7. The Russian Capture of Przemysl, 22 March Ivanov's campaign in Galicia for the capture of Cracow had necessarily been somewhat checked by Hindenburg's assaults on Russky's lines in front of Warsaw. Ivanov had transferred some of his troups on the left of the Russian front to Russky m the centre, and he had drawn bacic his columns which had becn advancing on Cracow; for if Warsaw fell, and it might happen, Russian troops too far west in Galicia would be in danger of being cut off. Brussilov also had had to give up some of the Carpathian passes which he had occupied in the fall of 1914, in spite of the fact that the possession of these passes was essential to. any future advance in Cracow. During the winter of 1914-15 Brussilov had kept up a continuous struggle, with alternating success and failure, for the possession of these Carpathian passes. As soon, however, as Warsaw seemed to be safe from Hindenburg's assaults, he began to press forward more vigorously and all the passes of the Carpathians were reoccupied.
Of more military importance was the cap ture of Przemysl. This first-class fortress, dominating western Galicia and controlling two of the railways from Galicia into Magary, had been completely surrounded and cut off by Ivanov and Radko-Dmitriev on 27 Sept. 1914, during the first Russian occupation of Galicia. Starvation soon began to threaten it, for the Austrians had not collected any great amount of provisions there, never supposuig that Rus-, sian armies would reach it. When it became clear that a siege was likely to take place, the Austrian conunander sent off some of the ci vilian population. But those who departed were more than equaled by the large number of soldiers, perhaps 100,000, from Auffenberg's army, who took refuge in the fortress after their defeat at Letnberg. In the middle of October 1914 Hindenburg by his first assault on Warsaw had brought a momentary relief to Przemysl. Frightened at Hindenburg's ad vance toward the middle Vistula, the Russizuis in Galicia had withdrawn their advance column and raised the siege on the west of the city. For several days large quantities of food and ammunition were hurried into Przemysl and the fortress ha,d leisure to prepare for a second, longer and grimmer siege. After the failure of Hindenburg's first assault on Warsaw the Rus sian ring again closed round Przemysl. In the defense of this fortress the Austrians showed as much incompetence as in their initial campaigns before Lemberg and Rawa Russtca. They kept within the fortifications far too great a proportion of the civilian population, whose mouths had to share the insufficient stock of provisions. The excessively large Austrian military force—nearly 150,000 men— was packed inside the outer intrenchments and did little to strengthen the defenses or to worry the enemy by aggressive tactics. The Austrians depended wholly on the protection of their heavy guns planted in concrete emplacements.
Instead of shifting them in that system of °mobile defense') which the French used so cleverly at Verdun, they allowed the Russians' heavy shells to blow up some of their guns and destroy their outer works. However, the Russians did not care to pay the cost of human life and possible failure which a general assault on the strongly fortified works might entail. They waited for starvation to do its work. By 1 March 1915 food and fuel had become very scarce, and the morale of the besieged army was growing perceptibry worse. Many of the civil population, who were not allowed the same rations as the soldiers, had already died of cold and hunger. On 13th March the Russians carried by assault a segment of the outer line of fortifications to fhe north of the fortress. They fortified the ground they had captured and from it were able to begin a bom bardment of the inner circle of forts. This sealed the fate of Przemysl. Four days later the garrison made a feeble attempt at a sortie in the direction of Lemberg, but they were driven back suffering heavy loss of killed in addition to 4,000 prisoners left in the hands of the Russians. With the failure of this sortie General von Kustnanek and his staff lost all courage and hope. Early on the morning of Monday, 22 March 1915, the Russians were startled by the noise of great explosions and then by the sight of heavy columns of smoke, rising above the city. The Austrians were blow ing up their ammunition and guns and destroy ing other war material. Then a white flag ap peared and Austrian officers brought a formal letter of surrender.
The capture of Przemysl, as has been well said, was not a Russian achievement so much as an Austrian disgrace. The fortress fell like an crverripe fruit. The action is not to be com pared with any of the great sieges of history, for it was not a case of a strife of inflexible wills or an issue determined by overmastering skill and strength; nor did it prove of any permanent or decisive value to Russia. To be sure, it deprived Austria of the 120,000 soldiers who surrendered as prisoners of war and were shipped to Russian prison camps or to Siberia. Russia also acquired a considerable stock of ammunition and guns, both large and small, whidi the defenders had not had time to de stroy. And it improved Russia's railway con trol in Galicia. But as we shall now see it did not give her a rock of strength such as Verdun gave the French, which could be defended against the strategy of Hindenburg and Mack ensen. Within three months of their capture of Przemysl the Russians theinselves in tum were forced to evacuate it as fast as they knew how, because Macicensen had won the decisive battle of the Dunajec and was driving eastward through Galicia with irresistible force.