War was declared on Serbia 28 July 1914. On 29.July Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor, told the British ambassador that he was °pressing the buttonp as hard as he Could in Vienna, but was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at the Austrian capital that matters had been PreeiDitated rather than otherwise. On the sur face it appeared as though every one of the powers was working hard to preserve peace with, apparently, one e3cception —Austria, for on the morning of the day when the ultimatum had expired the Vienna press comments left °the impression that the surrender of Serbia was neither expected nor really desired?) Great Britain participated in three attempts for peace. Seconded by Russia she had urged Vienna to extend the time limit and together they had begged Germany to join in this effort. Berlin consented to pass the message on to Vienna. Nothing availed to avert the catastrophe. Aus tria had refused extension of time; the German ambassador in Vienna told his British colleague there that the Serbian concessions were a sham; that Austria was determined to punish Serbia; that Russia would keep quiet during the process and, finally, that Germany knew very well what she was about in baddng up Austria in the matter. ((White Paper,) No. 32). Austria had disclaimed any intention of taking Serbian terri tory, though Russia' certainly did not believe that Austna, once at war, would or could stop bhort of crushing Serbia entirely. Every diplo mat foresaw what would happen unless Austria or Russia gave wax: Russia coming to the aid of Serbia would inevitably bring Germany to the side of Austria; France would just as inevi tably join Russia.
So far, at least five nations would be in volved. There yet rem,ained two unknown quantities— Great Britain and Italy. True, Italy was a partner with Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance, but very few who had followed European affairs closely since 1905, seriously believed that Italy would join her allies in a war against France. The conditions which had originally led Italy into that alliance no longer existed. Above all, and this was a circumstance of which the outside world was unaware until two months after the end of the war, namely, that Italy and France had con cluded a secret treaty in 1902. For Italy it was a °reinsurance' treaty precisely as those which Bismarck had concluded with Russia. By this instrument Italy and France mutually tuidertook not to participate in any war against the other. Signed in November 1902, the text of this treaty remained strictly secret; the mutual promise therein made and lcept contribn ted decisively to maintain the peace of Europe for 12 years, and when the Great War came, the pact of 1902 was fotmd to be so completely in harmony with Franco-Italian sentiments and interests that one might say no diplomatic act was ever more ratified by peoples and events. In the circumstances, therefore, the existence of this treaty being unlcnown at the time, the Central Powers probably expected Italy would preserve a °friendly neutrality?) An important questical asked, not only by Europe and the world at large, but by the British people them selves was— what would Great Britam do? On 26 July 1914 Sir Edward Grey submitted to Paris, Berlin and Rome his proposal for the ambassadors of those three disinterested powers to meet him in conference in London, suggesting that Auatria, Russia and Serbia should meanwhile suspend all active military operations pending the result of the conference. France and Italy agreed at once and Russia de clared her readiness to stand aside; Germany alone rejected the proposal on the ground that it would practically constitute a ((court of arbi tration* and proposed instead that Austria and Russia should negotiate directly with each other. Considering that those two powers followed two utterly irreconcilable policies, the German counter-proposal promised little hope of a peaceful solution. However, negotiations were actually begun between Saint Petersburg and Vienna when Austria suddenly declared war. Moreover, as Austria had refused even to discuss the Serbian reply, there could hardly be useful grounds for negotiation with Russia, seeing that the Serbian reply was the paramount point at issue in the whole dispute. M. Sam
nov urged Sir Edward Grey to induce Ger many to indicate, even at the llth hour, under what terms she would consent to work for a peaceful settlement. The final stage of the crisis was reached on 29 July: Russia was par tially mobilizing in her southern provinces; the Austrians were bombarding Belgrade; Bel gium was mobilizing for self-defense; the Ger snan High Sea Fleet was recalled to port and the British navy was concentrating in the North Sea. Never, perhaps, in its long history had the world experienced a more dramatic day. At 4 in the afternoon Sir Edward Grey tele graphed to Berlin as requested by M. Sazonov, urging the German government, if they did not like the idea of the ambassadors' conference in the fonn he had sugge.sted, to suggest any other form they pleased. 4Mediation,* he said, 4was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace.* At michfight, a council of war was held at Potsdam, presided over by the lcaiser. Judging from what followed immediately after that meeting, there is reason to believe that its de liberations were concerned less with the ques tion of peace or war than with the problem of Great Britain's attitude in the event of war. Straight from the council chamber, the Im perial Chancellor sent for the British ambassa dor and made (the following strong bid for British neutrality*: So far as he (the Chan cellor) was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, ait was clear that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neu trality of Great Britain were certain, every as surance would be given to die British Govern ment that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.* cop. at. No. 85) The ambassador then asked the chancellor about the French colonies, to which the latter replied that he. was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect As to Belgium, he said that it de pended upon the action of France what opera tions Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Bel gian integrity would be respected if that coun try had' not sided against Germany. Continu ing, the chancellor said that ever since he had held office he had labored to bring about an understandintywtiith England. What he had in mind was a eral neutrality agreement* be tween EngIan and Germany and that Ian as surance of British neutrality in the conflict, which the present crisis might produce, would enable him to look forward to the realization of his desire.* At this stage the ambassador presented the following note he had received from Sir Edward Grey earlier in the day: . . . 4The Chancellor may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to COM! into collision with her, we shall join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having preserved the peace of Europe.* Within a few hours the British answer to the German proposal arrived in Berlin: 4His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment en tertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colo nies. From the niaterial point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, cotdd be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power, and becotne subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bar gain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace froin which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not enter . . . You should tain that barn either.