The security of the individual quarters depends, 1. On posts being well placed on all the roads by which the enemy approach. 2. On the judicious use of patroles towards all points from whence Ult. enemy might approach. 3. On the good disposition of the quarters for defence against every surprise and open at tack. 4. On the discipline of the troops under each commander, and the regular performance of their ditty. The troops, in quarters, however, should never be un necessarily subjected to fatigue.
There is scarcely any operation in war more delicate and difficult, than the distribution of the troops into winter quarters ; it requires a perfect knowledge of the country, and must be regulated by a prodigious variety of circumstances. 1. Regard must be had to the enemy's disposition ; 2. to his general plan of war, and to the particular object he has in view for the en suing campaign; and, 3. to the object you have your self in view for the following campaign. If you pro pose to be on the defensive, the distribution of the troops must be made in such a manner, as to be able to unite in different points, without leaving even a possi bility of their being intercepted in their march to the place of rendezvous; that these points be chosen as near the frontiers as possible, in order to cover the countiy ; and that they be so well chosen, that the enemy can neither force you in them, nor leave you be hind. If you propose being on the offensive, the troops must be so distributed, that, in one march or two, they may form several great corps on the enemy's frontiers, and pass them, so us to separate his quarters, and run no risk of being intercepted before they join, and form one body in the enemy's country. Above all things, cart must be taken that they are not exposed to be in quieted during the winter, which the troops must en joy in peace and safety, as well to refresh themselves, as to form the recruits, Scc.
The following is the manner in which the army is generally distributed in quarters: 1. The troops of the right wing are placed in the villages lying to the right, those of the left wing in the villages to the left, in the same order in which they encamp. 2. The troops of the first line are placed in the more advanced villages, those of the second in the villages lying behind, in pro portion to the extent of ground occupied by the army. 3. The whole of the infantry, however, is placed in the first and second line, and the cavalry in the third ; for the latter has no security in villages. 4. The light troops arc placed in front and on the flanks of the ar my, but, if possible, so as to be in some degree covered against the enterprises of the enemy, in order that they may not be obliged to provide for their security by hard service, otherwise the chief object of the winter quarters, viz. the refreshment of the troops, of which
they have so much need, would be rendered nugatory. They are, therefore, placed in front, but on this side of the defile which covers the army; from whence they may watch over the security of the army by constant patroles, consisting of only a small number of troops. This is called the cordon of the quarters. 5. The light infantry, or detachments of the army, occupy the en trenchments on the bridges, or other passes : but there, likewise, all proper measures must be taken for the maintenance and comfort of the troops.
The petty war which the troops carry on against each other along the cordon, is of little consequence ; for although they endeavour to attack every indivi dual quarter, as soon as they find that the commander has neglected any of the measures of security ; yet such an attack, even if successful, would have little influence, if the quarters were otherwise well disposed; and several attacks could only succeed against useless troops. The therefore, are the only things worthy of attention. 1. Attacks upon a principal post in the quarters ; and, 2. A general attack on the whole quarters. Both enterprises may have a strong influ ence on the attacking army, and therefore should not be wantonly undertaken. In the first case, we must inquire, 1. Whether the object be worth the trouble. For example : Can we compel the enemy to raise his whole quarters, and transfer them ? or can we main tain the place, and does it open to us the way to fur ther enterprises ? or, finally, are we so certain of suc cess, that the hope of making prisoners is sufficient to induce us to undertake it ? 2. Is it probable that we shall succeed ? This probability must result from the bad disposition of the quarters, which enables us to approach them undiscovered ; from the neglect of pro per measures on the part of the commander to prevent a surprise. The situation and circumstances must be such as to afford us the means of a safe retreat. When the attack has been determined upon, the same rules are to be observed as in the case of all other detach ments ; and we may also observe, that it is almost ne cessary to success, that we should get into the rear of the quarters, either with the whole or a part of the detachment ; partly because the attack from thence will be more unexpected by the enemy, and therefore have a greater chance of success; and partly, because we may thus attack him on more than one side, raise his whole quarters, and cut off his retreat.