A general attack upon the whole quarters of an army is, in all points, similar to an attack on an enemy's coun try, in order to surprise it. The following reasons may induce us to make such an attack. 1. A bad disposi tion of the enemy's quarters. 2. Measures ill taken among his troops for the performance of their duty. 3. A well founded hope that we shall be able to drive the enemy out of the country in his possession, either imme diately, or upon the opening of the campaign. This may be the case, if the enemy have neglected some tenable places, and left it in our power to make out selves masters of them ; or if he has enclosed some of our fortresses within his quarters, which the lateness of the season prevented him from taking, and which will serve us as points d'appui in our advance; or, lastly, if his whole quarters consist of an open country, from which we can drive him behind defiles, which he will afterwards in vain endeavour to pass. 4. The success of such an en terprise will be greatly promoted by a skilful disposi tion of our own quarters, by gond and secret arrange ments within them, by which we shall be enabled to draw them rapidly together, and move into those of the enemy.
In this concluding section, we propose to lay before our readers a summary of the essential principles of mi litary combinations. extracted from Jomini's excellent Treatise on Military Operations.
The fundamental principle which ought to regulate all military combinations, consists in operating with the great mass of our forces. a combined effort on the decisive point. We may easily conceive, that a skilful general may, with'60,000 men, beat an army of 100,000, if he can but contrive to bring 50,000 men into action upon one part of the enemy's line. The numereial supe riority of the troops not engaged, in such a case, is more hurtful than advantageous, because it only tends to in crease the disorder, as was proved at the battte of Lcu then. The rules for applying the principle above laid down are by no means numerous, and we shall endea vour to point them out.
I. The first rule is, to originate, or take the lead in all movements. The general who succeeds in placing this advantage on his side, has it in his power to employ his forces wherever he thinks it most advisable ; on the other hand, he who waits for the enemy cannot be master of any combination, because his movements are subor dinate to those of his adversary, and because he has no longer the power of arresting them when they are in full execution. The general who takes the lead, knows what he is going to do; he conceals his march, surprises and overwhelms an extremity, a weak part. He who waits, is beaten on one of those parts, even before he has been informed of the attack.
II. The second rule is to direct our movements on that weak part which can be most advantageously at tacked. The choice of this part depends upon the ene my's position. The most important point is always that of which the occupation would procure the most favour able chances, and the greatest results. Such, for ex ample, would be the positions which should enable us to gain the communications of the enemy, with the basis of his operations, and to throw him back upon an insur mountable obstacle, such as a lake, a large river without a bridge, or a great neutral power.
In double and scattered lines of operations, our attacks will be most appropriately directed on the central points. In carrying the mass of our forces to that quarter, we overwhelm the isolated divisions which guard them ; the scattered corps to the right and left can no longer operate in concert, and are forced to make those ruinous eccentric retreats, from which the armies of \Vurmser, of Mack, and of the Duke of Brunswick experienced such terrible effects. In simple lines of operations, and in contiguous lines of battle, the weak points, on the con trary, are the extremities of the line. Indeed, the centre is more within reach of being sustained, at the same mo ment, by the right and the left; while an extremity attacked would be overwhelmed before the arrival of sufficient means from the other wings to sustain it, for these means would be much more remote, and could only be employed one after the other.
A deep column, attacked on its head, is in the same situation with a line attacked on its extremity; the one and the other will be engaged and beaten successively, as has been demonstrated by the defeats of Rossbach and Aucrstadt. At the same time, it is easier to make new dispositions with a column in depth, than with a line of battle attacked on an extremity.
In executing a general strategical movement on the extremity of an enemy's line of operations, we not only bring a mass into action against a weak part, but from this extremity we may easily gain the rear and the com munications, either with the basis, or with the secondary lines. Thus, Bonaparte, when, in 1805, he gained De nauwerth, and the line of the Lech, had established the mass of his force on the communications of Mack with Vienna, which was the basis of this general in respect to and rendered it impossible for him to unite with the Russian army, which was his most important secondary line. The same operation took place in 1806, on the extreme left of the Prussians by Saalfeld and Gera. It was repeated in 1812. by the Russian army in its movements on Kaluga and Krasnoi ; and again in 1813, by Bohemia on Dresden and Leipsic against the right of Bonaparte.