The Russo-Japanese War (q.v.) did more than confirm the lessons of the South African War, for it demonstrated clearly the uselessness of the frontal attack, the power of the rifle and machine gun on the defensive, and that, as Napoleon had said 1 oo years earlier, "it is with artil lery that war is made." In broken ground the Japanese made use of moderately thick skirmishing lines, but in open country they had the wisdom to thin them out to from five to ten paces between men, the men being rushed forward in twenties 20 to 3o paces at the time. The Russian fire tactics were execrable, nevertheless the Japanese assault general:y failed, and to avoid casualties night operations became prevalent.
This war is remarkable in that to-day we can see in it a small edition of the World War of ten years later. The machine gun when efficiently handled by trained men, which was not the case in the South African War, added enormously to the defence. The artillery was driven further and further back by the' bullet, until the gunners were compelled to seek cover by ground and cease firing over their sights. Trenches appeared everywhere, not a single battlefield remained untrenched. Whenever it was possible these trenches were protected by wire entanglements. Frontal attacks, save as fixing operations, were altogether out of the ques tion, and at each great battle, and notably so at the Yalu (1904), Liao-Yang (1904) and Mukden (19o5), it was a Japanese threat of envelopment carried out by infantry and artillery, since cav alry had lost all offensive power, which compelled the Russians to retire.
The main lesson, however, was one which had been steadily ma turing since Frederick massed his guns at Leuthen : it was the ever growing power of artillery. Maj. J. M. Home of the British army, and attached to the Russian army, saw this clearly, and in one of his official reports may be read the following :—"The great impres sion made on my mind by all I saw is that artillery is now the decisive arm and that all other arms are auxiliary to it. The im portance of artillery cannot be too strongly insisted upon, for, other things being equal, the side which has the best artillery will always win. . . . So strongly am I convinced of the immense importance of artillery that it seems almost a question for delib erate consideration whether artillery should not be largely in creased even at the expense of the other arms. . . . With the extraordinary development of artillery it begins to appear as though infantry fire action cannot usefully be employed at ranges beyond 600yd., as beyond that distance the hostile guns ought to be able to prevent infantry from using their rifles." The battles of the Balkan War of
in no way contradicted this statement. The war in Manchuria was brought to an end in 1905 not through tactical or strategical action, but by revolution and attrition. Both
sides were virtually worn out, and Russia was threatened by rebellion and disaster.
The lessons of the wars in South Africa and Manchuria were entirely lost on the general staffs of European armies. The enormous power of modern weapons on the defensive was completely overlooked. A new school, the Moral School of War, rose in the ascendent. In France Col. de Grandmaison was its high prophet his theory of war was simplicity itself. It was : "A man seized by the throat and who is occupied in guarding himself cannot attack you in flank or in rear." Therefore rush on the enemy with all forces united and overwhelm him, or in his own words "Frapper fort, frapper tous ensemble." The French "Conduite des Grandes Unites" of 1913 was based on this doctrine. It was pointed out that all past French disasters had been due to the defensive! That after the South African War the theory of the inviolability of fronts had been propounded, and had been given the lie direct in the Russo-Jap anese War ! That all could be overthrown by the offensive; that the enemy's position must be taken with the bayonet, and that when once the battle is launched it must be pushed forward regardless of cost to the last man! The doctrine laid down in the German training manuals is identical. Cavalry must be used in mass: "No squadron should wait till it is attacked; it should always attack first." "Artillery should enter into action almost like one blow, in masses." "The infantry of the main body should simultaneously make a united attack." And again: "The infantry should cultivate its natural propensity for the offensive. All its actions must be dominated by this one thought : Forward, upon the enemy cost what it may." Such was the frenzy which smote French and German tactics like a pestilence. The art of war was to be replaced by a dog-fight, each side was to fly at its antagonist's throat and shake him to pieces. The whole process was so irrational as to be mad. Two years before the South African War, and 18 years before the World War, M. Bloch, a Polish banker, had seen this clearly. He said that the future of war would not be fighting but famine, "not the slaying of men but the bankruptcy of nations. . . . Every body will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a great war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to a soldier as his rifle. . . . All wars will of necessity partake of the char acter of siege operations. . . . Your soldiers may fight as they please ; the ultimate decision is in the hands of famine." Had the general staffs of European armies been as clear-sighted as M. Bloch, there would have been' no question as to the nature of the tactics of the next war.