Meanwhile Kuropatkin, assembling the main army week by week, was in a difficult position. His policy of gaining time had received a severe blow in the failure of his executive officer to realize it, and that officer, though his unpursued troops quickly regained their moral, had himself completely lost confidence. On the news of the battle (coupled with that of a fresh army appear ing on the Korean coast)', Kuropatkin instantly sent off part of his embryo central mass to bar the mountain passes of Fenshuil ing and Motienling against the imagined relentless pursuit of the victors, and prepared to shift his centre of concentration back to Moukden. The subsidiary protective forces on either flank of Zasulich had promptly abandoned their look-out positions and fallen back to join him. But the commander-in-chief, soon realiz ing that the Japanese were not pursuing, reasserted himself, sent the protective troops back to their posts, and cancelled all orders for the evacuation of Liao-Yang. From this time forward Kuro 'This was the 2nd Army, waiting in the port of Chinampo for the moment to sail for Pitszewo.
patkin allowed his subordinates little or no initiative. A few days later, Zasulich's persistent requests to be allowed to retreat and the still uncertain movements of the 2nd Army induced him once more to prepare a concentration on Moukden. But on May 6 he learned that the Japanese 1st Army had again halted at Feng hwang-cheng and that the 2nd Army was disembarking at Pits zewo, and he resumed (though less confidently) his original idea. The eastern protective detachment, now strengthened and placed under the orders of Count Keller, was disposed with a view to countering any advance on Liao-Yang from the east by a combina tion of manoeuvre and fighting.
Alexeiev and Kuropatkin.—It was at this moment of doubt that Alexeiev, leaving Port Arthur just in time and profoundly impressed with the precarious state of affairs in the fleet and the fortress, gave the order, as commander-in-chief by land and sea, for an "active" policy (May 19). Kuropatkin, thus required to abandon his own plan, had only to choose between attacking the ist Army and turning upon Oku. He did not yield at once; a second letter from the viceroy, the news of Nanshan, and above all a signed order from the tsar himself, "Inform General Kuro patkin that I impose upon him all the responsibility for the fate of Port Arthur," were needed to induce him to execute a scheme which in his heart he knew to be perilous. The path of duty for a general saddled with a plan which he disapproves is not easily discoverable. Napoleon in like case refused, at the risk of enforced
resignation, and so did Moreau; the generality of lesser men have obeyed.
Stakelberg's 1st Siberian Corps was therefore reinforced to wards the end of May up to a strength of above 35,00o. But it re mained a detachment only. The Liao-Yang central mass was still held in hand, for the landing of the 4th Army—really only a division at present—at Takushan and the wrong placing of another Japanese division supposed to be with Kuroki (really intended for Nogi) had aroused Kuropatkin's fears for the holding capacity of Keller's detachment. Moreover, disliking the whole enterprise, he was most unwilling to use up his army in it. The Russians, then, at the beginning of June, were divided into three groups, the southern, or offensive group (35,00o), in the triangle Neu chwang-Haicheng-Kaiping ; the eastern or defensive group (3o, 000), the main body of it guarding the passes right and left of the Wiju-Liao-Yang road, the left (Cossacks) in the roadless hills of the upper Aiho and Yalu valleys; the right (Mishchenko's Cos sacks and infantry supports) guarding Fenshuiling pass and the road from Takushan; the reserve (42,00o) with Kuropatkin at Liao-Yang; the "Ussuri Army" about Vladivostok; and Stossel's two divisions in the Kwantung peninsula.
On the other side the ist Army was at Feng-hwang-cheng with one brigade detached on the roads on either hand, the left being therefore in front of the Takushan division and facing the Fen shuiling. Oku's 2nd Army (four divisions or 6o,000 combatants) was about Port Adams. This last was the objective of the attack of Stakelberg's 35,000. Kuropatkin's orders to his subordinate were a compromise between his own plan and Alexeiev's. Stakel berg was to crush by a rapid and energetic advance the covering forces of the enemy met with, and his object was "the capture of the Nanshan position and thereafter an advance on Port Arthur." Yet another object was given him, to "relieve the pressure on Port Arthur by drawing upon himself the bulk of the enemy's forces," and he was not to allow himself to be drawn into a decisive ac tion against superior numbers. Lastly, on June 7, while Stakel berg was proceeding southward on his ill-defined errand, Kuro patkin, imposed upon by the advance of the Takushan column to Siu-yen, forbade him to concentrate to the front, only removing the veto when he learned that the 4th Army had halted and entrenched at Siu-yen.