Foch's hour of action arrived as the Ger man drive of 14-17 July came to its period of stabilization. The decision was his. Petain and Fayolle, whom he consulted as the French gen erals nearest in authority, were doubtful, but Haig gave his approval and took over addi tional trenches in order that French troops ut the Ypres sector might aid in the proposed attadc.
The task of delivering the blow was allotted to Mangin and Degoutte. Their reinforcetnents were assembled secretly in the forest of Villers Cotterets and in the wooded region south of it At 4:30 in the morning of the 18th Mangin went fonvard without artillery preparation, hi.s in fantry was preceded by a large number of the small French tanks which the British called ((whippets.) At the same hour Degoutte at. tacked, in some places without preparation. The whole area involved was front Fontenoy to Bel+. teat:, a distance of 25 miles. The Germans were not red for the attack They had come to tgeronclasion that the French were exhausted and they had left this flank in the Boehm commanding in the salient treated the attack as a local affair and ordered a counter attack against Mangin, who receiyed the blow firmly on the 19th and pushed forward a little. clinching his hold on the vital road. Then von Boehn came slowly to the conviction that the game was up and ordered a retreat which began at 9 P.M., 20 July. At the same time he con centrated his reserves against Mangin, expect ing, as it seems, that the French would try to crush in the salient in the neighborhood of Soissons. But Foch's orders were for Mangin to hold his hand. Degoutte, de Mitry and Berthelot, however, were sent forward to press the retreating enemy. They gave him no relief. De Mitry and Berthelot pressed the retreating eight divisions to the Marne and held the south.
hands of weak or exhausted troops. The re, suit was that the line crumbled at the first stroke. Mangin, who gave his arm full swing, drove forward from four to eight miles, reach ing the vicinity of Soissons on the south and bringing the Chatean-Thierry road under his guns. Degoutte's advance was less extensive, but that was by design. He was at the pivot of the moving line and was held back for an ad vance of from two to four miles, which was easily achieved.
These events did not alarm the German High Command. So completely was it con4 vinced of the impotence of the enemy at this point that it refused to believe that the attack of the 18th was a serious menace to the eight German divisions south of the Marne. Von ern bank of the river by the evening of the 20th, Next 'day Degotttte made a brilliant ad vance in the angle east and west of Chateau Thierry, the 26th American division reaching Epieds, more titan five miles from the starting point. At the same time American and French
troops under de Mitry forced a crossing of the river, causing the Germans to abandon the town of Chateau-Thierry.
At this time the Germans were hastily try. ing to remove the vast quantitiei of materials they had talcen to the region just north of the Marne in anticipation of a further advance. To protect them until they could be taken away it was necessary to stand and fight. As von Boehn showed fig.ht Degoutte began to press on toward fere-en-Tardenois. On the 25th he was within three miles of that important centre of communication. Von Boehn realized that he could not hold back Degoutte's forces much longer and gave the order to retreat from the Marne, sacrificing a large amount of material which he had not been able to move.
Days of hard fighting followed from 25-31 July. Degoutte, de Mitry and Berthelot pressed the southern part of the salient in furious ef forts to break it and force their way throu0. Von Boehn resisted with great firmness. His machine gunners senred him well in those stark days and paid dearly for it with their lives. But they. gave time for the main body of the army to fall back to the upper Ourcq with a line ex tending eastward thruugh the hill south of the road that runs from.Oulpg le Chateau to Ville en-Tardenois. By the reinforcements had arrived in large numbers aad heavy aesusier attacics were made in various parts of the line. The same was true on the 30th and on the 31st, despite brilliant local affairs by the French and Americans. The Germans hcild a line along the watershed between the Ourcq and dte Vesle and seemed to be about to settle down to trench warfare again. Then Foch threw in Mangin in deadly earnest, who during some days had slowly worked ahead in a humdrum way. The German line ran from Soissons to Bligny near Rheims, with Fere-en-Tardenois at the centre. Four miles west of this middle point was Hill 205, conunanding the entire region for several miles. Here Wangin struck on 1 August and captured the hill and held it against strong counterattacks. The victory meant that von Boehn's line was pierced and he lost no time in retiring to the Vesle. The French, British and Americans pursued swiftly. Soissons was entered with little resistance and on 4 August the line ran straight between Rheims and Sois sons, which means that the Marne salient WAS destroyed. In the operations between 15 July and 4 August the Allies took 40,000 prisoners and a large quantity of guns and supplies.