As the cloud of smoke over the spot where the "Defence" had gone down rolled away, the full measure of his peril was re vealed to Scheer. The High Seas Fleet was heading into the crook of the rapidly extending arm of the whole combined British Battle Fleet. It seemed to Jellicoe a glorious opportunity to fall on his enemy and crush him. The signal was actually hoisted for the Grand Fleet to close, when the commander-in-chief realised that his line had not yet straightened out, and the battle cruisers were not yet clear of his van; to turn to S.S.E. by sub divisions, as he wished, was not practicable at the moment. He had to cancel the signal and hold on on a course which neverthe less sharply converged with that of the enemy battle fleet. The Grand Fleet deployed on a course southeast at 6.15. The de ployment (excluding the 5th B.S.) was completed by about 6.4o. The German Battle Fleet approached on a northeasterly course. At 6.27, the "Konig," leading battleship, turned east, the re mainder following in succession (see fig. 3).
Now yet another misfortune befell the British. Proudly lead ing the long line of capital ships, was Hood in the "Invincible." Having closed to a bare 9,00o yd. she was furiously engaging the "Derfflinger," hitting her again and again with well directed salvoes, when the "Konig," leading the van of the enemy battle fleet, came to the rescue of the battle cruiser. Once again the plunging shell sought the vitals of the lightly armoured British ship; the "Invincible" was torn asunder, her stem and stern rising high out of the water before she disappeared (6.34). With her went Hood, who had so finely upheld the traditions of his historic name, and his splendid crew of over a thousand officers and men. The British battle cruisers had indeed suffered heavily. Valuable as their work had been in bringing about the main ac tion, they were clearly unsuited for "in-fighting." From now onwards they rightly confined themselves to harassing the van of the enemy when opportunity served, leaving the battleships to take the shock of closer contact. But close contact was the last thing Scheer was seeking. He was in a trap and needed all his wits to escape impending disaster.
The possibility of such a situation had not been overlooked by the German commander-in-chief, and he had practised his com mand in a manoeuvre known as the Gefechtskehrtwendung, which was really an "emergency retirement." In this the destroyers dashed out, fired their torpedoes "into the brown," and put up a smoke screen while each big ship did a right-about turn and re treated precipitately. This manoeuvre he ordered when at 6.35 he
found battleship after battleship of the Grand Fleet concen trating on the head of his line. It was not unattended with risk, but it was boldly ordered and skilfully executed. (See fig. 3.) In less than three minutes the evasive Germans had disappeared for the first time. The destroyer attack had not been pressed home, and, although some of the British battleship divisions swung away momentarily to avoid the torpedoes, the course of the fleet as a whole was not deflected. Burney's flagship, the "Marlborough," was hit by a torpedo, but the damage was not so great as to force her to leave the line. The German light cruiser "Wies baden," now the only enemy in sight, came under a heavy fire and in ten minutes, a blazing wreck, she sank from sight.
Jellicoe, too, had foreseen the problem which now confronted him, and he had not been alone in seeking, for some time past, a satisfactory solution; it was agreed by the highest tactical au thorities that to follow directly in the path of an enemy's battle fleet in a position where it could obtain the maximum advantage from torpedoes and mines, was sheer foolhardiness. He had been informed by the Naval Intelligence Dept. that the German capi tal ships were known to carry mines. In fact, he had already summed up the situation when he wrote "Nothing but ample time and superior speed can be an answer, and this means that unless the meeting takes place fairly early in the day, it is most difficult, if not impossible, to fight the action to a finish." In point of fact, so little was the Grand Fleet superior to the High Seas Fleet in speed that even had Jellicoe pursued it directly it is doubtful whether he would have caught up with it before nightfall. It was now 6.4o. There remained little more than two hours' daylight. The enemy was out of sight somewhere to the south and west, but another advantage which the deployment to port had given was the overlap to the eastward which the Grand Fleet had secured. (See fig. 4.) Jellicoe was therefore in a position to work his way steadily between the High Seas Fleet and its possible lines of retreat to the German coast, and this he proceeded to do. At 6.44 he turned his divisions southeast. Simultaneously Goodenough turned south and led his Light Cruiser Squadron to look for the enemy. By 7 he was able to report the hostile battle fleet bearing S.S.W.