Five minutes before this Jellicoe had altered course to south, and now, knowing that he was again in a position of con siderable tactical advantage, he ordered a turn of "3 points to starboard together" to close more rapidly. About this time a number of reports of submarines were being made to the com mander-in-chief. The "Lion" had just reported sighting one, the "King George V.," leading the battle fleet, sent a warning that a submarine was just ahead of the "Iron Duke," then the "Duke of Edinburgh" reported one "2 points from right ahead." It is now known that there were no submarines in the vicinity, but these reports could not well be ignored, so Jellicoe took the best course possible and turned directly towards the supposed ron at the northward end of the line was seen to open fire. The "Marlborough's" gunnery efficiency had not been impaired by her underwater injuries, and she discharged salvo after salvo at the "Konig" as the head of the enemy battle fleet came into sight. The rest of the squadron took up the engagement and soon the leading German ships were smothered in shell at a range of less than 9,00o yards. At 7.13 the "Iron Duke" came menace. Incidentally this brought the course of the fleet back to south and re-formed the divisions into line ahead, the leaders being disposed quarterly. Hardly was the turn completed before the enemy reappeared out of the mist.
Having extricated his fleet from one trap it seems incredible that Scheer should have deliberately walked into another (see fig. 5). In his official despatch he says: "It was as yet too early to assume night cruising order. The enemy could have com pelled us to fight before dark, he could have prevented our ex ercising our initiative, and finally, he could have cut off our return to the German Bight." If ever there was a man who wanted to avoid decisive action it was the man who penned those words, yet in the next paragraph of his despatch he makes the illogical statement : "There was only one way of avoiding this : to deal the enemy a second blow by again advancing re gardless of the consequences, and to bring all the destroyers to attack." The manner in which the High Seas Fleet renewed the action was such that its course was practically at right angles to that of the Grand Fleet, whose battleships were stretched across his bows so that they could concentrate on the leading German ships, while those in rear trailed astern out of action. The evidence goes to show that Scheer hoped to pass astern of the British line and thence make his way to the eastward, possi bly engaging a detached force en route. If he had succeeded, he could then have made for home, fighting a rearguard action.
But Jellicoe had forestalled him. The British Battle Fleet was fair across his path and, in the low visibility prevailing, its commander-in-chief had not risked dividing his forces. First some enemy light cruisers appeared to the southwest of the "Iron Duke." A few minutes later, at 7.12, the ist Battle Squad into action again. Once more the Grand Fleet was in a position of overwhelming tactical advantage and ship after ship joined her fire and picked out a battleship or battle-cruiser target as occasion offered. Meanwhile a small force of enemy destroyers had developed an attack which caused Sturdee to swing his 4th Division away two points to avoid their torpedoes. Directly the attack had expended itself, he turned back to the course of the fleet, approximately south, which brought him into line astern of the 3rd Division led by the "Iron Duke." Jellicoe had been holding steadily on his course across the head of the enemy, but seeing his rear divisions in some danger of segregation he ordered them to form astern of him, while the "King George" was directed to lead the van into line ahead. And now the full fire-effect of the British battleships was rapidly developing, and Scheer saw that his leading ships were in danger of annihilation; another "right-about turn" was imperative. But
the enemy seemed right on top and half round him. Drastic measures were necessary to get clear. The German battle cruisers would have to be sacrificed, if need be, to save the battle fleet. He made a signal to them which, read literally, meant "charge the enemy; ram; ships are to attack without regard to conse quences." At the same time the destroyers, once again, were launched en masse to attack.
The "Latzow" had been completely disabled in the first con tact of the main engagement, and was still ablaze and out of action. Hipper had not yet been able to get on board another battle cruiser, but Capt. Hartog, in the "Derfflinger" with the remaining three, led off gallantly on what the Germans have called a "death ride." To make matters worse, the British battle cruisers which had been working round on the outer arc of the circle, so to speak, were now coming into action again. So the enemy's 1st Scouting Group became the centre of a perfect hurricane of fire. The "Derfflinger" had two turrets shattered to bits and was being hit again and again, the "Seydlitz," "Moltke" and "Von der Tann" were also suffering severely when the welcome signal came permitting them to withdraw. By 7.20 the German Battle Fleet had repeated its former tactics and was retreating pell-mell to the westward behind a dense smoke screen put up by its destroyers. The latter pressed on to attack with more determination this time. There was no other enemy in sight so Jellicoe was free to concentrate his attention on this one. A heavy fire was opened on the oncoming torpedo craft which made them loose their torpedoes at long range. At 7.21 the British commander-in-chief swung his ships away in two quick successive turns of two points each before the torpe does could reach the line. The result was that this attack was completely foiled. A second and third attack were countered by Commodore Le Mesurier's 4th Light Cruiser Squadron which, crossing from its station on the disengaged bow, drove furiously at the enemy. One German destroyer, "5.35," was sunk and several badly damaged. Jellicoe was, for the time being, in com plete ignorance of what his main enemy was doing, but directly the torpedo attack had spent itself he, at 7.35, swung the fleet back five points to starboard and steered S. by W. (See fig. 4.) Beatty had by now worked his way round to the starboard bow of the Battle Fleet and was heading southwest. At 7.40 he signalled to the commander-in-chief to say that the enemy was about io m. N.W. by W. But the "Lion" was quite out of sight from the fleet flagship, and her own position, as she gave it, was obviously wrong. Jellicoe, however, turned southwest, on the same course as his battle cruisers. At 7.45 Beatty again re ported the position of the enemy, this time adding that the latter's course was about southwest. This signal was made to the "Minotaur" by searchlight, passed by her to the "King George V.," who passed it on to the "Iron Duke," where it did not arrive till 7.59. Jellicoe promptly turned the battle fleet west by divisions, and increased to 17 knots to regain touch with the enemy. Hardly had he done so before a wireless message came to hand from Beatty saying: "Submit van of battleships follow battle cruisers. We can then cut off whole of the enemy's battle fleet." The commander-in-chief ordered Admiral Jerram, at the head of the line, to comply with this request, but, owing to the unavoidable delay in cyphering, transmitting and decyphering the message, the "Lion" had by then lost sight of the enemy; moreover, the battle cruisers were not in sight from the "King George V." In point of fact, the battle fleet was already steering straight for the enemy.