The desire of knowledge is generated in the progress of society, but we do nut desire it till we find that we cannot do without it, and the majority of mankind are satisfied with a very moderat-. portion. When the sa vage has knowledge sufficient to manage his weapons, or to match his enemy in stratagem, he feels no violent orexis impelling him to farther acquisitions. We do not, therefore, regard the desire of knowledge as an in stinctive pt inciple : we consider it rather as a rational desire, recommended by its perceived utility ; for though a certain degree of knowledge is necessary in every stage of society, and is, in fact, unavoidably acquired by our intercourse with material objects, and by the results of experience, yet the desire of knowledge, for the sake of knowledge, operates only in an advanced state of hu man improvement.
That the desire of power is a natural and universal principle of our constitution cannot be denied ; never theless, we conceive it to be unphilosophical to consider it as original and ultimate. It is quite evident that man feels himself in want of many things ; and nothing can be so welcome to him as the means of procuring them. On this is founded the desire of power, the only object of which is to supply the wants and desires of our na ture. This desire of power, then, as it has been called, is nothing inure than a desire to have the means of pro curing the enjoyments which we think necessary for happiness; and hence it is manifested in a great variety of ways, according to the views which men have formed of enjoyment. if knowledge appears the most likely means of advancing our character, or of securing any desired pleasure, we eagerly seek knowledge. In this case, those who have never heard of the name of Bacon act under the influence of his maxim, that knowledge is power. If sensual indulgence be the prominent desire, the means of gratification are sought with no less keen ness ; and hence the desire of riches is geneeated, as these seem to be the most convertible means for procur ing varied enjoyments.
But, in the progress of mental improvement, some may perceive that a man's happiness consists as much in the limitation of his desires as in the extent of his gratifications; hence, they seek their security in self control and in the government of their passions, adopt ing as a maxim, Von desiderare jucundius est quam frui. These persons, as Cicero observes, are animated by the same principles which impel to the most arduous en terprise of ambition, the object of both being .Vc qua re egerent.
Such principles as these, however, can only nperate in a considerably advanced state of mental refinement. In the first instance, the appetites are clamorous, and it is the first desire of every man to gratify them in the way which they seem to point out. This gives rise to
a thousand varied exertions, and to numberless experi ments and disappointments, wnich often produce much misery both to the individual and to society. But the result, upon the whole, is salutary ; the stock of know ledge is increased, the moral discipline of the species is promoted, and a wise man will recognise an overruling Providence, when he sees the general order of the world maintained inviolate, amidst the confusion of human passions.
If any one of our desires could be entitled to rank as an ultimate principle in our nature, we should think the desire of esteem, or of being loved, might claim that dis tinction. It operates powerfully and universally, and vet it is easy to see how it is generated in the infant mind by the caresses of the parent and the advantages which accompany them. The child perceives that his happi ness depends on the good will of his parents, and there fore it is impossible for him not to desire it. The feel ing expands with advancing years, and, as we are formed to be dependent on each other's exertions. we perceive that we cannot be independent of each other's esteem. Let it nut, however, be supposed, that we consider the desire of esteem as factitious or accidental. We admit it to he a natural, universal principle of our constitu tion, as much so, indeed, as the ideas of right and wrong, virtue and vice, which, though not innate or instinctive, are nevertheless forced upon us by the condition of our nature, and by the circumstances in which we are placed.
There are some philosophers who seem to think that we detract from the dignity of human nature, unless we allow to man a set of original instincts and feelings, to tally distinct from those of the lower animals. We, on the contrary, think that it is most for the honour of man to make him almost wholly a rational being ; for, in propor tion as he is guided by instinct, he is a necessary agent ; it is only as a rational being, capable of weighing motives, that he can be the subject of moral discipline, or respon sible for his actiens. Others, again, think it derogatory to the honour of the Creator, to allow any influence to man in the fabrication of his fortune, or the formation of his character. All that we contend for is, that though God has established immutable laws, which no effort of man can alter, yet we are permitted to resist them so far as to create a temporary confusion, or local derange ment, or even to ruin our own happiness, whilst yet the general order of things remains perfectly unaffected by our madness.