4. From the Aisne to Chateau-Thierry.— The new scene of action was the line southeast of Leon where the second battle of the Aisne was fought. While the attack was delivered against strong positions, the Germans knew them to be held by troops exhausted in the recent fighting. Here we find repeated the_eureose with which the Lys attack was begun. The new movement was inaugurated to draw Allied troops from Flanders, where it was proposed to renew the struggle as soon as opportunity offered. But as the initiative did not shift from Flanders to the Sonune, it was not destined to shift back from the Aisne to Flanders.
The advance was begun on 27 May 191a Forty divisions from the imperial crown prince's army were assembled with great secrecy m the line opposite the Aisne positions on a front of 30 mdes, 25 of them in the first lhie of attacic and 15 in the reserve line. The Allied line was held by seven divisions, four French and three British, with a thin supporting line in the rear. The British troops had seen heavy fighting in the March and April operations and were in this part of the battle-line for rest. The position was weakly held, not because Foch thought it too strong for attack, but because he was in dire need of troops in other sectors. He had a right to feel that Ludendorff would not drive southward into the region south of the Aisne, since he could not reach Paris that way without making a wide detour whidi would leave bis flanks exposed to Focb's blows. In fact, Ludendorff admits that he had made no plans to sweep southward His objective was the Vesle line and the railroad from Soissons to Rheims, au advance of from five to 10 miles. By going that far he expected to draw French troops from Flanders and so weaken the lines there that he could resume his progress toward the Channel. At one end of the objective was Rheims and at the other Soissons, and it was supposed that the French would do much to protect these important places. • The right centre of the attacking line was opposite the Chemins des Dames position, which was held by French troops. When the Germans advanced after a botabardment of three hours these troops were swept off their feet Three divisions in their rear tried to form a line at the border of the Aisne but they, also, were overwhelmed and forced to retire .so quickly that they conkl not destroy the bridges. At aightfall the Ganrans had gone forward to the Vesle and even crossed it. At its greatest depth the advance was 12 miles, which was more than had been made or, any day in either of the two preceding drives. The British fought steadily and gave ground slowly, but the breach of the line on the.ir left made retreat inevitable. The net result of the day's fighting was to estab lish a salient 16 miles broad at the base and 12 miles deep. Next day it was widened until
die base was 25 miles and three miles added to the depth. The third day, 29 May, the Germans threw their strength agasust the western side of the salient and took Sansone, which the local leader had not tried to take at first, since it was not one of the original objectives. By this time Ludendorff was ready to enlarge his plans, and he had brought up fresh troops. Accord ingly, on the 30th he let the army have its way and it rushed forward to the Marne, whose northern bank it took from a point three miles east of Dormans to a point four miles east of Chateau-Thierry, making a salient 30 miles deep and 35 miles wide at the base. It was too narrow for its depth, and Ludendorff lost no time in trying to widen it He first brought strong pressure against die wesarn side, a forest region from Compiegne to Villers-Cotterets. On 31 May he had sonte success pushing westward from the itmer side of the salient, and southward from the adjacent part of the old fine. Etut already Foch's reserves were coming up and the advance was short. The attacks were pressed for several days, but without success. Within the same period strong efforts were made to take Rheims but they like wise failed. From the standpoint of military science the German divisions in the salient were in a trap, and they should withdraw if they could not widen the base of the salient The first attempts havmg failed Ludendorff took time and prepared a blow so heavy that he thought it could not fail. On 9 June he threw 15 divisions on the French lines defending the forests around Compiegne, advancing on the line from Montdidier to Noyon. Foch was ready for them and offered steady resistance. In two days' fighting the Germans gained six miles on a narrow front; but the Forest of Com piegne, rtmning into the centre of the angle the line made before it turned south near Sammons, could not be taken and the western side of the salient stood firm. Ludendorff then projected an attac.lc on the eastern buttress, but. for that he made such elaborate preparations that the affair was a battle in itself. His venture on the Aisne, however, had led him into the Marne salient, and he was so involved that he had to relit,. quish, at least for a time, his plans for Flanders. The successes of the first three drives had made the German soldiers overconfident. In the offensive just ending they had taken 55,000 prisoners and 650 guns, and they had raced froir, river to river so rapidly that they concluded that the French army was used up. They were soon to have occasion to regret their hasty conclusion.