Mr. Stewart distinguishes between the appetites and desires, by saying that the latter are not occasional like the appetites, nor do they, like them, take their rise from the body. Our desires arc, no doubt, some de grees removed from the grosser elements of appetite, but no small number of them originates in the ordinary appetites of our nature, and there, too, with the bulk of mankind, they terminate. Others of them originate in our bodily senses, and have for their object the gra tification of feelings immediately connected with these senses.
We believe that Mr. Stewart, who seldom errs but on the side of excessive caution, was afraid lest some dan gerous consequences should be deduced, from referring the origin of our desires to the appetites and senses. For, as Locke's Theory of Perception has been adopted by materialists, who maintain, that if all our knowledge be by sensation and reflection, there never can be any thing in the mind but the ideas of sensible objects, so it might be said, that if our desires originate in the appe tites and senses, the gratification of these must consti tute the ultimate and legitimate object of human enjoy ment. But as Mr. Stewart has qualified Locke's doc trine, by saying, that though certain kinds of knowledge cannot be referred immediately either to sensation or re flection, yet these principles furnish the occasions of ac quiring all our knowledge, so he might have said, that the appetites and senses furnish the occasions of excit ing the various desires which actuate human nature. Not that we would absolutely assent to this doctrine, though it is evident that it must be very generally applicable.
We have already said, that the feeling of want creates the desire of power ; and knowledge, riches, honours, public applause, &c., are only modifications of power, or means of procuring what we desire. We might con ceive the desire of these things, therefore, to originate in the bodily appetites, as these give rise to the pressing wants of our nature. But, besides this, an extensive class of desires has its origin in the gratifications required by the different senses. The eye, the car, the taste, the smell, and, in a smaller degree, the touch, have each their specific gratifications; and, hence, there is room for indefinite, or almost infinite, objects of desire. The ear gives rise to the pleasures of harmony, it enables us to appreciate the pathos of poetry and of eloquence, and all the delights of human converse : the eye gives rise to pal-11:dg, statuary, architecture, cni all the imitative arts.
From the same source are derived our conceptions of grandeur and sublimity in the works of nature, and also those ideas of proportion and relation which give rise to the mathematical sciences. The taste, and the smell, do not give birth to any intellectual ideas, but they sug gest numberless objects of desire, to stimulate the acti vity of rational beings, and thus to put them in the way of acquiring knowledge, when they are only seeking sensual gratification.
But though it is quite evident that a very numerous class of our desires must be referred immediately to the body, as they have for their object the gratification of the appetites or the senses, yet we admit most readily, that what may be called the moral desires of our nature, must have a different origin. The desires connected with the senses, though they lead to the most extensive knowledge, and to the most elegant and wonderful attain ments, yet do not constitute a single element of moral feeling. They may, indeed, be rendered highly subser vient to morals, as means, or instruments; for extended knowledge should make us better acquainted with the laws, and the Lawgiver of the universe. But, in them selves, they are wholly indifferent as to virtue or vice ; they may be converted to either, according as they arc improved or perverted, and a man who is an adept in all the attainments of science, or of art, and nothing more, is yet a stranger to the noblest feelings, and best hopes of our nature.
We are, indeed, firmly persuaded, that nothing but the idea of God, and the conviction of our accounta bleness to him, can raise us above the importunities of appetite and the gratifications of the senses, or teach us to delight in feelings and contemplations, of which, with out this idea and conviction, we never could have form ed a conception. These impressions respecting the go vernment of God, do not originate in the senses, yet they are not foreign to human nature. We have shown else where, that the idea of power originates in our own con scious energies ; (see Lome) after this, one link only is necessary to connect our thoughts with God, and we are compelled to admit his existence, his power, and his go vernment, as soon as we perceive that the power of man could not make or sustain the universe. Our ideas of God, acquired in this way, will, indeed, be very imper fect ; but they exhibit the elements of that more perfect science which revelation has made known.