III. The result of the preceding truths proves, that if we ought to prefer an attack on the extremity of a line, we should also beware of attacking the two ext•e mities at once, unless indeed our forces are greatly su perior. An army of 60.000 men, which forms two corps of about 30,000 each, for the purpose of attacking the two extremities of an army equal in numbers, deprives itself of the means of striking a decisive blow, by multi plying uselessly the number of the means of resistance which the enemy can oppose to its two detachments. Such an extended and disunited movement may even expose it to the enemy, who may collect the mass of his force upon one point, and annihilate his adversary by the terrible effect of his superiority. Attacks multiplied in a greater number of columns are still more dangerous, and more contrary to the great principles of the art ; espe cially when these columns cannot be brought into action at the same instant, and at the same point. As a conse quence of this maxim, it is proper, on the contrary, to make an attack upon both extremities, when we have masses greatly superior to those of the enemy ; we may thus bring more troops into action upon each of his wings, while, by keeping very superior forces accumu lated upon a single point, our adversary might perhaps be able to deploy and bring into action an equal number. We must take care, in this case, to throw the great body' of our force upon that wing, where the attack promises the most decisive success.
IV. In order to operate a combined effort with a great mass upon a single point, it is necessary, in strategical movements, to keep our forces collected upon a space nearly square, in order that they may be more dispos able.* Lai ge fronts are as contrary to good principles, as scattered lines, large detachments, and isolated divi sions.
V. One of' the most efficacious means of applying the general principle above laid down is, to make the ene my commit faults contrary to that principle. We may threaten him with some small corps of light troops on several important points of his communications ; and it is probable, that not knowing the force of these corps, he may oppose them with numerous divisions, and scat ter his forces. These light troops, at the same time, serve the essential purpose of collecting intelligence for the army.
VI. It is of great importance, when we originate any decisive movement, to neglect no means of informing ourselves respecting the enemy's positions, and the movements which he may make. The system of espi onnage is very useful, and no pains should be spat ed to bring it to perfection; but it is still more essential to procure accurate intelligence by means of partisans. A general ought to scatter small parties in all directions, and to multiply their number with as much care as lie would avoid such a system in great operations. Forthis
purpose, some divisions of light cavalry are organized, which are not admitted into the line of battle. To ope rate without these precautions, is to march in the dark, and to expose ourselves to all the disastrous chances which a secret movement of the enemy might produce. We have already observed, that these partisans would contribute, at the same time, to alarm the enemy upon some important points, and thus induce him to divide his forces. These means are too much neglected ; the system of espionnage is not sufficiently organized be fore hand ; and the officers of the light troops have not always the experience requisite to enable them to con duct their detachments.* VII. In conducting the operations of war, it is not enough to carry our masses skilfully on the most im portant points ; we most also know how to bring them into action. When we have established ourselves upon these points, if we remain inactive, we have lost sight of the principle entirely. The enemy may make counter inanceuvres, and to deprive him of the means of cluing so, we must immediately engage him, as soon as we have gained his communications or one of his extremi ties. It is at that moment especially that we ought to combine a simultaneous effort of our forces. Battles are not decided uy the present, but by the masses engaged. The former decide the preparatory strategi cal movements; the latter determine the success of an action. In order to obtain this result, a skilful general ought to seize the moment when it is necessary to carry the decisive position of the field of battle, and he should combine the attack in such a manner as to engage all his forces at the same time, with the sole exception of the troops destined to form the reserve. If an effort founded upon such principles shall not be successful, we cannot hope to obtain the victory from any comhination, and we shall have no other resource but that of making another attempt with this reserve, in concert with the troops already engaged.
VIII. All the combinations of a battle may be reViii. All the combinations of a battle may be re- duced to three systems.
The first, which is purely defensive, consists in awaiting the enemy's attack in a strong position, without any other object than that of maintaining ourselves in it. Such were the dispositions of aim) at Torgau, and of AIarsin at the lines of Turin. These two events serve to demonstrate how vicious all such dispositions are.
The second system, on the contrary, is entirely of fensive. It consists in attacking the enemy wherever we can find him ; as Frederi k did at Leuthen and Tor gat], Bonaparte at Jena and Ratisbun, and the allies at Leipsic.