Realizing that the prospects of a peaceful so lution were growing more remote every hour, Sir Edward returned to the problem of Bel gium. Cabling to the British ambassadors at Berlin and Paris, he expressed a hope that the situation was not irretrievable, but that in view of a prospect of a mobilization in Germany it became essential to the British government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether France and Germany each were prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violated it. In a note to Brussels he assumed "that the Belgian government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neu trality, which I desire and expect other powers to uphold and observe.° France immediately promised to respect that neutrality; Germany made no direct reply. Four days later, on 4 August, Prince Lichnowslcy was instructed to assure the British government that, °even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Ger many will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory° ; that the German army could not be exposed to French attack across Bel gium, awhich was planned according to abso lutely unimpeachable information,* and that "Germany had consequently to disregard Bel gian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.° (German troops had entered Belgium on that day). On 1 August Prince Lichnowsky asked Sir Edward Grey whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate the neutrality of Bel gium, England would engage to remain neu tral. Sir Edward replied that he could not give such a promise; that the attitude of Great Britain would be determined largely by public opinion, to which the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly. The prince then pressed Sir Edward to formulate conditions on which England would remain neutral, and °even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.° The British minister afelt obliged to refuse definitely any prornise to remain neutral on similar terms,0 and said that England must ((keep her hands free.° On the same day the British min ister at Brussels reported that aBelgitun ex pects and desires that other Powers will ob serve and uphold her neutrality, which she in tends to maintain to the utmost of her power.° On 3l July Germany suddenly dispatched an ultimatum to Russia demanding that she should countermand her mobilization within 12 hours; the tinie limit to expire at 11 o'clock the next day. The British ambassador in Paris an nounced that the German embassy there was packing up. Late in the evening the French government advised their representative in London that German army corps from Metz, Cologne, Treves and Strassburg had been moved close to the frontier and that German patrols had already entered French territory. It must be borne in mind that at this time Aus tria and Russia were engaged in negotiations, for on 1 August Sir Edward Grey wired to Sir Goschen in Berlin, " I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained be fore any Great Power begins war. The Russian Gov ernment has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia . . . and to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested. Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that the German Government nay be abk to make use of the Russian communications referred to above. in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government [British] are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters." On presenting this note to the German Secre tary of State, Sir E. Goschen °spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Ger many was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evi dent, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her ovvn account, it seemed to me [Sir E. Goschen] only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement.° In reply, the minister attributed Austria's acquiescence to German in fluence at Vienna, and that all would have been well had not Russia mobilized against Germany. But Russia by abstaining from answering Ger many's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also, and that Ger many must regard the refusal to answer as acreating a state of war.* Here it is apposite to quote from the Paris Matin of 5 Feb. 1919, which published a statement made by the for mer Italian premier, Signor Salandra, to the effect that after Austria had begun hostilities against Serbia and had found that Russia was mobilizing, Count Berchtold hesitated and wanted to turn back, but that "Germany inter vened and obliged her ally to continue the war.° During the time from 29 to 31 July an ex change of telegrams took place between the kaiser, the tsar and King George. The kaiser drew the attention of the tsar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilization and to the continuance of his own activity in the direction of mediation. The tsar responded on the 31st, thanked the kaiser, and pointed out that it was technically impossible to discontinue mobiliza tion, which had been rendered necessary by Austria's action. The tsar promised that his troops would undertake no provocative action so long as the negotiations with Austria con tinued. The German Emperor replied that the responsibility for the safety of his ldngdom (Prussia) compelled him to take retaliatory measures. (My efforts to maintain the peace of the world have now readied their utmost possible limit,* said the kaiser, declaring that it lay with the tsar to avoid war by ordering cessation of military tneasures. The tsaes swstion to submit the Austro-Serbian quarrel to The Hague Tribunal went unanswered. The kaiser also telegraphed to King George an out line of his communications to the tsar, ddio replied with a personal appeal to the emperor *to leave still open grotmds for negotiation and possible peace.* In one dispatch to the tsar the German Emperor declared that ((the pro pmis made by the Germim government in Vietma were conceived entirely on dte lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German govenmient recommended them in Vienna for their serious consideration.* This statement seems to indicate that Germany, while offering no suggestion of her own, apparently consid ered the British proposals as sufficiendy satis factory for Austria to accept— if they were intended to be accepted. ((Owing to the action of Russia,* reads the kaisees message, 6the Austrian answer . . . was not given.* It may be left to future historians to speculate on the problem, if it promised a solution of the diffi culty, why that answer was not given. Ao mrding to the German (White Book> Russian troops are said to have crossed the frontier the same afternoon that the tsar's telegram was sent This publication bore the subhead, ((How Russia and her Rules betrayed Germany's Con fidence and thereby made the European War.* The first Russian troops entered German ter ritory on 3 August, three days after the dec laration of war by Germany. • Meanwhile, in the evening of 31 July, the German ambassador in Pans called on the French foreign minister, informed him of the uhimatum that had been sent to Russia, and said that he would return at 1 P.M. on the fol
lowing day to learn what attitude the French government proposed to adopt in the circum stances. He returned next morning and was told that the French government failed to conrprehend the reason prompting his conuntmi cation of the previous evening. It was pointed out to him that .general mobilization in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilization and that the Rus sian govenunent was ready to demobilize if all powers did likewise. (It seemed strange to the French government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German government should have at that moment presented an ulti matum at Saint Petersburg requiring inune diate demobilization by Russia. There was no difference between France and Germany, but the German tunbassador had made a menacing communication to the French and had re quested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to brealc off relations and leave Paris if the reply was not satisfactory.* The ambassador stated ((that he had packed up.* Later in the day he received his answer, namely,. that the French Republic ((would be forced to consult her own interests.* The German ambassador then announced to the French premier that a state of war existed between Germany and France. At 3A0 P.M. (1 August) a general mobilization of the French army was ordered. The troops nearest the German fron tier were ordered to leave a zone of 10 kilo meters between themselves and the German boundary line, in order to avoid a collision. On the same day German troops entered Lux embourg.
In the morning the British Cabinet held a meeting and after its close Sir Edward Grey gave the French ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, an assurance that if the German fleet came into the Channel or through the North Sea to under take hostile operations agatnst French coasts or shipping, the British fleet would give all the protection in its power. This assurance was given subject to the policy of the govenunent receiving the support of Parliament and was not to be taken as binding the govenunent to take any action until the contingency of action bdel: German fleet took place. On 3 August ny demanded permission from Belgtum to send troops through that country on the pretext that this proceeding would help Bel gium to prevent the violation of her territory. Berlin was, of course, well aware that France had already solemnly promised to respect the neutrality of Belgium. About the nine the German amtessador in Paris was carrying out his instructions, M. Sssonov was expressing his gratitude to the British government, 6which had done so much to save the situation? and that ((it would be largely due to them if war were prevented.* Even at this bate hour, when Russia, France and Germany were already tech nically at war, there were indications of Austrian wavering. Acting on instructions from Count Berchtold, the Austrian ambassador in Paris assured the French foreign minister that there was no intention on the part of Austria to im pair the sovereignty or territorial rights of Serbia. Simultaneously, the Russian ambas sador in Vienna was 6begged* by Count Berch told to do his best to remove the wholly errone ous impression in Saint Petersburg that the gdoor had been banged* by Austria on all further conversations. Special attenTion was • drawn to the fact that the conversations Thad not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.* This naturally gives rise to the question, If negotia tions had not been broken off by either of the two prindpal disputants, who did break them off? As M. Sazonov described the situation, 6Gerinany was unforturiate in her representa tives in Vienna [the late Herr von Tschir schky) and at Saint Petersburg [Count Pour tales]) ; the former was 6a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on,* and the latter had represented to his govertunent that ((Russia would never go to war.* He (M. Sazonov) 6had accepted every proposal that had been held out to him. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation be tween Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had re fused them altogether.* A time limit of 12 hours was attached to the German ultimatinn to Belgium, with a threat, in case of refusal to permit the passaie of German troops, to treat Belgium as an enemy. Without hesitation the Belgian government answered that an attack upon their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that t,o accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honor of a nation. "Con scious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means?) Dur ing the day the French ambassador in London asked Sir Edward Grey what England would say about Belgian neutrality. The minister replied that the violation of Belgitun was a more important matter than the Luxembourg raid, and added, °we are considering what statement we should make in Parliament to morrow— in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a came belli?) The French government offered the support of five French army corps to the Bel gian govenunent. The latter replied (3 Au gust) : "We are sincerely grateful to the French government for offering eventual support. In the circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the ntee of the Powers?) Meanwhile, witiatrawas the attitude of Italy, a partner of Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance? The full conditions of that alliance were never made public till October 1919. Con trary to general belief, the treaty contained no detailed military provisions; its spirit being purely defensive in case of an unprovoked attack upon any one of the partners. It was definitely laid down, however, that Italy was not expected to come to the aid of Germany in a war with Russia, while in 1896 Italy had notified her partners that she would not join them in any war in which France and England were aligned on the same side against the Central Powers. Furthermore, Italy was not to be called upon to fight against England. (New York Times, 24 Oct. 1919). Italy's attitude in the great crisis is explained in the following message from Sir Edward Grey to the British ambassador in Paris on 3 Aug. 1914: "The French ambassador made the following com munication: (In reply to the German Govern ment's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister, d. 16 Oct 1914], replied that the war undertalcen by Austria, and the con sequences which might result, had, in the words of the German ambassador himself, an aggress ive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.) In making this com munication, M. Cambon was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggress ive war, and that, for this reason, the casus fccderis under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.D On the news of the German declaration of war reaching England, all the naval reserves were called out and a partial moratorium was proclaimed in order to avert a financial crisis.