Thus far the artillery cycle had proved a grotesque failure, the reasons being that grand tactics were at fault. In all these battles the cen tral idea was to use artillery to blow a hole through the enemy's defences in order to facilitate the advance of the infantry, who were in their turn to facilitate the advance of the cavalry. It was this conception of tactical action and not the gun which was to blame, since if such penetration were effected, this in itself would not render infantry and cavalry invulnerable to the bullet, and the bullet was the father of the trench. The problem was not to advance infantry and cavalry, but to advance the guns, and this demanded that their crews and teams should be rendered bullet proof. The problem was to produce a mobile self-protective gun. Once produced it could advance and blow the enemy back, and behind it the infantry could follow to occupy ground, and the cavalry to collect prisoners. In brief, as the artillery barrage had replaced the old infantry firing line, the problem now was how to replace this barrage by a moving line of guns and howitzers. This problem was solved by the tank which definitely established the artillery cycle.
The armies which fought in 1918 were very different from the armies which entered the war in 1914. Cavalry and infantry had steadily dwindled in importance, and artillery had rapidly come to the fore; nevertheless so con servative is the spirit of the soldier that in 1919, in spite of vastly increased machine gun power, all armies as quickly as possible re verted to the 1914 model. Lethal and non-lethal chemicals were prohibited, tanks, guns and aircraft were reduced in numbers on wholesale lines, and infantry, who were impotent during the war, were once again proclaimed the predominant arm. In the British Field Service Regulations of 1924 it was stated : "Infantry is the arm which in the end wins battles. . . . The rifle and the bayonet are the infantryman's chief weapons. The battle can be won in the last resort only by means of these weapons." Tactically the war had been fought in vain ; nevertheless in spite of the war, and in spite of the conservatism of soldiers, science and industry will win through. The artillery cycle has come to stay for its period, and there can be no possible doubt that armies will be mechanized.
As this is so, the question arises : Can past tactics assist the tacticians of to-day to predict the tactics and army organization of to-morrow? A brief sum mary of what happened during the last 1,500 years will show that this question can be answered in the affirmative. In the cavalry
cycle war as an art virtually disappears because mobility is founded on no stable base. There is no possibility of holding an enemy, consequently movements are chaotic, and it is only when the infantry cycle is well advanced that cavalry tactics once again become an art, movements being replaced by manoeuvres. No sooner has this high order of tactics been established, than the in creased power of the musket reduces the power of cavalry, and as cavalry loses power to manoeuvre, infantry becomes paralytic. In fantry can hold infantry, but they have no stable base to man oeuvre from. To make good this deficiency artillery is established as the base of action, and infantry tactics assume a high order. Manoeuvre is again established, but as infantry can move but slowly tactical manoeuvre is largely replaced by strategical man oeuvre, which under Napoleon assumes its highest form. Artillery now becomes so powerful, that infantry, following in the foot steps of cavalry, can no longer develop movement from their artillery base. Artillery then becomes the predominant arm, and as guns cannot move in face of infantry fire, and as infantry can no longer manoeuvre under gun fire, in 1915 the result is static warfare. To reinstate manoeuvre, that is to develop offensive mobility from a protective stable base, the tank, or mobile ar moured gun, is introduced. The base of action of the tank is the static gun. In fact the tank bears the same tactical relationship to the horse-drawn gun as the cavalry once did to the infantry.
To-day this inherent defect which characterized the classical artillery cycle can be overcome once it is realized that it is now possible to make a radical change in the element of movement. Hitherto it has been muscular (human or animal) ; to-day, based as it is on petrol and oil power, it can be made mechanical. Con sequently two great categories of artillery can be established, namely, mobile offensive and mobile protective artillery; the second forming the base of action of the first, the second holding and the first hitting the enemy. Thus true manoeuvre is once again rendered possible.
This change in the element of movement will strongly influence the eiement of protection. Since the initiation of the infantry cycle, protection has in nature been mainly indirect, but in the last war, the full advent of the artillery cycle, it became direct, and, as happened in the classical artillery cycle, it took the form of entrenchments, the symbol and soul of the passive defence.