These ideas of Lloyd, which are contrary to the prin ciples upon which most of his own maxims are esta blished, have been wrought up into a system by Bulow, under the title of eccentric retreats, in opposition to concentric movements. A contrary system, however, is with greater propriety, we think, maintained by Jo mini. We have already observed, that an army inferior in numbers to its antagonist ought always to endea vou• to act in a body ; because it is only by so doing that it can hope to obtain any advantage over the ene my. It cannot be disputed, that an army compelled to retreat is already sufficiently weak, without being be sides divided. All the divisions, indeed, cannot be ruined when thus separated ; but one or two will cer tainly meet with such a fate ; and the most disastrous concentric retreat cannot produce any thing more cala mitous. When we shall have compared the system of Lloyd and Bulow with events, and, in particular, with the result of the concentric retreat of the Archduke Charles of Austria, in 1796, we have no doubt but the propriety of drawing opposite conclusions to their's will be universally admitted. Lloyd, indeed, is already in contradiction with himself ; for he allows that the di viding of the pursuing forces exposes them to defeat. How then can he advise the pursued to commit the same fault ? When the weather becomes so bad that the body cannot withstand it, the troops ought not to be exposed to it in the open field, but should be placed in quar ters, where they may find shelter and protection. Awl, as active service in the field is extremely fatiguing, they ought to be placed at the end of a campaign in ex tensive quarters, where they may find subsistence and comfort, in order to refresh themselves. Hence arises a twofold mode of placing troops in quarters c I. When the only object is to shelter the troops from the wea ther. 2. When they are distributed in extensive quar -ers, with a view to their subsistence and comfort. The former are called cantonments, the latter winter quar ters.
As the army is incapable of withstanding the enemy in its quarters, the general principle, whence all the rules for the distribution of the troops in quarters is de rived, is this: That in case of an attack from the enemy, we should always have it in our power to draw the army together in order of battle, upon an advantageous field, before the enemy can attack us.
Rain and nightly cold force us first to place the ca valry, on account of the horses, in the villages. Their quarters must be so disposed, that the camp of the in fantry completely covers them, and the enemy cannot fall upon them front' behind ; and that either the dis tance of the out-posts, or the obstacles which the ground or the resistance of the infantry presents to the enemy, should leave time for the cavalry to unite and assist in beating off the attack. The same principles must be followed, when we are compelled to place the infantry in quarters.
We place our troops in winter quarters when we per ceivc, 1. That we ourselves can no longer undertake any enterprise of importance ; and 2. When the enemy
cannot attack our troops in their quarters. The first may occur, when the capture of a fortress would be necessary to enabled us to advance farther into the ene my's country, but the badness of the weather prevents us from undertaking the siege ; when no post or pass is to be carried, which would be of use in opening the following campaign, or in securing our quarters ; when there are no provisions any where to be consumed, which the enemy might want ; or when no blow is to be executed against his magazines, &c. The second case occurs, when our fortresses are sufficiently provided with all necessaries ; or when our quarters are so dis posed, that the enemy either cannot penetrate into them at all, or only with the greatest danger, or when an at tack would be no use to him, but only ruin his own army. Excepting these cases, we must wait until the enemy places his troops in quarters, and then the campaign sometimes continues during a great part of the winter.
For the security of the quarters, of whatever kind they may be, it is required, L In general ; that the whole of the enemy's army may not be able to make an attack upon our whole quarters, without finding them prepared. 2. In particular ; that the enemy's troops may not be able to attack and carry one or other of the quarters.
The general security of the quarters depends, I. On the nature of the country between the enemy and the quarters ; as when they are covered by a river, a chain of mountains, or other objects forming defiles. In such cases, we have the additional advantage, that the na tural obstacles are generally still more effectual at that season of the year. 2. On the nature of the ground in the quarters, and on their situation. There must be no defiles within the quarters which can interrupt their connection ; and in case the quarters should be attack ed at one or more points, the troops must have the means of retiring and uniting with the army, without the risk of being cut off; which might happen, if any one part were to form a projection, not covered by ten able posts or otherwise. 3. On the measures taken to protect them. All the approaches through the de file which covers the quarters, must be destroyed or fortified. The quarters must not be too far distant from each other ; and a common rendezvous must be chosen, where they can all arrive with rapidity and safety, and find an advantageous position. The pro per distribution depends upon the time in which the enemy can approximate his quarters, and make an at tack upon ours; for otherwise, the more they are ex tended, the more comfortable will it be for the troops. The rapid junction of the army on approximating the quarters, should be facilitated by improving the roads and communications, removing the obstacles, establish ing signal posts, &c. The light troops in front, should constantly send out small patroles, in order to obtain notice of all that is going on among the enemy ; and for the same purpose, the army should be provided with good spies.