captured, but when in the second phase, the frontage was ex tended, the artillery support was inadequate. Further, owing to scanty information and to the two corps commanders waiting upon each other a long pause occurred which gave the Germans five clear hours to organize fresh resistance. Then, too late and mistakenly, the attack was ordered to be pushed "regardless of loss." And loss proved the only result. An underlying factor was that the narrowness of the attack sector made the breach more easy for the defenders to close, although this defect was unavoidable owing to the general shortage of munitions. The British had been slower than the Germans to awaken to the scale of ammunition supply required for this new warfare, and, even so, deliveries fell far behind contract, owing largely to the handi cap imposed by trade union rules on the dilution of skilled labour. These could only be modified after long negotiation and the shortage of shells became so obvious in the spring of 1915 as to lead to a public outcry which culminated in the establishment of a Ministry of Munitions, under Lloyd George, to co-ordinate and develop both manufacture and the supply of raw materials. Apart from sheik the crudeness and inferiority of all the British trench warfare weapons compared with those of the Germans, made such a radical organization overdue, and its urgency was emphasized by the near approach of the time when Britain's new armies would take over the field. If the task was undertaken late, it was carried out with energy and thoroughness, and by 1916 the flow of munitions reached a volume, still expanding, which finally removed any material handicap on the strategy of the British leaders.