Tactics

In his Italian campaigns of 1796-97 we find full use made of line, column and skirmishers. At Lonato and Castiglione, the French work in battalion columns at deploying intervals, the columns being of double companies covered by skirmishers. At Rivoli (q.v.) it is much the same. At the crossing of the Taglia mento (1797) demi-brigades are used, the centre battalion being deployed, and the flanking battalions kept in double company columns with skirmishers in front. Such a formation enabled considerable frontal fire to be delivered without uncovering the flanks to cavalry attack. After 1800 we find a change, the act of distraction passing more and more from the infantry to the artillery. It was not that the French infantry were falling off in value, as has frequently been stated, for probably as late as 1812 they were equal to those of 1796. It was because Napoleon, like Frederick, had begun to realize that artillery is the superior arm. Even at Castiglione and Rivoli he massed the few guns he had. When guns are allotted to divisions as they were to Augereau's corps at Eylau and to Ney's at Friedland the infantry are repulsed. But after Aspern (q.v.) in 1809 Napoleon fully grasped Frederick's system, and increased his guns from two to three to each i,000 infantry. He also created a central artillery reserve of 126 guns, and allotted a reserve artillery to each corps d'armee. From Wagram (1809) onwards "it is the number of pieces rather than that of battalions which henceforth serves as the measure of the relative strength of armies." Thus writes Napoleon : "The better the infantry, the more one must husband it and support it with good batteries. . . . The invention of powder has changed the nature of war : missile weapons are now become the principal ones : it is by fire and not by shock that battles are decided to-day.

• • • The power of infantry lies in its fire. In siege warfare, as in the open field, it is the gun which plays the chief part ; it has effected a complete revolution. It is with artillery that war is made." Curious ac it may seem, it was Napoleon's lack of appre ciation of the value of the howitzer which caused him heavy casualties at the battle of Borodino (q.v.) in 1812, and decisive defeat at that of Waterloo (q.v.) in 1815.

Wellington.

In Napoleon's early campaigns we find the active defence playing an important part, for example at Rivoli and Arcola (1796), but once the emperor became the man of destiny, the reincarnation of Alexander, of necessity the offensive replaced this more cautious system of waging war. Yet fate must have it otherwise, for once he had decided that the gun was the decisive weapon, as he did of ter Aspern, he was immediately con fronted by a general—Wellington—who made the active defence the backbone of his tactics. The method adopted by the Iron Duke and his generals was simplicity itself, and it invariably succeeded. It consisted in selecting a good covered position behind which the main force of infantry was deployed, and in front of which was extended a line of skirmishers trained on the system taught by Sir John Moore at his camp at Shorncliffe in 1803– 18o5. The French advanced in columns, company behind com pany, covered by skirmishers, and were met by musket, rifle and artillery fire, and severely mauled. When they neared their objective, the English rose from behind their cover, fired a volley, rushed forward lapping round the columns, and charging them in front and both flanks. The battle of Busaco in 1810

is probably the most perfect example of these tactics. At Al buera (q.v.) in 1811 the English attacked a mass of columns on a hill with the same result. Again were these tactics repeated with decisive effect at Salamanca (q.v.) in 1812 and finally at Waterloo.

The amazing thing was that Napoleon never seems to have grasped how easily they could be defeated. Frederick had been equally ignorant of the solution at the opening of the Seven Years' War, but once the Austrians began to use ground as cover against fire, he at once increased the number of his howitzers, and literally blew them out of their positions. Had Napoleon realized the power of the howitzer, and had the third of his artillery been howitzers, there is little doubt that at Waterloo he would have been able to demoralize the main force of Wellington's army who were sheltered from his cannon balls and grape shot, and so have paved the way for the advance of his squadrons and infantry columns. It is one of those enigmas of tactics that with all his genius he could not see this very simple solution as old as the battle of Hastings (q.v.) and beyond.

The Influence of the Rifle.

The 5o years which followed the battle of Waterloo are tactically most instructive. Over 20 years of devastating war, of battles, sieges and naval actions, of attacks and retreats, and manoeuvres taught the armies of Europe noth ing, and from the military point of view Napoleon might as well have never been born. No sooner had the emperor been incarcer ated in St. Helena than the rigid school of war, the men of the hoplite mind, took over control. Nevertheless in spite of their ponderous ideas the industrial revolution swept on. Invention followed invention, and amongst these were two of supreme tacti cal importance, namely, the percussion cap invented in 1814, and the cylindro-conoidal bullet invented in 1824.

The rifle had been long known, but hitherto all rifles and mus kets had been fired by a flint and steel, and in rainy weather frequently misfired. The percussion cap signed the death warrant of the cavalry charge, and the conoidal bullet revolutionized artillery tactics. In 1839 a percussion musket was issued to the British infantry, and in 1851 they were equipped with the Minie rifle, a weapon with an effective range of i,000 yards. In 1815 cavalry, artillery and infantry were in close contact, and operated by the general in chief as easily as a platoon is to-day. The guns were frequently placed in front of the infantry, 'and the cavalry close behind them. All this was changed by the rifle. The cavalry can no longer attack infantry, unless completely broken. The guns have to retire well in rear of the infantry, and as the range of the rifle is increased so is the distance between them and the infantry they are supporting. Thus the old battle order, which in idea had changed but slightly since the days of Gustavus Adol phus, was completely thrown out of joint. To operate an army as Wellington did at Waterloo was impossible; to render its sepa rated parts co-operative demanded intelligence and not merely a powerful voice. The Prussians seeing the difficulty attempted to overcome it by replacing the general by an army fashioned like a clock, which once wound up was expected to tick out victory.