Nikolai 1854-1918 Russky

Battle of the Yalu.

The Japanese 1st Army was carefully concealed about Wiju until it was ready to strike. Determined that in this first battle against a white nation they would show their mettle, the Japanese lavished both time and forethought on the minutest preparations. Forethought was still busy when, in accordance with instructions from Tokio, Kuroki on April 30 ordered the attack to begin at daybreak on May 1. For several miles above Antung the rivers Yalu and Aiho are parallel and connected by numerous channels. The majority of the islands thus formed were held and had been bridged by the Japanese. The points of passage were commanded by high a little farther up where the valleys definitely diverge, and beyond the flank of the ill-concealed positions of the defence. The first task of the right division (12th) was to cross the upper Yalu and seize this. To the Guard and 2nd Divisions was assigned the frontal attack on the Chiuliencheng position, where the Russians had about one half of their forces under Maj.-Gen. Kashtalinski. On April 30, Inouye's 12th Division accomplished its task of clearing the high ground up to the Aiho. The Russians, though well aware that the force in their front was an army, neither retired nor concentrated. Zasulich's mediaeval generalship had been modified so far that he intended to retreat when he had taught the Japanese a lesson, and therefore Kuropatkin's original arrangements were not sensibly modified. So it came about that the combined attack of the 2nd and Guard Divisions against the front, and Inouye on the left flank and rear, found Kashtalinski without support. After a rather ineffective artillery bombardment the Japanese advanced in full force, without hesitation or finesse, and plunging into the river stormed forward under a heavy fire. A few moments after wards Zasulich ordered the retreat. But the pressure was far too close now. Broken up by superior numbers the Russian line parted into groups, each of which, after resisting bravely for a time, was driven back. Then the frontal attack stopped and both divisions abandoned themselves to the intoxication of victory. Meanwhile, the right attack (12th Division) encountering no very serious re sistance, crossed the Aiho and began to move on the left rear of the Russians. On the side of the defence, each colonel had been left to retire as best he could, and thus certain fractions of the retreating Russians encountered Inouye's advancing troops and were destroyed of ter a most gallant resistance. The rearguard itself, at Hamatan, was almost entirely sacrificed, owing to the wrong direction taken in retreating by its left flankguard. Fresh attempts were made by subordinates to form rearguards, but Zasulich made no stand even at Feng-hwang-cheng, and the Jap anese occupied that town unopposed on May 5. The Japanese losses were 'Jo° out of over 40,000 present, the Russian (chiefly in the retreat) at least 2,50o out of some 7,00o engaged.

The Yalu, like Valmy, was a moment in the world's history. It mattered little that the Russians had escaped or that they had been in inferior numbers. The serious fact was that they had been beaten.

Distribution of Russian Forces.

The general distribution of the Russian forces was now as follows : The main army under Kuropatkin was forming, by successive brigades, in two groups 1st Siberian Corps (Stakelberg), Niu-chwang and Kaiping; 2nd Siberian Corps, Liao-Yang. Zasulich (3rd Corps and various other units) had still 21,000. In the Port Arthur "fortified rayon," under Lieut.-Gen. Stossel (4th Corps), were 27,000 men, and Gen. Linievich around Vladivostok had 23,00o. These are, however, paper strengths only, and the actual number for duty cannot have been higher than i ro,000 in all. The Trans-Siberian railway was the only line of communication with Europe and western Siberia, and its calculated output of men was 40,000 a month in the sum mer. In October 1904, therefore, supposing the Japanese to have

used part of their forces against Port Arthur, and setting this off against the absence of Linievich and Stossel, Kuropatkin could expect to have a sufficient superiority in numbers to take the offen sive. His policy was still, "No battle before we are in superior force." Landing of Japanese 2nd Army.—For the moment it was equally Japan's interest to mark time in Manchuria. Still intent upon the Russian Port Arthur squadron, she had embarked her 2nd Army (Gen. Oku, 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions) during April, and sent it to Chinampo whence, as soon as the ice melted and Kuroki's victory cleared the air, it sailed to the selected land ing-place near Pitszewo. Here, under the protection of a continu ous chain of war-vessels between the Elliot islands and the main land, Oku began to disembark on May 5. But the difficulties of the coast were such that it took three weeks to disembark the whole and to extend across the peninsula to Port Adams. Oku then, leaving the 5th Division behind, moved down with the rest towards Kinchow, and after storming that place found himself face to face with a position of enormous strength, Nanshan bill, at the narrowest part of the peninsula, where part of a Russian division (3,000 only out of 12,000 were actually engaged) had fortified itself with extreme care. On May 26 took place the battle of Nanshan. The Japanese attack was convergent, but there was no room for envelopment ; the Russian position moreover was "all-round" and presented no flanks, and except for the enfilade fire of the Japanese and Russian gunboats in the shallow bays on either side the battle was locally at every point a frontal attack and defence. The first rush of the assailants carried them up to the wire and other obstacles, but they were for many hours unable to advance a step farther. But the resolute Oku attacked time after time, and at last the 4th Division, on his right, assisted by its gunboats, forced its way into the Russian position. The Russians had just begun to retreat, in accordance with orders from higher authorities. But it was a second undeniable victory. It was, moreover, a preface to those furious assaults on Port Arthur which, because they were the expression of a need that every soldier felt, and not merely of a tactical method, transcend all cool-blooded criticism. The Japanese losses were 4,50o out of 30,00o engaged, or 15%, that of the Russians fully half of the 3,00o engaged. The victors captured many guns, but were too exhausted to pursue the Russians, whose retirement was not made in the best order.

The transports were now conveying the 6th and iith Divisions to Pitszewo; these were to form the 3rd Army (Nogi) for opera tions against Port Arthur. Oku exchanged his 1st Division for the 6th. The 2nd Army then turned northward (3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions). The loth Division, forming the nucleus of the 4th Army, had begun to land at Takusham on May 19. The 2nd and 4th Armies were the left wing of a widespread converging move ment on Liao-Yang. Oku had the greatest distance to march, Kuroki the smallest. The latter therefore had to stand fast in the face of the Russian eastern detachment, which was three days' march at most from Feng-hwang-cheng and could be supported in three more days by Kuropatkin's main body, whereas the pressure of Oku's advance would not begin to be felt by the Russian south ern detachment until the twelfth day at earliest. It was necessary therefore for the first objective to make a slight concession to the second. Oku had to start at the earliest possible moment, even though operations against Port Arthur were thereby delayed for a week or two. In fact, Oku's march began on June 13, Kuroki's on June 24; the moves of the intermediate forces at various dates within this time.