By 5 October he had shifted the bulk of the German forces in East Prussia by rail around the frontier of Silesia, and was advanc ing with incredible rapidity along the railway line from 1(214cl toward Lodz and Warsaw. To his East Prussians he had joined additional troops from central Germany, though probably not from the Western Front, as General Gourko supposes (4War and Revolution in Russia,' pp. 90, 100).
By 16 October the main Gertnan force had reached the outskirts of Warsaw and begun the great three days' battle for its possession. German dirigibles and aeroplanes flew over the city dropping bombs in the direction of the main railway station on the east side of the Vis tula. They did little material damage, but they caused a panic among the inhabitants and even among some of the Russian soldiers who saw these monsters of the slcy for the first time. Then came showers of propagandist leaflets in Polish, Hebrew and Russian, promising Polish auton omy and making all sorts of religious and racial appeals. One pamphlet designed for Polish Ro man Catholics bore a colored picture of the Virgin and Child, flanked by medallions of the Pope and the lcaiser, that versatile believer who elsewhere was being represented as a convert to Mohammedanism— it was at this moment that Enver Pasha decided to bring Turkey into the war on the side of Germany. To co-oper ate with the main force at Warsaw and to con centrate as great a force as possible at the point of attack, Hindenburg sent a smaller army from Thorn up the west bank of the Vis tula toward Lowicz and Warsaw, but it moved slowly and was chedced by Rermenkampf who hurried troops from the Niemen front and prevented it from taking part in the assault on Warsaw. Hindenburg had also ordered for ward a strong body of Austrians, strengthened by German troops, who were to advance from Cracow by way of Kielce and Radom. They were to take the fortress and railway junction at Ivangorod, and then cross the Vistula where the river narrows at Josefov south of Ivan gorod.
When the Grand Duke Nicholas perceived the nature of this concentration of Germans and Austrians moving from southwest Poland toward the Vistula, he took no chances. He re solved to run no risks on the plains west of the Vistula, where he would have to rely for sup plies on divergent railway lines, and where the broad and muddy Pilica would cut his army in two. On the whole Russian centre he called in behind tire Vistula all of Russky's troops ex cept a screen of cavalry, lceeping in touch with the enemy and bodies of entraiched infantry protecting Warsaw and the Ivimgorod bridge head. In Galicia he ordered Ivanov to aban don the advance on Cmcow, to retire behind the Sari to form the aligmnent of the centre, and to send some of his troops to strengthen the centre. Ivanov's retirement necessitated for a moment the relaxing of the siege of Przemyst Hindenburg's threat at Warsaw thus enabled the Austrians to force an opening on the west side of Przemysl and to pour pro visions into the fortress. But it was only for a moment A few days later Dmitriev again en closed it tightly and kept it closed until it was starved into surrender six months later.
To return to the assaults on Warsaw and Ivangorod (15-19 Oct. 1914). Warsaw, from the Russian standpoint, lies on the wrong side of the river —the left or west side. But it was defended by a circle of 11 outlying forts, some six to eight miles distant from the city itself. Fortunately the railways merely sldrt tilt city and cross to the Praga suburb on the east side, where is situated the main Station to which converge the milways from all Russia. If nee essary, the Russians could abandon Warsaw, blow up the three bridges across the river to Praga, and yet not lose control of the all-im portant Praga Railway terminal. But as it turned out, Warsaw did not have to be aban doned in 1914. Just as Hindenburg was furi ously assaulting with superior nurnbers the outer trenches and forts west of the city, new Russian troops were beginning to arrive from the far corners of the empire. The famous Siberian Rifle regiments, after nearly a month's weary journey tn closed freight cars, were rushed from Praga through the streets of War saw to charge the Germans with cold steel. They were the first instahnent of eight full corps which came to Warsaw and Ivangorod within the next few days and represented the completed results of Russian mobilization. They were among the finest troops in all Russia, ow ing to the care with which they were selected and the considerable practice in actual warfare which they had had with nomad tribes on the borders of the empire. Their arrival saved \Varsaw. After three days of furious fighting (16-18 October) Hindenburg saw that the city was not to be taken by surprise. It was not worth his while to sit down.to a siege, for the Russian defenders daily grew in numbers while his own forces were limited unless help came from the Western Front, which he could not yet expect. Farther south, Ivangorod was de fended in a spirited fashion by General Schwartz, who did not allow the enemy either to get their big guns within range or to take the bridge-head—the only bridge over the Vis tula between Warsaw and Galicia. Still far ther south, at Josefov, where the Russians were weak and had no railroad to support them, the Germans managed to throw over a pontoon bridge and crossed with a considerable force to the right bank. But on 21 October Russky fell upon them at the little village of Kazimirjev, half-way between Ivangorod and Josefov. No German escaped back over the Vistula. Hin denburg then ordered a general retreat to the Silesian frontier, but Russky, crossing the Vis tula in force, gave the retreating invaders no rest. In the wooded country and along the muddy banks of the Pilica, he attacked the Ger mans and Austrians, causing very heavy losses among the latter. As they retired toward Sile sia, the Germans fought desperately and bravely, and by their rear-guard actions man aged to protect their guns and marching col umns of infantry. It was an orderly retirement, not a rout.