It has been estimated up to the close of 1915 the Germans.had captured nearly 2,00%000 Russian prisoners, mostly untrained reserves and fortrees troops; but the Russians had taken an even larger number of prisoners, a'bout 200,000 Germans and nearly 2,000,000 Austrians. Many of the latter, however, were really Rumanians, Czecho-Sloyaks and Galicians who were deserters rather than actual prisoners captured in battle; they could be trusted, and were set to work in Russian village& The Ger mans were sent farther east. They afterward helped the Bolskeviki in eastern Russia and Sibesia. ' The most important thing about the retreat of 1915 was the depressing effect it had on the masses of the Russian people. It was not the toes of territory nor the great loss in prison .ers, however, which they felt most The lack of munition& the conviction of the inefficiency and even treachery of the tsar's autocratic govern ment, mid .the apparent hopelessness of the struggle, sank deep into the hearts of the Rue -ssan people. Nor were they reassured by the .tsar's mesaage at Christmas, 1915: °I will con clude 210 • peace till we have chased the last fee from our soil; and I will make no peace save in unison with* our Allies, t,o whom we are botutd, not by paper treaties, but by affection and our annmon sacrifice.° On the contrary, the masses felt an increasing discontent with the existing *line and its court intrigues, and an increasing sense of the nselessness of any fuither fighting. To the Great Retreat must be attributed in part at least the Revolution of March 1917, and the socialistic military collapse which followed it four months later in July 1917.
Brusaikrv's Summer Offensive in 1916.
During the crucial winter of 1915-16 there 'was a careful mobilization of Russian industries with a view to subordinating all manufacture to the one great aim of increasing war material and improving the transportation on the rail ways. The result was that the deficiencies which had so largely caused the Great Retreat in 1915 were largely made up and the outlook seemed much brighter from this point of view.
General Alexeiev, who had become chief-of staff in September 1915, when Nicholas II be came commander-in-chief, planned to wait until the summer of 1916 before undertalcing an of fensive. This would give a longer period for accumulating munitions. It was also hoped that the Allies in the west could by that time launch a great offensive, and that the Central Powers, struc.k on both fronts at once, and unable to transfer troops in either direction, could at last be forced down to defeat. But two unforeseen events caused Alexeiev to undertake offensives earlier than he had intended. These two events were the German attack on Verdun and the Austrian attack on Italy.
To lessen the German pressure on Verdun, Alexeiev consented to an offensive by Kuropat kin on the Northern Front against the Germans in Courland. The attack was to be made from the line of the Duna River betvveen Riga and Dvinsk; but the Germans got warning in time to call up plenty of reserves. And the failure to secure any permanent marked success clearly showed that an advance made under the con ditions of trench warfare in that region, during periods of frosts or winter thaws, (placed. the attacking armies in a much more difficult posi tion than the defending forces. Even if the attacking troops were able to carry the enemy trenches and make any considerable advance, the frozen ground prevented them from digging themselves in; the attacicing forces were then at once exposed to the merciless fire of the enemy's artillery. A similar Russian offensive in April, farther south, opposite Vilna, had no better success. Both .these activities, however, may have served their purpose in relieving a little the intensity of the German pressure on Verdun.
Much more important for Russia was the Austrian advance into Italy in May 1916. To draw off some of the Austrian forces by a renewed Russian attack on Galicia, Alexesiev consented to allow Brussilov to begin his veatti summer offensive a month earlier than had originally planned. General Brussilov, in recog
nition of the great with which he had with drawn the extreme Russian left in 1915, had superseded Ivanov in conunand of the Southern Army Front This extrnded nearly 300 miles from the Pripet River and Marshes south to the Rumanian frontier. Brussilov had under him four armies with able commanders: Kaledine with his headquarters at Rovno; Salcharov threatening Brody; Scherbachev astride the Galician frontier near Tarnopol; and Lechitslcy ready to cross the Dniester and oc cupy Bukovina. Opposed to Brussilov were five German-Austrian armies under the nominal su preme command of Archdulce Frederick. They numbered altogether about 750,000 men, whidi was less than half the forces which had been placed under Brussilov. Instead of trying to break through any one point in the enemy's line, it was Brussilov's plan to try out the whole front with what may be regarded as an inunense reconnaissance. His objective point was not yet determined. He would wait until he had tested out the strength of the enemy's line before he decided on a special strategic aim.
Accordingly on Saturday, 3 June 1916, Brus silov opened a steady bombardment along his whole front with as great an intensity as his guns permitted. As the front was nearly 300 miles long the cannonade could, of course, not compare in intensity with the terrific bombard ments which preceded the attacks at Neuve Chapelle, the Dunajec or Verdun. It did not disrupt the trenches, but it ploughed many broad alleys through the German barbed wire entanglements. After 20 hours of such artillery preparation, on Sunday morning, 4 June, the waves of Russian infantry sprang over the parapets to attack along the whole front. In the north, opposite Kaledine, the Austrian front was completely broken by noon of the first day. The Russian bayonets carried the Austrian trendies, while the Russian bar rage cut off all communications with the rear. The result was that the fine Austrian trenches and dugouts proved death-trap& Austrian soldiers huddled together in thein could not escape and were captured in thousands by the triumphant Russian infantry. That day in Lutsk the birthday of the Archduke Frederick was being celebrated, when news caine that the Austrian front was swept away and that the enemy were approaching the gates. Confidence was placed for a moment in the great strength of the Lutsk defenses; but Austrian demorali zation was so complete that at 8:25 P.M. on Tuesday, 6 June, the vanguard of Kaledine's columns entered the city and took possession of a great booty of guns, shells and provisions. Many thousand Austrian wounded who had no time to escape were also taken prisoners. By the capture of Lutsk, Kaledine was able to reach and cross the Styr during the next few days and to reach a point within 25 miles of Kovel On the extreme south, while Kaledine was sweeping upon Lutsk, Lechitsky had achieved an equal success by crossing the Dniester, rout ing the Austrians under Pflantzer-Baltin, and advancing into Bu1covina. On 16 June he cap tured Czernovitz, the capital of the province, and on 23 June he took ICimpolung, the most southerly town in Bukovina. The Austrian resistance had completely broken down and aU of Bukovina was in Russian hands. In the centre, between Kaledine and Lechitsky, Sak liarov and Scherbachev also advanced with suc cess and took many thousand prisoners, but they occupied much less territory. June 23 may be said to mark the end of the first stage of B1119SilOV'S offensive. Within three weeks his armies had captured 4,000 officers, 194,000 men, 219 heavy guns, 644 machine guns and vast quantities of war material. It was one of the moet rapid and spectacular advances in the his tory of the war; but it left 'the Russian line 'with two great salients— at Lutsk and in Bu kavina —which were dangerously open to Ger man counterattacics on their sides.