Direct ootnmunication was needed between the Danube and the Adriatic to complete Ser bian independence; when claims were presented to annex a strip of the Adriatic coastline in No vember 1912, a vrar vrith Austria seemed im minent Meanwhile, 8 Oct. 1912, Montenegro' had begun operations against Turkey and ush ered in the first Balkan War. Within a fevr days after the Balkan sillies had joined in the hostilities, Austtia beheld the Serbs in posses sion of Uskub, of Old Serbia, of a large piece of the Sanjalc of Novi-Bazar, and making rapid strides for the Adriatic Coast, an unexpected proceeding that threatened to nullify Austria's consistent policy of 30 years : Serbia had broken her fetters and was no longer under Austrian tutelage. Under ITALY AND THE WOItLD WAR iS SII0Val that in August 1913, at the close of the second Balkan War, Austria proposed to start war against Serbia and endeavored to enlist Italian support for the venture. The prompt refusal of Italy to countenance any such aggression merely postponed the war to a later date. Ten months after came the Serajevo tragedy. For 18 months before that a violent press campaign against Serbia had been raging in Austria-Hungary, and it needed only a slight aggravation of the situation to provoke a con flict The assassinations provided the Austri ans with the necessary lever for action. Un fortunately, the Serbians had not enjoyed a very enviable reputation in Europe since the murder of their King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903, and it was generally felt that Austria would be justified in exacting reparation for the Serajevo outrage; indeed, little sympathy with Serbia existed in either France or Great Brit ain. It was otherwise with Russia, the pro tector of the Slav nations, the country which, curiously enough, had been the principal agent in liberating the Balkan Peninsula from Turk ish rule and securing that freedom for the small nations which she denied the people within her own borders. It was no secret in Europe that Russia would never stand aside and see Ser bia perish, a contingency which could be re garded only as an Austrian victory over Rus sia. Therein lay the great danger to the peac.e of Europe— of the world.
1 The murders happened on 28 June. For 25 days no word nor sign emanated from the Vi enna Foreign Office. Anti-Serb riots broke out in Austrian territories; mobs in Vienna threat ened the Serbian legation, while the Austro Hungarian press clamored violently for the chastisement of Serbia. Disinterested powers began to exercise what influence they possessed in endeavoring to reconcile justice with peace. But while the trend of pubhc opinion both in Austria-Hungary and Germany was plain enough, the Intentions of the Austrian govern ment were shrouded in mystery. On 7 July the Serbian minister in Vienna, M. Yovanovitch, wired to his government (Whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they [the Austrians] must now or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Hapsburg Monarchy.* As late as 20 July the same minister 1,vrote: (It is very difficuh, al most impossible, to discover here. fin Vienna] arrything positive as to the real mtentions of Austria-Hungary. . . . There is, however, no place for optimism. . . . That which is
chiefly to be feared, and is highly probable is, that Austria is preparing for tvar against Ser bia.* Not alone in Serbia was there anxiety; a feeling of intense uneasiness hovered over Europe, where the consequences of any possible action on the part of Austria were fully appre ciated. On 22 July the Hungarian Minister President stated in Parliament that the situa tion did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary oi even probable. The very next day came the first premonition of the approaching storm, when Count Berch told (q.v.) launched the fateful ultimatum at Belgrade. In this document the Austro-Hun ganan foreign minister reviewed the past rela tions between the two countries and called upon the Serbian government to publish a regretful and semi-apologetic declaration on the front page of their Official Journal on 26 July. The following 10 demands were also made: That the Serbian government should undertake (1) to suppress any publication which incited to animosity against Austria; (2) to dissolve a certain nationalist society (Narodna Odbrana) and prevent others from being formed; (3) to eliminate all anti-Austrian doctrines from pub lic instmction; (4) to remove from military service and administrative departments officers and officials guilty of plotting against Austro Hungarian integrity; (5) to accept the collabo ration in Serbia of Austro-Hungarian govern ment officials to assist in suppressing the move ment; (6) to talce judicial proceedings against persons accessory to the assassination plot, Aus tnan officials to take part in the investigations; (7) to arrest Major Voija Tankositch and a state employee named Milan Ciganovitch; (8) to prevent co-operation of Serbian authorities conducting traffic in illicit arms and explosives across the frontier, and punish those who had facilitated that traffic in aid of the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime; (9) to explain utter ances of high Serbian officials who expressed hostility to the Dual Monarc.hy; and (10) to notify the Austro-Hungarian government that the above demands have been complied with. This ultimatum was to be accepted in 48 hours, by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, 25 July 1914, The charges formulated against the two Ser bian officials mentioned in the document were those of having aided and abetted the perpe trators of the crime. Three principals hadlt‘ been arrested on the spot: Nedeljko Cabrino vitch, who threw the first bomb; Trifko Gra besh, who threw the second bomb, and Gavrilo Prinzip, Nvho had fired the fatal shots. These three had originally in their possession (accord ing to the Austrian statement) six bombs and four Browning pistols with ammunition. Ci ganovitch and Tankositch were accused of hav ing supplied these weapons; the former was alleged to have instructed the three conspirators how to use the bombs and to have given Prin zip lessons in handling the pistol in a certain forest. Ciganovitch was also charged with having enabled the assassins to smuggle the weapons across the frontier. Furthermore, the bombs were said to be hand grenades from the arms depot of the Serbian army at Kraguje vatz. These details appeared in a brief sum mary annexed to the ultimatum.