Our dislike or objects naturally offensive or danger ous never amounts to hatred : we only seek to avoid them ; and, therefore, carefully shun the situations where they arc likely to be found. But when we have enemrs in human shape, and in human society, this can,.ut ate done ; we can only fortify ourselves against their arts by counteraction ; and we are compelled to seek our own security by exposing the malignity, hy pocrisy, and worthlessness of our enemies. This has all the appearance of malevolence ; and, in general, it soon actually becomes so : for as love begets love, so there are few minds in which hatred does not produce hatred, and offence the desire of revenge.
It has often been observed, that the malevolent pas sions are always accompanied with painful feelings to those who indulge them. This has been considered as a wise arrangement of Providence, to impose a restraint on qualities so obviously injurious to the peace and happiness of society. The argument is not weakened by showing that melevolence must necessarily be ac companied with pain, if the account which we have given of its origin be correct : for it evidently origi nates in fear or in dislike ; and whilst these qualities are present to the mind, it would be as impossible to feel comfortable, as it would be to remain perfectly undisturbed in the presence of a wild beast which we fear, or in the midst of noxious and offensive objects, which our souls abhor.
Whilst, then, we admit that there is a vast deal of malevolence in the world, yet we think that it is not so much a native principle, as the corruption and abuse of feelings naturally indifferent, and capable of being applied to very different ends. At the same time, we do not imagine that there is the slightest chance that this perversion can be avoided. We have the highest authority for stating that offences must come : they ere often unintentional on the part of the offender ; they may arise from his ignorance of our feelings, our cha racters, or our circumstances. We, on our pats, are per haps equally ignorant of his feelings 'and intentions : we are, therefore, always apt to confound injury with injus tice, and to ascribe the evils which we suffer to bad ino: tines, on the part of him who is the cause of them; and we believe it to be impossible, in the ordinary circumstances of human nature, not to feel ill-affected towards those who have caused us pain and suffering. Opposite feel
ings may indeed be implanted, and high Chastain prin ciples may teach a man to love his enemies, and to do good to them that hate him. But the or"inary feeling of human nature is, to hate them who hate us, —Vindicta bonum vita jueundis ispa.
The heathen moralists were not agreed on this sub ject. Some of them considered revenge not only as al lowable, but praiseworthy. Of this number are Aristo tle and Cicero. The former says, that it is the property of a slave to put up with an injury. (Ad Nicom. iv. II.) And Cicero glories in cherishing the feeling of revenge. Odi honzinczn et odero, utinam ukisci possem. (Ad Att.) Some of the ancient moralists, on the other hand, point edly condemned revenge. (See the authorities collect ed by Grotius, De \relit. 1. iv. c. 12.) It is sufficiently evident, however, that they were not possessed of any principle of sufficient efficacy to enforce the doctrine of forgiveness. Juvenal declaims eloquently against revenge ; but his argument is rather satirical than so lid : it is because revenge is chiefly the passion of a Though we have expressed a doubt whether any of our natural feelings be, in the first instance, decidedly malevolent; yet we have pointed out a fertile source from which malevolent affections may, and in the or dinary circumstances of our nature, must proceed. For the purposes of partenetical exhortation, it may be most useful to take the passions in their matured state, and, without attempting to trace their origin, to point out their consequences. But as our object is analysis, rather than moral suasion, we have all along deemed it necessary to mount as far as possible to first prin ciples, and to show the steps through which the feelings pass, till they reach their decided character of virtuous or vicious habits or affections. It is the same thing as to the practical result, whether malevolence be con sidered as an original feeling, or as resulting necessa rily from the circumstances in which we are placed : but it is not the same thing as to arrangement ; that being always the best which approaches nearest to ele mentary principles, as it enables us to trace more com pletely the progress of the vicious affections, and to de tect the circumstances which have nourished and matu red them.