While the Serbian reply to the Austrian ulti matunt was pending, the German ambassadors in Saint Petersburg, Lcrndon and Paris called upon the respective foreign ministers of Rus sia, Great Britain and France and informed them that Germany approved the form and sub stance of the Austrian note, adding that, if the quarrel between Austria and Serbia were not localized, dangerous friction might arise be tween the Triple Entente and the Triple Alli ance. Sir Edward (now Lord) Grey, on behalf of the British government, at once informed Count Mensdorff, the Austrian ambassador in London, that he had never before seen one state address to another independent state so formidable a document. He specially depre cated the imposition of a time-limit at this stage of the proceedings, as it allowed no time for mediatory measures. On 24 July the Ger man government communicated a note to the powers declaring the guilt of Serbia and that the Austrian demands could only be regarded as (equitable and moderate,* emphasizing at dte same time that °every interference of another power would, owing to the different treaty ob ligations, be followed by incalculable conse quences.' In reply, Sir Edward Grey reminded the German ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky (q.v.), that some days before the latter had expressed a personal hope that Eng land would endeavor to use moderating mflu ence with Russia, but now, in view of the seri ously stern character of the Austrian note and the shortness of time allowed, he (Sir Edward) felt quite helpless so far as Russia was con. cerned, and he did not believe any power could exercise influence alone. The only dunce he saw was that the four disinterested pre:rhiovz Germany, France, England and Italy, work together simultaneously at Saint Peters burg and Vienna in favor of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Rus sia becoming threatening. The Britishnlgele re sentative at Belgiade was at once lust to the effect that Serbia should give Austria the fullest satisfaction; that "she certainly ought to express concern and regret." The ultimatum brought forth the follovnttg from that inflame tial German newspaper, the Rheiniach-West. phillische Zeitung, on 24 July: The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum is nothing but a pretext for war, and this time a dangerous As it seems, we are on the brink of an Austro-Serbian war. — . It is a shame if the Imperial Government had not required that demands of this kiud should be sub mitted to it beforeluind. Our one duty pow is to do. dare that we are not under any obligation to launch into a war to further the aggressive policy of the Haw burgers.
Everything depended upon Germany at this critical Juncture; as the Russian foreigu min ister, M. Sazonov, said a few days later, the key of the situation was to be found at Berlin. Privately the German foreign minister ex pressed his doubts as to the ultimatum; offi cially, the German government regarded it as "equitable and moderate" and "de.sired urgently the localimtion of the conflict," although, on this date, 24 July, there was as yet no conflict to localize. On that same morning M. Snow/ summoned the French and British ambassadors in Saint Petersburg and bluntly told them that Austria's action meant war, and he asked for the support of France and Great Britain. The French ambassador pledged the support of France, as was inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The British ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, could give no such assurance on behalf of his country. The next day, 25 July, Sazonov made the following gloomy though truthful prophecy. to Buchanan: ((Austria's ac tion," he said, "is in reality directed against Rus ila. She aims at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishmg her own hegemony there. I do not believe that Germany really wants war, but her attitude will be decided by yours [the British]. If you [Great Britain] take your stand firmly with France and Russia there will be no war. If you fail us now, rivers of blood will flow, and you will in the end be dragged into war." The British ambassador replied that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienria to better purpose as a friend who, if her coun sels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally [of Russia] than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. (British 'White Paper,) Exhibit No.
17). To this M. Sazonov answered, "Unfortu nately Germany is convinced that she can count 'upon your neutrality.' This assertion suggests the question, would there have been no war if Great Britain had from the beginning dedared herself an active partner in the Triple En tente? On 30 July, two days after the war had begun between Austria and Serbia, President Pome.are expressed the same opinion to the British ambassador in Parts: "The President is convinced that peace between the powers is in' the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's govertintent announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a re sult of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude." (Sir F. , Bettie to Sir E. Grey; op. cit. 99).
To return to the ultimatum. Acting on Ras- t sian advice, the Serbian government yielded all the 10 points with tvro reservations—articles 5 and 6— which they asked to be pert:tined to submit to The Hague Tribunal. At 6.30 on the Saturday evening, half an hour after the ex piration of the time-limit, the Austrian minis ter, Baron 'Gies!, left Belgrade, having an nounced that nothing short of cotnplete accept ance would suffice. Serbia urged that the two points to which she could not categorically agree were of a nature calculated to subvert her sovereign independence and contrary to her constitution. From this stage began a week of feverish diplomacy to avert the impending catsup trophe. All the governments concerned have since published more or less of the official cor respondence that was flashed from capital to capital during those momentous days. Whereas the German side laid the blame for the war first on Russia and later on Cleat Britain, the British, Freachand Russian authorities accused Germany —and not so much Austria — of being primarily responsible. The Britiah. diplomatic record was first issued as a (White Paper) on 5 Aug. 1914 and later published in pamphlet form. with the heading, (Great Britain and the European Crisis.) It gives what purports to be a compkte account of all the communications that passed between the Foreign Office and its repre.sentatives in European capitals front 20 Jubr to 4 Aug. 1914, with two memoranda written in London by Sir E. Goschen and Sir Id. de Bunsen, former ambassadors to Berlin and Vienna; these are dated 8 August and 1 September respectively. There seems no rea son to believe that important documents were omitted. The French (Yellow Book) appeared in November 1914 in French and English and contains a complete record of the negotiations. The Russian (Orange Book) (Septeutber 1914) is less complete. The Austrian (Red Book' did not appear till January 1915 and gives a detailed statement of Austro-Serbian relations. It contains very little information of Austro. German relations, but much space is devoted to the negotiations with Russia. The Serbian (Blue Book) and the Belgian (Grey Book) cover less ground, but contain the full texts of important documetits. On 4 Aug. 1914 the Ger man government issued a "Provisional memo randum" entitled "Vorlaufige Denkschrift und Aktenstficice zum Kriegsausbruch." It contains fragments of dispatches; also the telegrams ex changed between. the kaiser and the late tsar, excepting the one from the latter suggesting that the Austro-Serbian problem be laid before The Hague Tribunal. An English translation issued by the German government bore the title of the German (White Book.) Both the Ger man and Austrian records leave much to be de sired; they are not consecutive narratives and produce no evidence of German udiplomauc pressure)) having been exerted on Austria in favor of moderation or a desire to preserve peace, as German statesmen had frequently as serted.