speak to the sftancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of main taining the good relations between England and Germany is dust they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. . . And I will say this: If the peace of Eur can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to proniote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately . . . If this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.* On the same day (30 July) that Sir Edward Gm made this unequivocal declaration of British policy, he also telegraphed to the British am bassador in Berlin, 41 have warned Prince Lichnowsky [German ambassador in London] that Germany must not count upon our stand ing aside in all circumstances)) A slight ray of hope flashed across the darkening sky; Aus tria seemed for the moment to tremble at the storm she bad raised and Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey (30 July) that the German government would endeavor to influ ence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Ser bian territory near the frontier, to promise not to advance further, while the powers endeav ored to arrange that Serbia should give satis faction sufficient to pacify Austria. The terri tory thus occupied ((would of course be evacu ated when Austria was satisfied.0 This sitnple plan originated with Sir Edward Grey himself and provided an admirable exit from the politi cal nnpasse. It allowed Austria to retire gracefully and save her face, while Serbia was (chastised?' But a military plus a diplomatic victory in the Ballcans for Austria could hardly be agreeable to Russia. Moreover, Austria had broken off conversations with Saint Petersburg by the declaration of war. The British ambas sador in Rome wired on 30 July that the Italian foreign minister Thad reason to believe that Gertnany was now disposed to give more concil iatory advice to Austria, as she seemed con vinced that we [Great Britain] should act with France and Russia and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.* But he added, ((It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Ger many would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. . • . There was still time so long as Austria had received no check.2 Germany had handed the proposal to Austria (respecting Serbian territory) on 29 July, and diat same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognize that the conflict with Serbia had be come a question of general European interest and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sov ereignty of Serbia. This offer came late at night; during the day the German ambassador had informed M. Sazonov that Germany had decided to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. This statement is not mentioned in the German (White Book.) Sazo nov replied that the Russian preparations had been caused, on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising attitude of Austria and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro Hungarian army corps were already mobil ized. Russia decided then to mobilized all her strength.
The British reply to the German neutrality proposal was handed to the chancellor on 31 July, and on the same clay Austria at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Serbia. Russia asked the British government to assume the di rection of these discussions. Conversations took place in Vienna and negotiations were resumed in Saint Petersburg; Sir Edward Grey begged the chancellor to encourage them and for a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace. Un fortunately, there were various stutnbling blocks in its path, besides the obviously deter mined militancy of Austria, natnely, mobiliza tion and mutual suspicion. Austria, being actu ally at war, was naturally continuing her mobili zation; Russia had begun to mobilize on her Austrian frontier, while Germany may be said to have been more or less mobilized for years.
Each side complained of the other's tion, and in each case tbe stereotyped retort was to the effect that awe cannot afford to lose the time which is being employed by other powers in making preparations against US." edly, there was justification in preparing for the veorst, it being the first duty of a government to provide its country with adequate defense and to be prepared for every possible gency. The other obstacle, suspicion, was haps equally formidable. Austria mistrusted Serbian assurances; Russia suspected tria's intentions with regard to Serbia's pendence and integrity, and furthermore trusted the entire Austrian policy in the kans, a sentiment that was fully reciprocated by the Dual Monarchy. Germany suspected the Triple Entente of aggressive designs against her; France, Russia and England suspected many of aggressive designs and regarded tria as her tool; Belgium suspected German tentions with. regard to her neutrality, and so on. Overshadowing all was the determination on the part of Germany to force the war that was long regarded by her statesmen as table?' On this point we have the evidence of Prince Lic.hnowsloy in his famous dum': 41 WU to work for the localization of the conflict, It tuiturally only needed a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic t,uccess and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the .contrag, we pressed for war. We rejected the British proposals of .
medaation . . . and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply. . . In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civil ized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world war?' These words of the former German ambassador in London have been amply corroborated during and since the war by the numerous revelations which emanated from highly authoritative Ger man sources.
As a preliminary to the resumed conversa tions Sir Edward Grey suggested " that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solu tion being found by Vienna and Saint Petersburg, Ger many might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound Saint. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided that they did not impair Serbian sovereignty and territorial integrity. . . . Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to pre vent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Serbian sovereignty and integrity. All the Powers would of course suspend further military operations and preparations." In reply to this proposal the German for eign minister assured the British ambassador that both the kaiser, at the request of the tsar, and the German Foreign Office had been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discus sions. Reports from Vienna, he said, had been of a promising nature — but Russia's mobiliza tion had spoiled everything. On 31 July, while negotiations between Austria and Russia were in progress, Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lich nowsky that if Germany 'could get any reason able proposal put forward which would make it clear that Germany and Austrki were striving to preserve European peace, he would support it at Saint Petersburg and Paris. He further assured the prince that, if Russia and France unreasonably rejected such a proposal, "His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences.° During the day Sir Eduard received two dispatches, one from Saint Petersburg, announcing that general mo bilization had been ordered ain consequence of report received from the Russian amba.ssador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of the Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Serbia. Russia has also reason to be lieve that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.° The other message, frotn Berlin, confirmed the Russian mobilization and an nounced that a state of Kriegsgefahr (Immi nence of War) would be proclaimed at once. According to the chancellor, 'It could only be against Germany that Russian general mobiliza tion was directed.° So far, Germany had not been involved in the dispute, which rested pri marily between Austria and Russia.