Diplomatic relations between Austria and Serbia were severed on 25 July, though war was not immediately declared. The next day M. Sazonov told the Italian Ambassador that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Serbia to be crushed. Thus the altemative that faced Europe on 25-26 July 1914 amounted to this: Unless Austria was willing to suspend her ac tion she would inevitably and quickly come into collision with Russia. The unexpected ultimatum, the short time limit, and the refusal to extend it in order to permit mediatory dis cussion, justified the general belief that Austria was determined to institute military operations against Serbia at once. In view of the enormous disparity existing between the relative military strength of Austria and Serbia, such a lightning campaign would almost inevitably end in the defeat and occupation of Serbia, thus producing the very situation — that of a fait accompli— which Russia was equally determined to pre vent. Geography made it impossible for Russia to send military assistance into Serbia; she could only act upon Austria herself, and what ever steps might be taken with the object of restraining Austria would necessarily have to be immediate and decisive. Only two ways of exerting pressure were feasible — either a fonnal announcement to Austria that an attack on Serbia would be regarded as a declaration of war against Russia, which was liable to provoke war immediately—or a continuance of friendly negotiations accompanied by a partial mobilization on the Austrian frontier to strengthen the diplomatic protest. The alliance between Austria and Germany being specially directed against Russia, it was not improbable that either method would lead to war, though the second alternative, eventually decided upon by Russia, gave the better promise of a pacific result According to the French acting foreign minister, M. Bienvenu-Martin, the Imperial Council of Ministers met in Saint Petersburg on 25 July in the presence of the tsar, when the mobilization of 13 army corps intended eventually to operate against Austna was con sidered. This mobilization, however, was only to be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not till after notice had been given by the foreign minister, upon whom devolved the duty of fix ing the day, with liberty to continue the negoti ations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russia's policy to this stage had been clearly defined and openly avowed. She had success fully advised Serbia to submit to all possible demands, but had also declared that she would not desert her if war nevertheless should ensue.
Mobilization, if only partial, was obviously necessary to bacic up this determination. It remained for Austria to decide whether the satisfaction of ((punishing Serbia* was worth embroiling, so far as could then be foreseen, herself, Germany, Russia and France in a general war.
From the German point of view, as ex pressed at the time by all the German ambas sadors, the turn of events depended upon Russia; the latter had only to withdraw and acquiesce in any action taken by Austria. On 21 July the Russian ambassador at Vienna had been assured that the forthcoming demands on Serbia gwould be thoroughly acceptable?) He accepted this assurance and went away on his summer vaca tion, with the result that there was no Russian representative in Vienna when the crisis be came acute; furthermore, half the ambassadors in Europe were away on leave at the time President Poincare of France and his foreign minister, M. Viviani, were on the sea, returning from .a visit to Russia. All the German and Austnan accredited diplomats were at their respective posts. While tlie French and British correspondence shows the endeavors of the Triple Entente to compose the quarrel, we have to search the records published at a much later date in order to arrive at any Imowledge of what were the intentions of Germany and Austria. It was not until October 1919, nearly a year after the cessation of hostilities, that Count Berchtold informed a correspondent of the New York American that the repeated con versations he had had with the German am bassador von Tschirschky in Vienna in 1914 ((could create no other impression than that the Gennan government expected warlike action* on the part of Austria as against Serbia. *Espe cially a conversation I had with him during the early half of July,g said Berchtold, *convinced me that if we did not show this time that we were in earnest, then on the next occasion Berlin not only would not support us but would in fact 'orient) itself in some other direction, In June 1918, Mr. Morgenthau, United States am
bassador in Constantinople 1913-16, published in The World's Work that the German am bassador Wangenheim at Constantinople had gone to Berlin early in July 1914 and, on his return to Constantinople shortly after, had told him (Mr. Morgenthau) that he had attended a conference at Potsdam over which the kaiser presided. aWangenheim now told me that the kaiser solemnly put the question to each man (present] in turn, was he ready for war. All replied (yes) except the financiers. They said that they must have two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make loans . . . then the several members went quietly back to their work or started on vacations. The kaiser went to Norway on his yacht, von Bethmann Hollweg left for a rest, and Wangenhe!m re turned to Constantinople?) Continuing his nar rative, Mr. Morgenthau says, °In telling me about this conference, Wangenheim., of course, admitted that Germany had precipitated the war. I think he was rather proud of the whole performance; proud that Germany had gone about the matter in so methodical and far-seeing a way ; especially proud that he himself had been invited to participate in so. momentous a gathering. . . . The conspiracy that has caused this greatest of human tragethes was hatched by the kaiser and his imperial,crew at this Potsdam conference of 5 July 1914. One of the chief partidpants, flushed with his triumph at the apparent success of the plot, told me Me details with his own mouth.* The Serbian minister Yovanovitch, already referred to, pub lished a report of a conversation he held with von Tschirschky in Vienna (apparently before the Serajtvo affair), in whic,h he begged the German ambassador to use his influence in Vienna in the direction of a pacific settlement of the Oriental Railways and the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest questions. The Ger man replied, °Until there has been a war be tween you and Austria-Hungary, not one of the questions that you are actually neg,otiating with that country can be settled. Yes! first the war, and then the settlement?) (Balkan, Review, London, March 1919). Again, on 25 July 1914 Count Szogyeny, Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, telegraphed to the minister of foreign affairs at Vienna, °It is generally admitted here [in Berlin] that, in case of a possible refusal by Serbia, our immediate declaration of war win coincide with the military operations. A delay in the initiation of military operations is con sidered here as a great danger because of the intervention of other powers. We are urgently advised to begin immediately and to confront the world with an accomplished fact? (M. Barthou in the French chamber, before the peace committee, 7 Aug. 1919). Two days later, when Serbia had replied, Szogyiny telegraphed: °The Secretary of State [Herr von Jagow] in forms me in a very clear and confidential state ment that in the near future possible proposals of mediation on the part of England may be sent to your Excellency by the German govern ment. The German government binds itself in the most solemn way not to associate itself in any way with these proposals; on the contrary, it ts absolutely opposed to their examination and will transmit them only to comply with England's request?) (Current History, New York, October 1919). Five days. before the ultimatum was launched, the Bavanan minister in Berlin notified his government in Munich on 18 July 1914 that he had had an interview with the German Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, from whom he gathered that (('IU step which the Vienna Cabinet has decided to talce at Belgrade . . . will occur on the 25th of the present month. The deferring of this action until that time is based on the desire to await the departure of MM. Poincare and Viviani from Saint Petersburg in order to make an agreement between the Dual Alliance Poivers [Russia and Franoe] for counteraction tnore difficult. *Until that time the appearance of padfic intentions will be feigned in Vienna by the simultaneous granting of leave of absence to the minister of war and the head of the General Staff? The last-mentioned official, who was field marshal Conrad von Hoetzendorff, began the publication of his recollections in April 1919, nearly six months after Austria had suffered defeat. In these he testifies to return ing from a feigned holiday in Tyrol (where he had gone after the Seraievo affair), and at tendin.g a meeting of ministers at the foreign office in Vienna. Count Berchtold presided and asked the field marshal's advice on some mill tar.y. details. The latter did not conceal his oputton that the monarchy was unequal to the demands of war on three fronts. Three days later von Hoetzendorff was present when the late Emperor Francis Joseph signed the decla ration of war.