Next day the situation was clearer though no less critical. General Byng's army held its own though hard pressed. General Gough, however, was forced back through the system of trenches that served for the second line of defense. They proposed to stand firmly at the third line, but in the afternoon a gap was made in the thin line of defenders as they fell back and the Germans poured through in large numbers. They seized the third line before it could be made secure and during the night General Gough was forced to withdraw to the east bank of the Somme, a distance of eight miles. Later in the night he came to the bitter conclusion that he could not afford to stand on the east side of the river and risk battle against the masses of opponents that were following him, and he issued a second order directing the army to cross to the west side. The movement was executed with difficulty, so great was the Ger man pressure.
While it was being carried out a still greater danger occurred in the area north of Peronne, where no friendly river offered cover. This part of the lines was firm at first but had to fall back to keep its adjustment with the southern part. In the afternoon of the 23d, while the withdrawal was in progress, a gap appeared at the point where the 3d and 5th Armies joined, the Germans threw themselves into it and turned against each edge in order to widen the gap. Now did the quality of British courage that has been called 6bull-doe show itself in thc most valuable manner. Beaten battalions stood in the breaches and fought until they were a shadow of their ordinary strength. A brigade of South African troops held one position until it contained only 100 unwounded men. Team sters, engineering units, men separated from their commands, and any others who were swept bacicward before a retreating army were rallied, and the gap was filled with them. Thus it was that by hook and crook the Germans were held back until the lines could be re-forrned. The 24th and 25th were critical days, and only the stoutest resistance by men already at the point of exhaustion saved the day for the sal vation of Britain. By the 24th French sup ports began to arrive on the southern section of the line attacked. Next day they were present in larger numbers and took over a I2-mile section of the line north of the Oise, the dis placed troops being moved northward to help the hard-pressed division there.
The events of these four days made a pro found impression in France and Great Britain. Face to face with complete disaster the rulers now discarded their opposition to a unified command. Representatives of each govern ment held a meeting in France at which the critical decision was taken, 25 'March, to ap point Gen. Ferdinand Foch commander-in-chief
of the Allied armies in France with unlimited authority. It was the best day's work of the war on the side of the Entente Allies. The man named was the greatest general the war brought to the front. He was a master of mili tary science, a great strategist, a well-poised commander in difficult times, a genius for seiz ing the right moment for an offensive and a leader who knew how to inspire confidence in his subordinates. In taking this step the Allied statesmen were supported by the peoples of their own countries, and particularly by the in fluence of President Wilson, who was begin ning to make the United States felt in the higher policies of the war.
Foch took command at once. During the first day the situation seemed desperate. The 19th British corps, just south of the Somme, had been driven back 20 miles in five days and was at the point of collapse. Twenty miles to the west was the important railroad centre of Amiens. If it fell the entire line of communi cation between Frenc.h and British armies would be demolished. The Germans realized their opportunity and were pouring their forces into this sector to take the city if possible. Could the weary 19th corps withstand them? The situation was saved by a motley brigade of men gathered up behind the lines, among them the llth Regiment of American Etgineers who had been constructing bridges behind the British lines. The brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Carey. The 26th was thus a day of grave danger, but it was weath ered without a collapse, probably because the Germans were nearly as weary as the British. They had outrun their transports and heavy guns and there was a slight weakening of pres sure on the 27th at the centre of the great salient that a week's fighting had created.
The engagement now passed into another stage. It had as its special local problem the capture of the Paris-Amiens Railroad, the mam line of conununication behind the Allied defenses. South of Amiens the road bends eastward four miles before it resurnes its south ward course to the capital, and at this point it is only seven miles from Amiens. Could the Germans cut through to this bend? On the 28th they were only seven miles to the eastward at Demuin. General Foch was collecting a snobile force, a mass of manceuvre, to throw into this part of the field, and the railroad which the Germans were trying to capture was the line by which they would have to arrive. Could the British hold on until the expected French forces could detrain? That was the fateful question.