This order seems advantageous, when we have to fear grand attacks of cavalry ; for it gives, at once, se curity to the infantry, and shelter to the cannoneer and to the train of arti;iety. At the same time, as it affords less activity and less impulse than that of co lumns of attack, the latter appears preferable, because, with troops well exercised, it is easy to form the square in each battalion, by a simple conversion to the right and left of the centre division. The general's plan of battle, the nature of the ground, the description of troops, must determine the preference to be given to these two orders.
XII. If the art of war consists in concerting a su perior effort by a mass against weak parts, it is incon trovertibly necessary to push a beaten army vigorously.
The force of an army consists in ifs organization, in the whole resulting Irom the connection of all the parts with the central point which sets them in motion. After a defeat, this whole no longer exists; the har mony between the head which combines, and the body which ought to execute, is destroyed ; then relations are suspended, and almost always oissolved. The whole army is then a weak part ; to attack it is to march to a certain victory. Abundant proofs of these truths will be found in the march on Rovetedo, and the defiles of the Brenta, to complete the ruin of Wurm ser ; in the march from Ulm to Vienna,—fioin Jena to Wittemberg, Custrin, and Stettin,—From Waterloo to Paris. This maxim is often neglected by generals of inferior talents. It would appear that the whole effort of their genius, and the scope of their ambition, were limited to gaining the field of battle. Such a victory is a niece displacing of troops, without any real utility.
XIII. In order to render the superior shock of a Xiii. In order to render the superior shock of a mass decisive, the general must spare no pains in form ing the moral disposition of his army. To what pur pose should we place 50,000 men in order of battle against 20,000, if they wanted that impulse which is necessary to carry them forward, and to overwhelm the enemy ? We do not allude merely to the soldier, but still more particularly to those whose business it is to lead. All troops are brave, when the chiefs chew the example of a noble emulation and perfect devotion.
The soldier must not remain exposed to fire from the mere dread of a rigorous discipline ; he must rush into it by the desire of not being outdone by his officers in honour and bravery, and, above all, by the confidence with which he has been inspired in the wisdom of his leaders and the courage of his companions in arms.
In all his calculations, a general must be able to rec kon upon the zeal of his lieutenants ; he must be as sured that a vigorous attack will take place wherever .le orders it to be made. In order to attain this end, he must render himself at once beloved, esteemed, and feared ; and he ought to have the choice and the fate of his lieutenants in his own hands. If they have ar eived at this rank by the right of seniority alone, we may conclude beforehand that they will scarcely ever possess the qualities necessary to enable them to fulfil their important functions. This circumstance alone may cause the failure of the best planned enterprises.
It will be seen from this rapid sketch, that the science of war is composed of three general combina tions, each of which presents hut a small number of subdivisions. The only perfect operations will be those in which these three combinations shall be properly ex ecuted.
The first of these combinations is the art of embrac ing lines of operations in the most advantageous man ner, or what it commonly called the plan of a cam paign. We do not well understand, indeed, what is meant by this term; for it is impossible to lay down a general plan for a whole campaign, the first movement of which may overthrow the whole scaffolding, and in which it may be impossible to foresee beyond the second movement.
The second branch is the art of conducting our masses in the most rapid manner possible to the deci sive point of the primitive or accidental line of opera tions. This is what we commonly understand by stra tegy ; which is nothing else than the means of execut ing this second combination.
The third branch is the art of combining the simul taneous employment of our greatest mass on the most important point of a field of battle ; or the art of bat tles, which some authors have called the order of bat tle, while others have treated it under the name of Tac tics.