from its starting point. Defeat almost turned into disaster when this was forced at Jaroslav, but the impetus of the advance had momentarily spent itself and reserves were lacking. A new factor was introduced by Italy's declaration of war against Austria, but Falkenhayn persuaded the Austrian command, with some diffi culty, not to move troops from the Russian front, and to main tain a strict defensive on their Italian frontier, which was secured by the mountain barrier. He realized that he had committed him self too far in Galicia to draw back, and that only by bringing more troops from France could he hope to fulfil his object of transferring troops back there, as this could only be possible when Russia's offensive power was crippled and her menace to Austria removed. Strengthened by these reinforcements, Mackensen at tacked again in co-operation with the Austrians, retook Przemysl on June 3 and captured Lemberg on June 22, cutting the Russian front into two separated portions.
But the Russians, from their vast man-power resources had al most made good the loss of 400,000 prisoners, and Falkenhayn's anxiety about the stability of his Austrian allies decided him to continue the offensive, although still with limited objects and with one eye on the situation in France. He changed its direction, how ever, from eastwards to northwards, between the Bug and Vistula, where lay the main Russian forces. In conjunction, Hindenburg was ordered to strike south-east from East Prussia, across the Narew (q.v.) and towards the Bug. Ludendorff disliked the plan as being too much of a frontal attack ; the Russians might be squeezed by the closing in of the two wings but their retreat would not be cut off. He urged once more his spring scheme for a wide enveloping manoeuvre through Kovno on Vilna and Minsk, but Falkenhayn rejected it, fearing that it would mean more troops and a deeper commitment. The result justified Luden
dorff's expectation—the Grand Duke extricated his troops from the Warsaw salient before the German shears could close on him. Falkenhayn, on the other hand considered that Ludendorff had not put his full weight into the attack. (See further BREST LITOVSK, BATTLES OF.) Nevertheless, 750,000 prisoners had been taken by the middle of August, Poland had been occupied, and Falkenhayn decided to break off large scale operations on the Eastern front. Bulgaria's entry into the war was now arranged and he wished to support the combined attack of Austria and Bulgaria against Serbia, as well as to transfer troops back to meet the French offensive ex pected in September. Mackensen was sent to the Serbian front and Ludendorff was given a belated permission to carry out his Vilna scheme, with such resources as he had, but as an independ ent operation.
It began on Sept. 9, Below's Army of the Niemen and Eich horn's loth Army forming two great horns which gored their way into the Russian front, the one east towards Dvinsk and the other south-east towards Vilna. The Russians were driven back in divergent directions and the Germany cavalry advancing between the horns far overlapped Vilna and drew near the Minsk railway. But the German strength was slender, the Russians free to concentrate against this isolated menace, and in face of the stiffening resistance Ludendorff took the wise course of suspend ing operations. The crux of the situation was that the Russian armies had been allowed to draw back almost out of the net before the long delayed Vilna manoeuvre was attempted ; the degree of success attained with such weak forces was confirma tion of its-practicability and of Ludendorff's claim that a power ful blow delivered while the Russians were deeply enmeshed in the Polish salient might have annihilated the armed force of Rus sia. She had been badly lamed, but not destroyed, and although never again a direct menace to Germany, she was able to delay the full concentration of German strength in the West for two years, until 1918. Falkenhayn's cautious strategy was to prove the most hazardous in the long run, and indeed to pave the way for Germany's bankruptcy.