Tactics

The English maintained their fox-hunting generals, and the French, contemptuous of others, since they had produced one of the greatest geniuses in history, shrouded their ignorance in the glamour of his fame.

Tactics from 1849 to 1870.

The middle of the century ushered in a series of wars which lasted for 20 years. During this long period tactics underwent a profound change; the gun again and again asserted its superiority, yet the leaders of armies still maintained the supremacy of infantry. They could not see that as each campaign ended infantry had become more and more a supplement to artillery action. The battle of Temesvar, in 1849, was but a repetition of Ocalia in 1809, for artillery not only accomplished the act of demoralization,' but brought both of these battles to a decisive issue. The war in the Crimea was largely an artillery war, mainly so on account of Sevastopol. True, the French massed their artillery as Napoleon had done, but between the British and the Russians the old and somewhat stale contest of line versus column was once again f ought out, because the Russians still believed in shock by weight of num bers, which never takes place, and the British in deployment in order to develop fire power which seems obvious, but which apparently is not so to a semi-oriental, since the Russians repeated their tactics in 1878.

In 1859 rifled guns were issued to the French army, and this same year Napoleon III., emulating his uncle, decided on a war against Austria in Italy. The Austrian infantry were the better armed, as the Lorenz muzzle-loader was superior to the French Minie rifle. To compensate for their inferior rifle the French made extensive use of skirmishers, the Austrians normally remain ing stationary. The broken nature of the ground favoured these tactics, as happened at Solferino (q.v.) in 1859. When Marshal Niel's firing line began to waver he brought up his reserves, and "the bayonet," as he writes in his report, apparently to please the emperor, "recovered everything that had been lost by the fire-fighting." His enemy, the Austrians, however, showed no in itiative. They believed in the methodical battle as recommended by the Germans, that is, a gradual nourishing of the fighting-line until the enemy's strength is used up; only then would they at tack him with their last reserves. What actually happened was

that the nourishing of their firing line starved their reserves to death, so that when the decision was signalled the reserves had volatilized. The French learnt little from this war, and never troubled to reflect on the causes of their successes. The Austrians, however, learnt "that the employment of artillery en masse, when it is to take general part in the action, must be made from the very beginning, and the infantry attack must really be the one to bring about the decision." In 1859 the Austrian tactics were of a defensive nature, in 1866 they were diametrically opposite, that is they were offensive, and with these tactics they decisively defeated the Italians under La Marmora, at Custozza (q.v.) in 1866, though it should be re membered that their enemy had lost all power of taking the initiative. In Bohemia it was otherwise, for the solid masses of Austrians who, almost unprotected by skirmishers, attempted to rush the Prussians armed with the needle gun, were decimated. In the Prussian army, however, the employment of the arms in co-operation had been neglected. Their general staff had studied the French infantry tactics of 1859, but their artillery tactics had been overlooked. They considered that the bulk of the guns should be held ih reserve for the final act of disruption, and that distraction could best be attained by a methodical infantry fight. One-third of the guns were to support the attack, one-third to reinforce it, and the remaining third to be held back in reserve. Thus was the battle of Trautenau fought on June 27, 1866, and that of Nachod, on the same day, was fought almost entirely without artillery. At Skalitz, the next day, it was much the same. After this battle the Prussians suddenly woke up to the value of artillery, and at Koniggratz (q.v.) the methodical attack was replaced by the manoeuvre battle, and artillery in place of being held in reserve for some problematical decision was brought forward, as was notably the case in the II. Army.