The third system is in some degree a middle term between the two others. It consists in choosing a field of battle, determined according to its adaptation to stra tegical purposes, and the nature of the ground, in order to await the enemy's attack, and to seize, during the battle itself, the proper moment for assuming an offen sive attitude, and to fall upon our adversary with every chance of success. The combinations of Bonaparte at Rivoli and Austerlitz, those of Wellington at Waterloo, and in the greater part of his defensive battles in Spain, may be classed under this head.
It would be difficult to lay down precise rules for the employment of these two last systems, which are the only ones that can be successfully adopted. We must always have a view to the mural disposition of the troops of each party, to the peculiarities of the na tional character, and to the nature of the ground ; and these circumstances alone may direct the genius of a commander. \Ve shall confine our remarks, therefore, to the three following general observations. I. With experienced troops, and on open ground, the absolute offensive, the initiative of attack, is always the best sys tem. 2. In ground of difficult access, whether by na ture or from other causes, and with well-disciplined troops, it is perhaps better to allow the enemy to arrive in a position which we have previously reconnoitred, in order to take the lead of him when his troops shall have been exhausted by their first efforts.
3. Nevertheless, the strategical situation of both par ties may sometimes require, that we should make a lively attack upon the positions of our adversary, with out regard to local circumstances ; for example, if it were of consequence to prevent the junction of two hostile armies,—to fall upon a detached part of an ar my, or upon a corps isolated on the other side of a river, &c.
IX. The orders of battle, or the most proper disposi tions for conducting troops into action, ought to have for their object to give them, at once, activity and soli dity ; for they ought neither to he too extended nor too crowded. A spare order is weak ; troops crowded into too dense an order are in a great degree paralised, be cause it is only the head that can be brought into ac tion, they are easily thrown into disorder ; and artillery makes dreadful ravages amongst them. It appears to us, that in order to fulfil both conditions, troops re maining on the defensive may be partly deployed, and partly in columns by battalions, like the Russian army at the battle of Eylau ; but the corps drawn up for the attack of a decisive point ought to be composed of two lines of 'hattalions each, instead of deploying, being formed in columns by divisions, in the following man ner :* _ _ _ — — -- - This order presents infinitely more solidity than a de ployed line, whose fluctuations prevent the impulse ne cessary for such an attack, and put it out of the power of the officers to carry on their troops. At the same
time, with a view to facilitate the march, to avoid the too great depth of the mass, and, on the other hand, to increase the front, without at all injuring its consisten cy, it would perhaps be more proper to place the in fantry in two ranks. The battalions would thus be rendered more moveable ; for the march of the second rank, pressed between the first and third, is always fa tiguing, fluctuating, and, consequently, less firm and lively. Besides, they will have all the requisite force, as the three divisions will present six ranks in depth, which is more than sufficient. Finally ; the front en larged to the extent of a third will present more fire, if it should come to firing ; and at the same time that it appeared more formidable to the enemy, by spewing him more men, it would be less exposed to the fire of artillery.
X. In ground of difficult access, such as vineyards, enclosures, gardens, and walled heights, the defensive order of battle ought to be composed of battalions de ployed, and covered by numerous platoons of sharp shooters. But the attacking troop, as well as the re serve, could not be better drawn up than in columns of attack by the centre, as in the preceding observa tion ; for the reserve must be ready to fall upon the enemy at the decisive moment, and attack with force and vivacity, that is to say, in columns.f Nevertheless, this reserve may be left partly deployed until the mo ment of charging, in order that the extent of its front may appear the more formidable to the enemy.
XI. In a defensive battle on open ground, we may sub stitute, for these columns, squares of battalions, by doub ling the lines of the two ranks, so as to form them on a depth of four. Each battalion would thus present a sufficient mass, as it would have only a front of from forty to fifty files.