Tactics

In the American Civil War (q.v.) (1861-65) the most promi nent tactical lessons were the power of the rifle on the defence, and the ever increasing use of entrenchments to enhance this power. The gun now became definitely the backbone of the de fence, and as the Americans still possessed many smooth-bore guns the discharge of case-shot on the attackers was frequently devastating. Nevertheless the defence was devoid of strategical results, and lack of strategy on the part of the Southern Armies ended the war.

In 1870 the Prussians possessed the superior gun and the French the superior rifle. The French having watched the failure of the Austrian offensives in 1866 determined to base their tactics on the defensive. Moltke, who was a believer in defensive tactics, was thus compelled to assume the offensive. At Spicheren (Aug. 6, 1870) the Prussian tactics were methodical since reinforce ments came forward gradually. At Gravelotte (q.v.) (Aug. 18) the battle was one of manoeuvre prepared by an overwhelming artillery fire. Sedan (q.v.) (Sept. I) was essentially an artillery battle, and the result of a finely executed strategical manoeuvre. In all the battles of this war, whenever the infantry fought in suc cessive efforts, and were predominantly employed, the result was "the complete dissolution of the body of troops engaged, divi sions as well as corps, and extraordinary losses." Breech-loader met breech-loader, and unless the attacker could by artillery fire adequately break down the defender, the attack was repulsed un less it was delivered against a flank.

To all who possessed the slightest tactical perception it was apparent that the leading lesson of this war was that artillery had definitely become the stable element in the fight. Other lessons were : That in certain circumstances the defender can be so com pletely broken by gun fire that the infantry attack can be dis pensed with ; that infantry armed with the breech-loading rifle need pay no longer any attention to cavalry; that, to initiate an attack, all the artillery must be brought into line as soon as possi ble, and must not only crush the enemy's artillery but prepare the infantry advance by a lengthy bombardment. Yet, in spite of this, as the war showed, fronts had become inviolable, for, throughout the war, neither the French nor the Germans succeeded in taking a single position by a frontal attack. The infantry breech-loading

phalanx was unbreakable, and cavalry though they could turn it were incapable of attacking it in flank or rear.

Tactical Theories, 1875-1900.

In 1870-71 the French lost battle after battle, yet they came out of the war as oblivious to its lessons as did Frederick's mule after its tenth campaign. From 1875 to 1900 the French regulations maintain the complex system of firing line, supports, local reserves and reserves in echelon. The infantry regulations do not even mention artillery, which is sup posed to have completed its task by the time the infantry at tack is launched. The power of fire was recognized, and in order to develop it to the full, about 1895, whole battalions were moved forward in single rank without intervals between the men, and were called "skirmishing lines." Behind these walls of rifle fire "decisive attacks," whatever these might mean, were to be launched forward by brigades and divisions in mass. In an of ficial report written in 1875 we read : "Troops massed in column, or in line in close order, can no longer manoeuvre, fight or even remain in position under fire." Twenty years later this lesson having been forgotten, the regulations extol dense formation, not for marching and manoeuvring only, but for the attack itself.

"Troupes de choc," "Masse de manoeuvre" and such like meta physical terms were invented. It was considered that well-led troops must overcome all obstacles. A veritable spell fell not only upon the army of France but on all the armies of Europe.

The South African War, 1899-1902.

The South African War did little to dispel this hallucination. Artillery action was negligible, and infantry formations, which at first were dense, were thinned out into a line of men at from ten to 5o paces be tween individuals. To command such a line was impossible. To those who could read tactics aright the outstanding lesson was the power of the rifle on the defensive. At Modder River (1899) the British had 3,00o men on a front of 7,000yd., at Colenso in the same year 4,500 on a front of 13,000yd., and at Magersfontein (1899) 5,000 on a similar frontage. These fronts could not be pierced. Again, as had been learnt in 1870, frontal attacks even against weakly held positions were no longer possible. The war ended through the gradual attrition of the Boers.