In these operations the troops of the United States played an important part. The 1st and 2d divisions were with Mangin and won his farthest advance on the 18th to the 20th, capturing 7,000 prisoners and 100 guns. The 26th division held the right wing of Degoutte's army and took Torcy and Belleau in the first day of the engagement On the 21st it crossed the Soissons-Chateate-Thierry road and pur 'rued the Germans to Epieds, and on the 24th it was relieved by the 42d division. The 3d and 4th divisions were on de Mitry's left and crossed the Marne when Degoutte's at tack uncovered Chateau-Thierry. They took position on the right of the 26th and pressed the retreating enemy. In the fighting on the Ourcq the Americans took notable parts. The 42d di vision took and held Sergy, although the place changed hands five times before the Prussians who contended for it were finally beaten off. The division then met and defeated in a fierce hand-to-hand conflict the celebrated fourth Prussian Guard division, which was sent to drive the Americans into the Ourcq. The 32d division fought with equal distinction in Meu niere Wood and drove its enemy before it, though greatly outnumbered. American divi sions followed the enemy to the Vesle and seized Fismes before the Germans could get to it. They then crossed the Vesle and estab lished themselves in a position that served for a jumping-off place in further operations. ' When the Germans retreated from the Marne in 1914 they outnumbered their opponents and had better equipment. When they retreated in 1918 they were in weaker numbers and had lost the superiority in equipment Much fighting had worn down their strength and their morale was undermined. Hardly a man in the army that did not realize that Germany could no longer hope to win the war. The enterprise which started so well had ended in gloom for the Teutons. Von Boehn had used up all the
reserves of the group of armies conunanded by the imperial crown prmce and had drawn on the reserves of other groups. Ludendorff had but 26 reserve divisions and gave over all thought of maintaining the offensive. But he believed he could retaut what he held until the end of the autumn and utilize the winter to build up another force that could prevent defeat Three facts were aramst him; (1) The German people were sick of war and had lost confidence in the promises of their rulers. They were willing. to give up the contest and accept defeat It is true a large part of the army stood to their arms in the most trying circum stances; but an increasing number showed signs of discouragement. It me difficult to get men back from furloughs, or to get them out of hospitals, or to keep them in the spirit which warranted sending them into battle. The divi sions that were bad became worse,. so that it was not safe to use them in the critical work that was demanded, and this made it necessary to use the.good troops for longer and more fre quent periods. (2) The arrival of the troops from the United States in great numbers placed the Germans at a disadvantage. They not only gave Foch the initiative, but built up his mass of mancenvre until he could strike where he chose. (3) In Foch the Germans had an adver of unusual capacity. He was not the man tsn't an opportunity slip. At the moment when they were most in need of rest, he was able to strike as he had not been able to strike before. His hard blows but increased the disintegration of German morale, and the line was cracicing most seriously when the revolution in Germany precipitated general defeat. Germans had borne themselves as ruthless conquerors before the world for four years, but the tables were turned on 1 Aug. 1918, when the war entered its fifth year.