German troops invaded Belgium on 3 August, when the king of the Belgians telegraphed to King George: "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friend ship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard die integrity of Belgium?) Sir Edward Grey immediately instructed the British ambassador in Berlin to protest against the violation of a treaty to which Germany, in common with England, was a party, and to request an assur ance that the demand made upon Belgium would not be proceeded with and that her neutrality would be respected. Next morning (4 August), however, the German minister in Brussels handed the Belgian foreign minister a note to the effect that as the Belgian govern ment had declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial government the latter would, deeply to their regret, be com pelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces. A state of war now existed also between France and Germany, for cm the evening of 3 August the German ambassador in Pans had handed the following document to the French premier: "The German military and administrative authorities have as certamed that a number of hostile acts have been committed on German territory by French military aviators. Some of the latter have vio lated the neutrality of Belgium, invading its territory. [Here follow some fictitious details of alleged attacks on Niiremberg, etc.]. I IUD directed and have the honor to inform your Excellency that in consequence of these aggres sions the German Empire considers itself at war with France, due to the acts of this latter power?) An interesting sequel to the German charges came to light 22 months later. In June 1916, Professor Schwalde, editor-in-chief of die German Week1T Review of Medicine, pub lished in that penodical: nt is false that French aviators threw any bombs on Niiremberg on 2 Aug. 1914. The Mayor of the city recently wrote to the general commanding the Third Bavarian Army Corps that he never had any knowledge of any bombardment of the stations of Niiremberg, Kissingen, or of Niiremberg Ansbach before or after the declaration of the war?) To return to 4 Aug. 1914. Germany made one more' attempt, through her ambassador in London, to dispel any mistrust that might sub sist on the part of the British government with regard to German intentions, by repeating most positively the assurance that, even in the case of artned conflict with Belgium, Germany would under no pretense whatever annex Belgian ter ritory. "Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that the German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to unimpeachable informa tion. Germany has consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent a Frenc.h advance?) Simultaneously, Brussels announced that Ger man troops had entered Belgian territory, and that Liege had been summoned to surrender by a small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed. The die was cast. Sir Edward Grey now instructed the British ambassador in Berlin to say that a satisfactory reply to his telegram was expected in London by mid night. "If not, you are . . . to ask for your• passports, and to say that His Maj esty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Bel gium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves?' Sir Edward Goschen delivered this message to Herr von Jagow, who at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be °No?' as German troops having crossed the frontier that morning. Belgian neutrality was already vio lated. The foreign minister explained that Germany had been obliged to take this step as she had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest route, so as to be able to get well ahead with her operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. By adopting the more southern route they could not hope, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to get through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an in exhaustible supply of troops. Sir Edward Goschen pointed out that this accomplished vio lation of Belgium rendered the situation exceed ingly grave, and asked whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible con sequences. The minister replied that it was impossible for Germany to draw back. At a later interview in the evening the British am bassador again asked the same question and received the same answer, namely, that it was too late. Sir Edward Goschen then called upon the German chancellor and found him °very agitated?) The chancellor °at once began a harangue, which lasted about 20 minutes?) He said that the step talcen by the British govern ment was terrible to a degree; just for a word — °neutrality?" a word, which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for (ea scrap of paper° Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which he had .devoted himself since his accession to .office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What England had done, he said, was °un thinkable.; it was °like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life ag-ainst two assailants.° He also held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.
The British ambassador protested strongly against that statement and said that, just as it was considered a matter of life or death for Germany to violate Belgian neutrality for strutegical reasons, so was it also a matter of life and death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The chancellor said, °But at what price will that compact have been kept. . . . Has the British Government thought of that?) The ambassador hinted that fear of conse quences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but °his Ex cellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving. he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater, that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relauons between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Rus.sia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our en, gagements, we could not possibly avoid. . .0 About 9 P.M. Sir Edward Goschen dis patched a telegraphic report of the interview, but the message never readied the Foreign Office in London. At 9.30 the German Under Secretary of State called on the ambassador and expressed his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between them were about to cease. He also "casually) asked whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. Sir Edward Goschen replied that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in the present case the British government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. The German official said it was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.
Not long after the minister had departed, Berlin was startled by a flying sheet, issued by the Tageblatt, stating that .Great Britain had declared war on Gernaany. The immediate re .sult of this news was the assemblage of an excited and unruly crowd before the British embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon over powered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. °We took no notice of this demonstration so long as it wa.s confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we all were sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the chief of police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantne.ss occurred.° After order had been restored Herr von Jagow called at the embassy and expressed his regrets. He said that the
behavior of his countrymen had made him feel snore ashamed than he had words to express. °It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin?) Next morning (5 August) the kaiser sent an aide-de-camp with the following message: °The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from these occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British field-marshal and British admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles?) In his report on the incident Sir Edward Goschen stated that the above message °lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery)) At 11 A.m. the British ambassador was handed his passports, and the last thread between England and Germany was broken. Sir Edward Goschen paid a glowing tribute to the great assistance rendered °to us all° by the American ambassador, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. °Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the Embassy, his Ex cellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely diffi cult situations at some personal risk to him self, and his calmness and and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient hands?) At this particular stage (5 Aug. 1914) the European situation presented a strange mosaic of international complications. Austria was at war with Serbia, but not with Russia; nor with France and England. Germany was at war with Russia, France, England and Belgium, but not with Serbia; Italy had declared her neutrality. While German troops were al ready operating in France and Belgium, Russia still abstained from attacking Austria. The Russian ambassador had been instructed to remain at his post in Vienna till war should be actually declared by Austria. This only hap pened on the 6th, when Count Berchtold in formed the foreign missions in Vienna that the Austrian ambassador at Saint Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian gov ernment that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Serbian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria considered herself also at war with Russia. On the 10th, France declared war on Austria, and on the 12th Great Britain followed suit. The participation of Japan in the war was due partly to consklera tions of policy based upon her alliance with Great Britain, who asked her (in August 1914) to safeguard their joint interests in the Far East, and partly to an unforgotten incident that happened nearly 20 years before. In 1894-95 Japan had defeated China in war and had failed to get satisfaction commensurate with her victory owing to the diplomatic inter vention of Russia and Germany. (See HIS TORICAL Itrnionucrrom in this department). Japan had wiped off her score with Russia 10 years later in a great war, and after another decade the opportunity was offered her of settling with Germany. But while grievances sometimes rankle in the minds of nations for many years, they are not often seized upon as a pretext for war. Since 1902 Japan had been an ally of Great Britain. The treaty existing between the two countries had been renewed in 1%5 and revised in 1911. Its provisions were operative only in the Far East and covered the maintenance of general peace in Eastern Asia and India, the preservation and integrity of China, and the principle of equal opportuni ties for the commerce and industry of all nations in China, besides the maintenance of the territorial rights and defense of the special interests of the contracting parties in Eastern Asia and India. It was also provided that °if by reason of unprovolced attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers, either party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests, the other party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.0 A new article was added in 1911 to the effect that °should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this agree ment shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.* This proviso presumably had specially in view the Anglo-American unlimited Arbitration Treaty signed in 1911, but not subsequently ratified by the United States Senate. On 15 Aug. 1914 Japan delivered an ultimatum to Germany de manding (1) an immediate withdrawal of all German armed vessels from Japanese and Chinese waters, and (2) the unconditional de livery of the leased territory of Kiao-chau at a date not later than 23 August, at noon, in order that it might be restored to China. As no answer was received by the specified time, Japan promptly declared war on that day and proceeded at once to active hostilities against the German forces stationed on the Tsing-tau Peninsula. In 1914 Japan possessed twice the naval and military strength which she had when she began the war with Russia in /904. The wheel of fate had come full circle with a vengeance. The participation of Turkey in the war on the side of Germany and Austna-Hun gary was the consummation of a process that had been in operation for many years. Germany began to take a tnore than. platonic interest in the decadent Turkish Empire not long after the signing of the Berlin Treaty in 1878. A German military mission under Gen eral von der Goltz was sent to Turkey to assist in reorganizing the Turkish army and a group of German financiers began to apply for railway concessions. The kaiser visited the sultan in 1889, and not long afterward the plan of a German railroad through Turlcish territory to the Persian Gulf began to assume shape. In 1898 the kaiser again visited Constantinople and this time made a spectacular tour of the Holy Land, proclaiming himself under all cir cumstances the friend of the 300,000,000 Mo hammedans in the world. Both Germany and Austria-Hungary had a °Drang nach Osten) or °push toward the east' policy in view, the former seelcing an outlet frona her geograpluc ally encircled position and the latter a pre dominance in the Balkans. The situation was well explained by the Frankfurter Zeitung a few months before the outbreak of the Euro pean War, on 7 Jan. 1914: (A war with Eng land, France and Russia at the time appears, fortunately, to be ever more improbable, but the possibility of such a conflict cannot be ex cluded . . . The Triple Alliance countries [Germany, Austria and Italy], Which are com pelled to have recourse to large armies, cannot hope to compete successfully with the fleets of England and France on the high seas . . . Where, then, shall the Triple Alliance countries look for their raw material if their sea routes are cut off? There is only one means of land communication, and it leads through Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey into Asia Minor . . . The states lying on the eastern border of Hungary and Asia Minor have, indeed, no choice: They must be the friends and allies of the Triple Alliance, or they must redcon with the unflinching hostility of the Triple Alliance in any conflict which threatens their inde pendence. Austria, too, has no choice. Either the countries on the Lower Danube must be her friends, or she must exterininate them . . . The German military mission in Constantinople is not merely helping to reorganize the Turlash army out of pure joy . . . Bismarck could not have foreseen that this territory . would one day become so essential a route for Gennan imports that we should not, if necessary, shrink from a conflict with Russia to maintain our freedom of trade there.) Thus those B states which did not fall in with the plan waloldi have to be exterminated. By an agreement in 1894 Rumania was linked to Austria; Bulgaria was evidently regarded as ((safe,* while Serbia remained the sole obstacle. During the first month of the European War Turkey maintained an uneasy neutrality. The escape of the Goebert and Breslau into the Dardanelles hastened matters. German men, gold and arms were sent to Turkey through Bulgaria and Gen. Li man von Sanders became a high official in the Turkish army. The army was mobilized and large quantities of war stores were dispatched to Bagdad and Syria; the Dardanelles forts were strengthened and an approaching lehad (holy war) was preached by German agents. The lcaiser was represented as a convert to Islam and stories were circulated of Moham medan uprisings in British, Russian and Frew% territories. Egypt was believed to be ready to revolt, and the khedive's sympathies had al ready been secured. The sultan, a mere figure head, and his grand vizier and finance minis ter were opposed to war, while the Turkish Kople were by no means hostile to the Allies.