General Haig concluded that Gough's 5th Army was unequal to the task of defense and withdrew it, putting in its place a body of hastily organized troops called the 4th Army to which eral Rawlinson with his staff was transferred from the old 4th Army. For five days they held back the attacics of their oppo nents, whose only gain was to thrust a sharp angle to the west at Moreuil, where they were five miles from the Paris Railroad. It was retaken two days later, passed to the Germans on the next day, and was recaptured by the British on the day after that, which was 1 April. On this day the French were arriving in force and took over the line to a point five miles south of the Somme. After two days of relaxation the drive was renewed on 4 April, when the French were driven bacic by massed attacks until the line stood two miles from the railroad. It went no farther, for two French armies now arrived and tht. line was made safe. Four months later the Allies were able to drive back their opponents until the line was a safe distance from the railroad. But the battle itself came to an end with the German attacks of 6 April, which ended disastrously for the Ger mans. The armies in the salient were exhausted and it was necessary, to let them rest while other armies took up the task of defeating the British.
Thus ended the operations which some persons have called the second battle of 'the Somme, but which is persistently referred to as the drive of 21 March. It was a surprise attack on a vast scale and in superior numbers. In the beginning the Germans threw 64 divisions against 32 British divisions. When it ended the Germans had used more than 80 and the British had used 49 divisions. In the beginning the Germans had used such concentrations, which their interior lines made possible, that they were in the ratio of three or four to one at the points of actual contact. As they marched forward they came to the region they had devastated in the preceding spring and fonnd it haxder to move their troops behind their own lines. The battle came to an end when the Germans in the salient had exhausted their strength and gone as far ahead of their heavy artillery as they dared go. They made an ad vance • of 30 miles at the deepest point and announced the capture 70,000 prisoners and snore than 1,000 guns.
On 23 March they began a long range bom bardment of Paris with a battery of 8.4-inch guns, firing from a position 70 or more miles from the city. When the first shell arrived French experts were astonished at the feat. Some refused to believe that it was fired from a cannon, suggesting that it was dropped from an airplane flying so high that the machine was invisible. But the arrival of the shells at regular intervals of 20 minutes disproved that theory. Like the dropping of bombs on London and other English towns, the military effect was slight It was meant for an attack on the French morale; but Parisians paid little atten tion. On Good Friday one of the shells struck the church of Saint Gervais in the older part of Paris, while the edifice was filled with worshippers, wrecking the building and killing 75 and wounding 90 of the worshippers. At a
time when Germany was bending all her efforts to end the war with an early peace she chose this means of terrifying her foes into sub mission, and only goaded them into fury. Had she offered the world a first evidence of respect for humane feeling by suspending her bombard ment on Good Friday, as she might well have done, the effect on the Parisians would have been much more favorable to the German cause. It was in the battles in front of Amiens that the British first used their small tanks, owhip pets,3) companions to the small tanks of the French.
3. Reaching for the Chatmel Ports.— Gen eral Ludendorff did not mean to break off the battle for Amiens, but only to suspend it while the guns could be brought up and his soldiers could get some rest. In the interval he proposed to strike elsewhere. He lcnew that Haig had drawn strength from the lines near Ypres and he assembled nine divisions for a sharp blow north of La Bassee. He hoped to do two things: break through to Bethune and on to Hazebrouck, connected by rail with Dun'cid; 25 miles away; and draw off strength from the Amiens front in anticipation of a renewal of the struggle there. He did not mean that the battle in this section should be a major engage.. ment He had enough troops to make this a powerful blow without wealcening his strength m the newly-established Atniens salient. He overlooked the fact that he was now fighting not the British army merely but Foch's Allied army. The French reserves were now freely at dte disposal of the British with no more de lay than was necessary to bring them to the requisite point by the exterior line of com munication. Had he been dealing with the British alone he would probably have used up their resrves in the north and reached his ob jective there.
On 9 Apnl, just as the battle was receding before Amiens, an attack was made on a 12 mile front from La Bassee to the Lys, near Armentieres. It came after a terrific bombard ment with gas shells and high explosives, and there was a German advance of from three to four miles at the centre of the sector. Next the battle was extended to the area north of the Lys for eight miles with further gains on the whole region involved. On the north it reached the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge, which the British managed to hold after severe fight ing. The battle had begun with nine German divisions in the attack, but it was extended on the second day until 16 were engaged. On the 4th Ludendorff had concluded that he had an opportunity to brealc through to the coast and began to put in his reserves without re straint. On this day six British divisions ar rived behind the lines and were thrown into the battle as rapidly- as they could be carried for ward. arrived none too soon; for the massed German attacks were being held back with difficulty.