The tactical sequel of Neuve Chapelle was less fortunate. It was clear that the small-scale experiment had only missed success by a narrow margin and that there was scope for its develop ment. But the Entente commands missed the true lesson, which was the surprise attainable by a short bombardment that corn pensated its brevity by its intensity. And only partially did they appreciate that the sector attacked must be sufficiently wide to prevent the defender's artillery commanding, or his reserves clos ing the breach. Instead, they drew the superficial deduction that mere volume of shell-fire was the key to success. Not until 1917 did they revert to the Neuve Chapelle method. It was left to the Germans to profit by the experience against the Russians in May.
But before that came, the Western front was destined to in crease the tally of military blunders. In the first, it was the Ger mans' turn to find and misuse a new key to the trench deadlock. This was the introduction of gas, and, unlike the British intro duction of tanks later, the chance, once forfeited, did not return, owing to the relative ease of providing an antidote. In a local attack in Polind on Jan. 31, the Germans had tried the use of gas-shells, but the experiment had been a failure owing to the nullifying effect of the intense cold. At the next attempt it was discharged from cylinders owing to the failure of the authorities to provide the inventor, Haber, with adequate facilities for the manufacture of shells. Further, the initial disappointment led the German command to place little trust in its value. In conse quence, when discharged against the French trenches at Ypres on April 22, there were no reserves at hand to pour through the wide breach it created. (See YPRES, BATTLES OF, 1915.) A strange green vapour, a surging mass of agonized fugitives, a 4 m. gap without a living defender—such was the sequence of events. But the heroic resistance of the Canadians on the flank of the breach and the prompt arrival of English and Indian reinforce ments saved the situation in the absence of German reserves.
The chlorine gas originally used was undeniably cruel, but no worse than the frequent effect of shell or bayonet, and when it was succeeded by improved forms of gas both experience and statistics proved it the least inhumane of modern weapons. But it was novel and therefore labelled an atrocity by a world which condones abuses but detests innovations. Thus Germany incurred the moral odium which inevitably accompanies the use of a novel weapon without any compensating advantage. (See CHEMICAL WARFARE.) On the Entente side, wisdom would have counselled a period of waiting until their munition supply had grown and the new British armies were ready, but the desire to regain lost territory and the duty of relieving the pressure on Russia, combined with ill-founded optimism to spur Joffre to premature offensives. The
German losses were exaggerated, their skill and power in defence underrated, and a series of diffused and unconnected attacks were made. The chief was by the French between Lens and Arras, under Foch's direction, and the earlier experience of failure to make an effective breach in the trench barrier was repeated. The attack was launched on May 9 by d'Urbal's army on a four mile frontage. It was quickly checked with murderous losses except on the front of Petain's corps which, thanks to meticulous preparation, broke through to a depth of three miles. But the penetration was too narrow, reserves were late and inadequate and the gap closed. Foch, however, persevered with vain attacks which gained a few acres of ground at excessive loss. Meantime Haig's 1st Army had attacked towards Aubers Ridge simultane ously with the larger French attempt. The plan was to penetrate at two points north and south of Neuve Chapelle, 4 m. apart, the total frontage of the two being 21 m., and then to converge in exploiting the double penetration. But the Germans, profiting also from the experimental value of Neuve Chapelle, had de veloped their defences. Thus the attack died away quickly from a surfeit of German machine-guns and an insufficiency of British shells. Under pressure from Joffre the attack was renewed on May 15 on the Festubert sector south of Neuve Chapelle, and continued by small bites until May 27. The larger French offen sive between Lens and Arras was not abandoned until June 18, when the French had lost 102,000 men—rather more than double the defender's loss.
The effect of these attacks was, moreover, to convince even the dubious Falkenhayn of the strength of his Western line and of the remoteness of any real menace from the Franco-British forces.
His offensive on the Eastern front had already opened. Tactically unlimited, its strategic object was at first only the limited one of relieving the pressure on the Austrian front and, concurrently, re ducing Russia's offensive power. Conrad proposed and Falken hayn accepted a plan which aimed at a rupture of the Russian centre as the best means to this end, and in which the Dunajec sector between the upper Vistula and the Carpathians was selected as offering the fewest obstacles to an advance and best pro tection to the flanks of a penetration. The break-through was entrusted to Mackensen, whose force comprised the newly formed German 11th Army—strengthened by divisions from the West, and the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army. The Ypres gas attack and a large cavalry raid from East Prussia were initiated to cloak the concentration on the Dunajec river of 14 divisions and 1,500 guns against a front held by only six Russian divisions and lacking rear lines of trenches.