Besides our appetites, which are necessary for the preservation of life, and the continuation of the species, and the various desires which take thvir rise from them, or from the bodily senses; we are co....cious of other feelings, which have been called affections, and which are supposed to be distinguished from the appetites and desires by this circumstance, that our fellow-creatures are always the objects of them. They are called bene volent or malevolent affections, according as we feel a desire to promote or obstruct the happiness of others.
As there are certain objects which offend or gratify the external senses, so there are certain exhibitions of conduct and feelings peculiarly offensive to our moral perceptions, and which produce a sensation of dislike or abhorrence infinitely stronger than can arise from any affection of the senses. We believe this to be the origin of the malevolent affections, although this moral dislike and aversion does not absolutely amount to malevolence, as it is possible to feel such dislike, without hostility to the person who excites it. It is seldom, however, that this is the case ; and the dislike which we feel towards moral agents most commonly produces in our minds hatred, and the whole train of malevolent affections.
Perhaps none of our natural feelings are directly ma levolent. Anger is undoubtedly the original feeling, on which malevolence may be very easily engrafted ; but this is not a necessary consequence, otherwise the injunc tion, Be angry and sM not, could never proceed from the religion of peace. Envy, jealousy, and revenge, are di rectly malevolent ; but they are superinduced qualities, originating in the perversion or abuse of innocent or in different natural feelings. Butler, in his first Sermon on Human Nature, observes, that " as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so neither is there any such thing as illwill in one man towards another, emulation and resent ment being away ; whereas, there is plainly benevolence, or good-will : there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude ; but only eager de sires after such and such external goods, which, accord ing to a very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy and as effectual to their end."
We do not mean to vindicate human nature from the charge of malevolence ; that such a quality exists, is proved by fatal experience; and we presume it will not be difficult to show, that it rises necessarily out of the circumstances of human nature.
Though natural objects may excite our disgust, yet we never view them with malevolent feelings. We do not consider them as objects of blame, because we know that they are not answerable for the offensive qualities which they possess. There is no volition in the injury which they inflict, and there is no malus animus towards the sufferer : it is this which constitutes the essence of an offence, and where this is wanting, however much we may be inaured, reason says that we ought not to be of fended. We view the hostility of a tiger with nearly the same feelings; we consider his rage as indiscriminate ; and though we fly from him with terror, yet we do not view him with malevolence. If a dog, however, or other animal, should single out an individual, and, direct all its fury against hint, whilst it is courteous to every other person, that individual could not avoid feelings of irrita tion, hatred, and malevolence: he would regard the ani mal as a personal enemy, and would rejoice in its de struction.
This is nearly the form which malevolence assumes when directed towards a human being; and, from the circumstances and constitution of our nature, we be lieve it to be impossible to avoid every degree of this feeling. It is impossible not to dislike those who have injured us without provocation. But this feeling of dislike does not amount to a moral offence. We may even go farther than this without offence to good mo rals ; for when we sec a person anxiously seeking op portunities of hurting us, and employing his power, wealth, and influence, to accomplish our ruin, we con ceive that we may rejoice without blame, when his power, wealth, influence, and every means of annoy ance which he employed against us, are destroyed. We cannot but feel ill-affected towards such a person ; yet we are not guilty o1 malevolence, considered in the light of a moral offence, unless we feel a rancor ous and excessive desire for the destruction of our enemy.