After this severe fighting at Lodz, Russlcy shortened his front still further, giving up the city and withdrawing eastward to a position be hind the Bzura and the Rawka, where he dug himself in and stood fast. For the first time on the Eastern Front the fighting ceased to be a se ries of strategical inovements over great areas. It settled down for nearly four months into the war of fixed positions — trench warfare — which had already become familiar on the Western Front soon after the battle of the Marne. The Russians, however, had as yet no barbed wire to protect their trenches, and they • were beginning to run short of ammunition, especially artillery supplies. But they man aged to protect themselves in the trenches by all sorts of hand-grenades made from materials found on the spot, such as empty. tin cans, shell cases and gas pipes. Several umes the Ger mans made prolonged efforts, supported by hur ricanes of artillery fire, to drive the Russian.s from this Bzura-Rawlca line back toward War saw. At Christmas they used asphyxiating gas bombs for the first time. By this means they got into some of the Russian trenches, but with poetic justice were overcome by their own gas. Those who were thus unconscious but not actu ally killed were buried in the trenches where they lay, by order of the Russian officer who supposed they were dead. The rest were driven out in a counterattack A few hours later some Russian soldiers who had been partially asphyxi ated in a wood and had recovered came back to hospital quarters for relief and treaunent It was not until then that the Russian officers be came aware of the barbarous new weapon that the Germans were using. Again during the first week in February 1915 heavy assaults, pre ceded by gas and long artillery preparation, were made against the Russians behind the Bzura-Rawka lines. But the Germans gained only- a few thousand yards.
6. The Winter Battle of the Masurian Lakes, February 1915.— In the first week of February 1915 Hindenburg was finally con. vinccd that the attacks on the Bzura-Rawlca trenches were merely resulting in a wasteful and futile expenditure of German man-power. He concluded that it was impossible to take \Varsaw by a frontal attack from the West and turned again to East Prussia, to a point farther east of Tannenherg and the sccne of his first great victory. Again using his favorite method of a very rapid surprise attack, depending on a quick concentration by strategic railways, he launched against .the Niemen-Narev line the strongest single army which Germany had yet put into the Eastern war area. It was Hinden burg's culminating effort. If it succeeded, the communications betwcen 1,Var,,aw and Bctro grad would be cut; the Niemen-Narev line of fortresses would become useless to Russia; NVarsaw could be easily taken from the rear, and Przemysl would be relieved from the vari cus besieging armies which by starvation were bringing it day by day nearer to surrender. Austria was instructed by Hindenburg to aid his plan by attacking vigorously at the Car pathian passes. This Austrian offensive would
prevent the transfer of any troops from the Galician front to strengthen the Russian line threatened in the north, and Russia would be speedily forced back behind the Bug to Brest Litovsk and the Pripet Marshes.
The Winter Battle of the Masurian Lakes began on 7 Feb. 1915 just as the final assault on the Bzura was dying away. The moment was favorable for Hindenburg because the Rus sians, under General Sievers, had been making a slight advance in East Prussia with the idea of drawing off German troops from the War saw front. The Russians had no suspicion of this tremendous winter attack. Sievers had about 120,000 men, but had allowed them to become dispersed among the .Masurian Lakes, when he suddenly realized drat he was being counter-attacked and completely outflanked by a German force twice as large as his own. One German army moved along the railway from Koenigsberg toward Kovno and was be ginning to encircle the Russian right flank; the other moved on the railways from Koenigs berg toward Bialystok and threatened to sur round the Russian left. Sievers had to struggle back 70 miles over half frozen lakes and through blind forests choked with snow drifts in his effort to regain his line of defense behind the Niemen and the Narev. In this retreat he lost at least 30,000 men and 80 guns. Berlin cele brated the victory as a second Tannenberg. But Siever's army was not annihilated as Sam sonov's had been, and by 20 February he was able to entrench himself. With reinforcements he even counter-attacked when the German thrust had spent its force. By the first week in March he won his way back to a corner of Prussian soil at Lyck, where the East Prussian frontier bulges into Russian territory. He doubtless would have won back a larger foot hold in East Prussia had not the Russian short age in rifles and ammunition begun to malce itself cruelly felt. So serious was the shortage in hand rifles that in the ((Winter Battle* of the Masurian LaIces Russia actually had trained but unarmed men come up behind the fighting line ready to fill up the gaps and take up the weapons of the dead. Men were even flung into the firing line armed only with a bayonet in one hand and a couple of bombs inlhe other, or even only with wooden clubs. With the courage and ferocity of combats in a primitive age they rushed close enough to throw their bombs and they charged with cold steel or the clubs. When it came to the fierce hand-to hand fighting the Germans always gave way. By 10 'Airch 1015 the fighting on this liart of the fiont died down Warsaw was not to be taken from the Russians by way of East Prus sia. There remained one other way which Hindenburg had not yet tried the way through Galicia viith an ad\ :ince on the rear of War saw from the southeast. This brings us to the struggle for Przemysl and the German attack on the Dunajec.