THE DECIDING CAMPAIGN OF 1918.
1. The Crisis of the War.—In the beginning of 1918 the will to war was visibly lower in the peoples of Europe. Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey were at the limit of their powers and their peoples had become apathetic. On the side of the Entente the Russian war spirit had disappeared and with it went the old Russian government In Italy war weariness had made vast strides; and it was known that only the presence of British and French troops in large numbers had stayed the tide of collapse late in 1917. In France and Great Britain the burden of war was heavy and although the people did not talk of quitting, a disposition to discuss terms showed that they longed for peace. In Germany there was a great deal of suffering and a corresponding desire for peace; but national pride was fed by the achievements of the army and overcame the popular war weariness. It wa.s much to the German that his country had held her own for three and a half years against the strongest states in Europe, and while doing so had won great victories. A nation still gain ing victories in the field could not be expected to cease fighting and ask for peace; but if vic tory should turn to defeat, her restrained war weariness was likely to have full sway, and startling results might be expected.
Germany, however, saw no reason to fear such an untoward turn of events. On 3 March she completed her conquest of Russia by forcing the Bolshevik government to sign the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Since the beginning of the year it had been evident that this governtnent was at her mercy, and the process of transferring troops frotn the Eastern Front to the west, which had been carried on to some extent in 1917, now wept on apace. Her Eastern Front no longer ousted. In 1914 her plan was to crush France and then throw all her strength against Russia. After many months of hard fighting she had succeeded in crushing Russia and was about to throw all her force into the work of winning a victory in France.
General Ludendorff's memoirs contain in teresting light on the German view of the situ ation at the time. He had choice in 1918, says the author, of two policies, to attack or to take the offensive behind strong entrenchments. He adopted the first course for several reasons: (1) It was necessary to win a great victory to keep the German prestige alive in Austria-Hun gary, Bulgaria and Turkey; (2) it was likely that the Aflies would break through any way if the defensive policy was assumed; and (3) there was every reason to win a decision before the Americans arrived in force. Having come to this conclusion orders were given for, com plete preparations for an attack on the grandest scale.
The sector chosen for the blow was north and south of Saint Quentin, which was believed to be the weakest point in the Allied line. Other
sectors were debated and rejected, the Ypres region because the ground there was too muddy in the early spring, and the sector of the Chemin des Dames because it was too strong. Ten weeks were given to special training for the at tack. In the beginning Germany had 192 divi sions in France, and more than half of them were placed opposite the British lines. For breaking-through tactics she set aside 70 of the best For meeting the fate gathering against them the Allies were badly situated. In the first place they had the exterior lines of a great angle. By massing troops on the interior the Germans could strilce at one side or the other with concentrated force, and the Allies could not quicicly move reinforcements around the point of the angle. The railroads within the an gle were numerous and well planned for com munication across its area, while those to the west of it ran off to the south toward Paris, and those on the south side of the salient ran off to the southwest.
Another disadvantage of the Allies was in their disunited command. The German armies moved at the direction of one will, which hap pened to be the will of General Ludendorff, a master of the military art. While General Petain and General Haig were always in per fect accord they were nevertheless acting in separate spheres of activity. In an emergency there was no tim,e to ask for co-operation, even though it was certain that it could be obtained for the asking. This division of the command was a weakness well understood by the military experts on each side, and efforts had been made for its removal. In November 1917, after the disastrous campaign in Italy, the Allied War Council at Versailles was created to obtain greater unity of action. Its functions, how ever, were only advisory. Its first members were General Foch, for France, Gen. Henry Wilson, for Great Britain, and General Cadorna, for Italy, and later General Bliss for the United States. The creation of the council was chiefly the work of Mr. Lloyd George, who spoke so frankly about the need of unity that he aroused a storm among his political enemies at home. It soon appeared that the council had little real authority, and the three eminent men first appointed resigned to be followed by persons of less prestige. Then— in February 1918 — an attempt was made to increase the authority of the council. At this Sir VVilliam Robertson, the British chief of staff, resigned. Immediately a popular outcry was raised against the Prime Minister, but he appealed to the good sense of the country and weathered the storm. He did not dare, however to go farther in his efforts in favor of unified command. That wis a step which only a vast disaster could wring out of the Briton.