It is here, then, that our moral character commences, for we now recognise our obligations to obey the laws of the supreme Lawgiver, and perceive it to be our para mount duty to seek to know his nature and his will. In this investigation we must soon discover, that he is to tally free from the solicitations or sense and appetite, that his goodness flows unconstrained, and untainted by selfish feelings, to every thing that lives. We see it to be our duty to imitate him, and perceive the resem blance to be more complete, in proportion as we emanci pate our minds from sensual gratifications, and raise them to the contemplation and love of that excellence which is inherent in the nature of' the God whom we worship. It is then that we perceive a pure and ade quate motive for the practice of the sublimest virtues, for we see that they are necessary to constitute our re semblance to the Parent of the universe, without which we cannot expect to be the objects of his love.
It is true, indeed, that men are trained to the duties of moral agents by the laws and institutions of the country in which they live. But these can only produce external conformity ; the principle of obedience is founded in a recognition of the wisdom of the divine law, and in an admiration of the excellence of the divine nature. When the laws of men correspond with what we see so conspi cuously displayed in the arrangements of Providence, they have the force of a divine sanction ; when they have a contrary tendency, we pronounce them to be injudi cious and oppressive, though fear may enforce a reluc tant submission.
Human laws, then, borrow their influence, and derive their sanction from their conformity to the visible ar rangements of heaven, and without connecting them with these as their foundation, they never can train the mind to moral feelings, nor inspire a love of the nul chrum ct honestum, abstracted from temporal advantages. The conscience, indeed, may acquire a sort of artificial influence, from circumstances of education and early associations. But it is then little better than a prejudice, useful, no doubt, to the general interests of society, but not yet exalted to the dignity of a moral principle.
A well-informed conscience is unquestionably the best safeguard to virtue ; a conscience under the influence of superstition or ignorant prejudice, is the most powerful instrument of mischief; a timid or a ticklish conscience will render the life miserable, and the conduct vacillating and uncertain. Thus, though conscience pronounces de cisively on the subjects which come under its cognizance, yet another principle is necessary to determine whether its decisions be correct. On this account we have con
sidered it, (see CONSCIENCE) only as a particular mo dification of the principle of moral approbation or disap probation, directed solely to the examination of our own feelings and conduct, and increasing in an astonishing de gree our happiness or misery, according as it leads us to approve or condemn our own actions. When its inti mations coincide with that amour firopre, which is na tural to every human being, it enhances our happiness in the highest possible degree, as we then feel as if we had some good grounds for that self-partiality which we are so much inclined to indulge. But when, on the other hand, it pronounces our condemnation, it sinks us in our own esteem, and thus infuses a feeling of misery, such as all the opposition and reproaches of the world will not produce, whilst we stand well with our own con sciences.
The principle of conscience, then, we conceive, de rives its influence, not from being possessed of any in dependent, autocratical power, but from a conviction that we are continually in the presence of God, and must be accountable to him for our actions. This is unques tionably the ultimate and only safe foundation of its ope rations : and, therefore, we conceive it to be legitimate reasoning to infer the being of a God from the opera tions of conscience, as we do not see any rational grounds for them apart from this consideration. The ancient moralists, indeed, like many among the moderns, held conscience to be an ultimate, and not an inferential prin ciple, and have given us most beautiful illustrations of its power over the mind of man. There is not, perhaps, to be found in any language a more powerful description of its effects, than occurs in the thirteenth satire of Ju venal : yet he never once alludes either to the belief of a God, or of a future state, as lending to conscience its chief sanction and authority. This is quite consistent with the 1, iew which he took of the independent power of conscience : and we have no doubt that it does fre quently operate most powerfully, without referring im mediately to such considerations : But we have as little doubt, that when its operations come to be analysed, the terrors and strong emotions which it produces will ap pear to be only superstitious bugbears and idle preju dices, if we separate it frotn the belief of a God, and a state of retribution.