The weight of military opinion bore down counter-proposals and the Balkan projects were relinquished in favour of a con centration of effort on the Western front. But misgivings were not silenced and at this juncture a situation arose which revived the near Eastern scheme in a new if attenuated form.
It is a moot point whether a prompt renewal of the advances would not have succeeded, for the Turkish ammunition was ex hausted, and in such conditions the mine obstacle might have been overcome. But the new naval commander, Admiral de Robeck decided against it, unless military aid was forthcoming. Already, a month before, the War Council had determined on a joint attack, and began the despatch of a military force under Sir Ian Hamilton. (See DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.) But as the authorities had drifted into the new scheme, so were they tardy in releasing the necessary troops, and even when sent in inade quate numbers, several more weeks' delay had to be incurred—at Alexandria—in order to redistribute the force in its transports suitably for tactical action. Worst of all, this fumbling policy had thrown away the chance of surprise, which was vital for a landing on an almost impregnable shore. When the preliminary bombardment took place in February only two Turkish divisions were at the straits; this was increased to four by the date of the naval attack, to six when Hamilton was at last able to attempt his landing. For this he had only four British divisions and one French division—actually inferior in strength to the enemy in a situation where the inherent preponderance of defensive over offensive power was multiplied by the natural difficulties of the terrain. His weakness of numbers and his mission of aiding the passage of the fleet compelled him to choose a landing on the Gallipoli peninsula in preference to one on the mainland or on the Asiatic shore; and the rocky coastline limited his possible landing places.
On April 25, he made his spring, at the southern tip of the peninsula near Cape Hellas and—with Australian and New Zea land troops—near Gaba Tepe, some 15 m. up the Aegean coast; the French, as a diversion, made a temporary landing at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore. The troops effected the impossible and made good their lodgment on beaches strewn with barbed wire and swept by machine-guns. But the momentary asset of tactical surprise had passed, the difficulties of supply were immense, while the Turks held the commanding heights and were able to bring up their reserves. The invaders managed to hold on to their two precarious footholds, but they could not expand them ap preciably, and the stagnation of trench warfare set in. They could not go on, and national prestige forbade them to go back.
Ultimately, in July, the British Government decided to send a further five divisions to reinforce the seven by now on the penin sula. By the time they arrived the Turkish strength in the region had also risen to 15 divisions. Hamilton decided on a double stroke—a reinforced blow from Gaba Tepe and a new landing at Suvla bay a few miles north—to sever the middle of the peninsula and secure the heights commanding the Narrows. He deceived the Turkish command and achieved surprise (Aug. 6), but the first blow failed and the second lost a splendid chance by the inexperience of the troops and still more the inertia and fumbling of the local commanders. For over 36 hours, before reserves arrived, only one and a half Turkish battalions barred the path. Energetic new commanders, for whom Hamilton had previously asked, were sent out when the opportunity had passed. The British were once more condemned to hang on to tenuous footholds, and with the autumn rains setting in their trials were increased. The Government had lost faith and were anxious to withdraw, but fear of the moral effect delayed their decision. Hamilton was asked for his opinion, however, and when he pro nounced in favour of continuing—in which course he still had confidence—he was replaced by Sir Charles Monro, who immedi ately declared for evacuation. Kitchener was then sent out to in vestigate, and on his verdict a withdrawal was sanctioned and carried out from Suvla and Anzac on the night of Dec. 18-19 and from Hellas on that of Jan. 8-9. If the bloodless evacuation was an example of masterly organization and co-operation it was also a proof of the greater ease of such operations in modern warfare. Thus the curtain rang down on a sound and far-sighted conception marred by a chain of errors in execution almost unrivalled even in British history.