Nikolai 1854-1918 Russky

His plan was accepted, but "a lateral influence suddenly made itself felt, and the completely unexpected result was war." Large commercial interests were in fact involved in the forward policy, "the period of heavy capital expenditure was over, that of profits about to commence," and the power and intentions of Japan were ignored or misunderstood. Thus Russia entered upon the war un prepared in a military sense. To the guards and patrols of the Manchurian railway and the garrisons of Port Arthur and Vladi vostok, 8o,000 in all, Japan could, in consequence of her recruiting law of 1896, oppose a first-line army of some 270,000 trained men. Behind these, however, there were scarcely 200,000 trained men of the older classes, and at the other end of the long Trans Siberian railway Russia had almost limitless resources.' The 'Belated declarations of war appeared on Feb. io.

'The total Russian army on a peace footing was almost i,000,000 strong.

strategical problem for Japan was, how to strike a blow sufficiently decisive to secure her object before the at present insignificant forces of the East Siberian army were augmented to the point of being unassailable. It turned, therefore, principally upon the ef ficiency of the Trans-Siberian railway and in calculating this the Japanese made a serious under-estimate. In consequence, far from applying the "universal service" principle to its full extent, they trained only one-fifth of the annual contingent of men found fit for service. The quality of the army, thus composed of picked men (a point which is often forgotten), approximated to that of a professional f orce; but this policy had the result that, as there was no adequate second-line army, parts of the first-line had to be re served, instead of being employed at the front. And when for want of these active troops the first great victory proved inde cisive, half-trained elements had to be sent to the front in con siderable numbers—indeed, the ration strength of the army was actually trebled.

Objects of Japanese Attack.

The aim of the war, "limited" in so far that the Japanese never deluded themselves with dreams of attacking Russia at home, was to win such victories as would establish the integrity of Japan herself and place her hegemony in the Far East beyond challenge. Now the integrity of Japan was worth little if the Russians could hope ultimately to invade her in superior force, and as Port Arthur was the station of the fleet that might convoy an invasion, as well as the symbol of the longed-f or hegemony, the fortress was necessarily the army's first objective, a convincing Sedan was the next. For the navy, which had materially only a narrow margin of superiority over the Rus sian Pacific squadron, the object was to keep the two halves of that squadron at Port Arthur and Vladivostok respectively sepa rate and to destroy them in detail. But in February weather

these objects could not be pursued simultaneously. Prior to the break-up of the ice, the army could only disembark at Chemulpo, far from the objective, or at Dalny under the very eyes of its de fenders. The army could therefore, for the moment, only occupy Korea and try to draw upon itself hostile forces that would other wise be available to assist Port Arthur when the land attack opened. For the navy, instant action was imperative.

On Feb. 8, the main battle-fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Togo, was on the way to Port Arthur. During the night his tor pedo-boats surprised the Russian squadron in harbour and inflicted serious losses, and later in the day the battleships engaged the coast batteries. Repulsed in this attempt, the Japanese estab lished a stringent blockade, which tried the endurance of the ships and the men to the utmost. From time to time the torpedo-craft tried to run in past the batteries, several attempts were made to block the harbour entrance by sinking vessels in the fairway, and free and deadly use was made by both sides of submarine mines. But, though not destroyed, the Port Arthur squadron was para lysed by the instantaneous assertion of naval superiority.

Alexeiev and Makarov.

Admiral Alexeiev, the tsar's vice roy in the Far East and the evil genius of the war, was at Port Arthur and forbade the navy to take the risks of proceeding to For a time, when, in place of Admiral Starck (who was held responsible for the surprise of February), Admiral Makarov, an officer of European reputation, commanded the fleet this lethargy was shaken off. The new commander took his ships to sea every day. But his energetic leadership was soon ended by a tragedy. A field of electro-mechanical mines was laid by the Japanese in the night of April 12-13, and on the following day the Japanese cruisers stood inshore to tempt the enemy on to the mine-field. Makarov, however, crossed it without accident, and pursued the cruisers until Togo's battle-fleet appeared, whereupon he went about and steamed for port. In doing so he recrossed the mine field, and this time the mines were effectual. The flagship "Pet ropavlovsk" was struck and went down with the admiral and 600 men, and another battleship was seriously injured. Then the ad vocates of passivity regained the upper hand and kept the squad ron in harbour, and henceforward for many months the Japanese navy lay unchallenged off Port Arthur, engaging in minor oper vivid picture of the state of affairs in the navy at this period is given in Semenov's Rasplata (Eng. trans.).