Although he had twice butted his head into trouble and twice withdrawn it considerably battered, Scheer was loath to be forced further to the westward and away from home. So, at 7.53, he hauled round and made his way tentatively to the southward. (See fig. 4.) Jerram had been somewhat at a loss as to how he was to carry out his orders, but hearing gunfire on the port bow, he turned his division towards it, and at 8.21 was heading W.S.W. The firing came from Rear-Adml. Napier's 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, which was engaging the 4th Scouting Group at the head of the High Seas Fleet. After a sharp conflict the enemy turned away and disappeared. Meanwhile, Beatty, who was also steering west, had again sighted the German battle cruisers and beyond them the pre-Dreadnought battleships steering south. He thereupon turned in succession to W.S.W. and opened fire. An attempt by hostile destroyers to attack the British battle cruisers was frustrated by Le Mesurier's Light Cruiser Squadron. Beatty held on his course and was beginning to inflict severe punishment on the sorely stricken enemy battle cruisers; but they could stand no more, and, running out of action to the west ward, sought cover behind the old ships of Admiral Mauve's 2nd Battle Squadron.
Meanwhile Jellicoe had good reason to be satisfied with the situation. His battle cruisers had made contact, he was between the German fleet and its own coast, and he seemed on the point of renewing the engagement. At 8.28 he turned by divisions to southwest and stood down on a converging course expecting momentarily to meet his adversary. But Scheer foresaw the impending collision, indeed his headmost ships were already in the track of the on-coming storm. He had no intention of suffer ing again from its full blast, and by 8.35 he had turned hastily to the westward and disappeared before the British battle fleet came in sight. So the firing died away; and now the mists of night rolled down between the rival forces. It was past 9.00 before Jellicoe was fully informed as to the situation; then he received a message from the "Lion" reporting that at 8.4o the enemy's battle cruisers and pre-Dreadnought battleships bore from that ship N. 34° W. 10 to II m. and were steering south west. Beatty at the same time made his position and gave his course also as southwest.
By this time it was an hour after sunset and growing darker every moment. The hazards of a fleet action at night were un thinkable to a wise commander. It only remained for Jellicoe to maintain his position between the enemy and the German coast until he could fight to a finish the next day. He therefore set about making his dispositions for the dark hours.
There were three potential lines of retreat for the High Seas Fleet. (See fig. I.) The northerly one led to Horn Reefs, and thence down the swept channel inshore of the Amrun Bank minefield to the mouth of the Jade ; the second would be reached by a southerly course to a swept channel which led eastward close to Heligoland ; lastly, there was the swept channel which led from the vicinity of the Ems river parallel to the coast to the entrance into the Jade. (See fig. I.)
Jellicoe's Dispositions.—At 9.17 Jellicoe ordered the fleet to take up night cruising stations. This meant that the battle fleet were to close up into three parallel columns with the 5th Battle Squadron, now consisting of three ships only, on the port quar ter. The "Warspite" after her involuntary circle at 6.20 P.M. con tinued to have trouble with her steering gear. At 7.00 she with drew from the action and at 8.5o was ordered back to Rosyth. She had been badly hit in the earlier fighting. Beatty had already anticipated his commander-in-chief's wishes and having taken station ahead and placed the ist and 3rd Light Cruiser Squad rons to the southward and westward of him, assumed the course and speed of the fleet; this was south at 17 knots. Five miles astern of the battle fleet Jellicoe massed his destroyer flotillas. This had the following advantages:— (a) It covered the rear of the fleet from attacks by hostile flotillas.
(b) It increased the chances of intercepting the enemy should he endeavour to make to the eastward, and of obstructing his passage by torpedo attacks.
(c) It kept the Grand Fleet destroyers clear of their own battle ships and therefore minimised the chances of disastrous mistakes in the dark.
The value of these dispositions was to some extent diminished by the difficulty of communicating their purport to command ing officers, especially those of the innumerable destroyers, but, in effect, the British fleet ploughing through the night presented a living wall of steel barring the enemy's passage home.
Scheer's Return.—Scheer also prepared for the night. His 1st Battle Squadron led the line and was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron; then came the older ships of the 2nd Battle Squadron and lastly the three sorely wounded battle cruisers. The "Liitzow" was limping along to the northward sinking deeper and deeper by the bows. At 2 A.M. she had to be abandoned and was afterwards sunk with a torpedo. The light cruisers of the 2nd and 4th Scouting Groups were stationed near the head of the battle fleet, while in advance of all were the majority of the German destroyers groping like antennae into the darkness. About 9.3o Scheer started to feel his way to the eastward, the van of his line turning S.S.E.+E., a course which headed for Horn Reefs. Shortly after 10.0o his advanced light cruisers came into contact with the right wing of the flotillas bringing up the rear of the Grand Fleet. A sharp fight took place in which the "Castor," leading the nth flotilla, was severely handled. The near-by destroyers would probably have retaliated with more effect had they not been deceived by the enemy making part of the British challenge for the day. This he appears to have picked up through indiscreet flashing signalling between the "Lion" and "Princess Royal," about half an hour previously.