5. The Beginning of German Defeat.— We have seen that General Ludendorff tried in vain to widen the salient into which the ardor of his troops led him by attacking on its western side. His next move was to try to widen it on the east Several sharp .mft&- s were made on the lines in front of and east of Rheims, bur =were all repulsed Then he determined to Rheims a part of his next major acticm. He proposed to cross the Marne southwest c.f this ancient city and move eastward on both banks while a powerful force attac.king east of Rheiros pressed the lines back and enabled the two forces to pinch out the Rheims salient. He expected to reach Epernay and Chalons and by seizing the railroads to Paris cut the vital line of supplies for the Allied forces in Lorraine and Alsace. In his previous drives during this year he had reached more than his inmiediate tives. It seemed to him mast probable that he would do the same thing in the drive he now projected. The German people, carried away by the ease with which their armies had reached the Marne, believed the last effort before victory was at hand. They called the approaching battle the Friedensturm, the ((stroke of victory.* Operations opened at midnight of 14 July. The artillery positions had been arranged by Colonel BruchmuIler, who had made this ann so efficient in the battles of 21 March, 9 April and 27 May. The effect of the opening cannon ade was terrible in the whole area of the attack. The front trenches were destroyed by four o'clock in the morning, when the infantry ad vanced. They crossed the Marne from Fossoy to Chatillon and pushed bacic their opponents four miles on a sector 10 miles long. North of the river they advanced three miles on a 10-mile sector. But Rheims was not shaken. From a point eight miles southwest of it to another seven miles east of it the line remained as it was. Still farther east? where the shock was greater, the Germans gamed slightly through the deliberate policy of General Gouraud, who held the opposite lines. He arranged his defenses in deep formation, his battle-line from two to four miles behind his outposts. When the attack came he withdrew from the front positions with all his advanced field guns, and the worst of the shoc3c was spent before his main line was reached. By delivering prompt counter attacks he prevented infiltration. His battle was conducted with remarkably slight losses, and it inflicted heavy casualties on his foes.
On 16 and 17 July the attacks were con tinued, the heaviest fighting being southwest of Rheims, on both banks of the Marne. On each day there was an advance of two miles on a narrow front, the result being that on the morn ing of the l8th the attack had gone about as far as it could be expected to go while the eight divisions making it had suffered heavy losses and were exhausted. General Foch had received ample notice of what was corning from prisoners and deserters and had made preparations to meet it. Of the four great drives of the Ger mans in 1918 this was the least successful. It had apparently reached its limits when it was suddenly eclipsed by movements Foch made in another part of the field. It passed so quickly from the gasp of failure to the desperate fight to escape from the Marne salient that the observer is likely to forget how bad the German situation would have been even if there had been no counterstrolce on the 18th.
Foch's preparations were carefully made. From a point opposite Soissons, in enemy hands, to Rheims, the lines of defense were held by the following armies: the 10th under Mangin, between the Aisne and Faverolles; the 6th under Degoutte, between Faverolles and Vaux, a mile west of Chatean-Thierry; the 5th under de Mitry, between Vaux and Dormans; and the 9th under Berthelot, from Dormans to Rheims, beyond which was the 4th under Gouraud. With
the forces under Mangin were the 1st and 2d divisions of United States soldiers, with Degoutte was the 26th, and with de Mitry was the 3d with the 4th in support. The 42d, or ((Rainbow Division* was with Gouraud, near Prunay, but it was about to be sent to Degoutte. Other American divisions were in reserve south of the Marne and were sent for ward to de Mitry as the battle was being fought. (For the part played by the Americans see next section).
In thrusting themselves into the salient the Germans lost the advantages of that well arranged system of roads that had favored them in most of their previous operations in France. One main highway led into the area, from Soissons to Chateau-Theirry, and it was well to the west of the centre of the salient From this road, near its central point, a lateral branch ran off to the east near Oulchy-la-Ville, leading to Fere-en-Tardenois, seven miles to the eastward, and to Ville-la-Tardenois, 13 miles still further eastward. Besides the two roads, which were but one for 10 miles south of Soissons, the only means of travel in the salient were the parish roads, small and without system. Three miles north of Oulchy the Soissons road was only six miles from the eastward point of Foch's If these six miles were eliminated it would be difficult to supply the forces in the southern part of the salient At no point was this north and south road more than 14 miles from the French positions. It was tempting fate to leave their vital line of communication exposed to attack while they hammered away at objectives 20 miles distant; but the Germans believed the French reserves used up. They were preparing for a fifth great drive, this time on Paris direct, and thought that eight divisions, with six more in support, were enough to hold the line on the west side of the salient Foch's plan was to seise this vital road, ixit he went farther than that. The war had many times proved that no offensive was worth whik after the defenders had time to bring up their reserves. All the gains hitherto made on the Western Front had been made by massing troops secretly and driving forward for a few days until the opposite side could hurry up enough men to stop the progress. Then it be came too costly to try to go farther. Hitherto one great lunge had beal followed by weeks of preparations for another, with the result that only a few such strokes could be made in a year. Foch decided to follow a modified form of the same tactics. Instead of putting all his energy into one crushing blow, he tiut it into several alternating blows, striking first at one place and then at another, and drawing the Ger man reserves to eadi place attacked, but brealc ing off the attack before it reached the stage at which his losses were most serious. Thus, as long as he could keep the initiative he broke up the enemy's masses of reserns, which had already been reduced seriously by his four great drives. It was an excellent plan for the situation then at hand and for a leader of such brilliant action as Foch. It is doubtful if it would have succeeded earlier in theyear, when the Germans were greatly superior m numben. It could hardly have succeeded in any event if the soldiers of the United States had not been on hand in large numbers. Another new feature in Foch's method of fighting was the use of the quick counterattack to break up in filtration. It was impossible for the Germans to find the wealc points in his line vrhile they were forced to meet his charges.