ations, covering the transport of troops to the mainland, and watching for the moment when the advance of the army should force the Russian fleet to come out. Meantime seven Japanese cruisers under Vice-Admiral Kaimamura went in search of the Russian Vladivostok squadron ; this, however, evaded them for some months, and inflicted some damage on the Japanese mer cantile marine and transports.
The Japanese had not waited to gain command of the sea before beginning the sea transport of that part of their troops allotted to Korea. The roads of that country were so poor that the landing had to be made not on the straits of Tsushima, but as far north as possible. Chemulpho, nearer by som. to Port Arthur than to Japan, was se lected. On the first day of hostilities Rear-Admiral Uriu disem barked troops at Chemulpho under the eyes of the Russian cruiser "Variag," and next day he attacked and destroyed the "Variag" and some smaller war-vessels in the harbour, and the rest of the st Army (Gen. Kuroki) was gradually brought over during Feb ruary and March in spite of an unbeaten and, under Makarov's regime, an enterprising hostile navy. But owing to the thaw and the subsequent break-up of the miserable Korean roads, six weeks passed before the columns of the army (Guard, 2nd and 12th Divisions), strung out along the "Mandarin road" to a total depth of six days' march, closed upon the head at Wiju, the frontier town on the Yalu. Opposite to them they found a large Russian force of all arms.
The Russian commanders, at this stage at least, had not and could not have any definite objective. Both by sea and by land their policy was to mass their resources, repulsing meantime the attacks of the Japanese with as much damage to the enemy and as little to themselves as possible. Their strategy was to gain time without immobilizing themselves so far that the Japanese could impose a decisive action at the moment that suited them best. Both by sea and by land such strategy was an exceedingly diffi cult game to play. But afloat, had Makarov survived, it would have been played to the end, and Togo's fleet would have been steadily used up. One day, indeed (May 15), two of Japan's largest battleships, the "Hatsuse" and the "Yashima," came in contact with free mines and were sunk. One of them went to the
bottom with 500 souls. But the admiral was not on board. The Russian sailors said, when Makarov's fate was made known, "It is not the loss of a battleship. The Japanese are welcome to two of them. It is he." Not only the skill, but the force of character required for playing with fire was wanting to Makirov's succes sors.
It was much the same on land. Kuropatkin, who had taken command of the army, saw from the first that he would have to gain three months, and disposed his forces as they came on the scene, unit by unit, in perfect accord with the necessities of the case. His expressed intention was to fight no battle until superiority in numbers was on his side. He could have gained his respite by concentrating at Harbin or even at Moukden or at Liao-Yang. But he had to reckon with the fleet' at Port Arthur. He knew that the defences of that place were defective, and that if the fleet were destroyed whilst that of Togo kept the sea there would be no Russian offensive. He there fore chose Liao-Yang as the point of concentration, and having thus to gain time by force instead of by distance he pushed out a "strong covering detachment towards the Yalu. But little by little he succumbed to his milieu, the atmosphere of false confi dence and passivity created around him by Alexeiev. After he had minutely arranged the eastern detachment in a series of rear guard positions, so that each fraction of it could contribute a little to the game of delaying the enemy before retiring on the positions next in rear, the commander of the detachment, Zasu lich, told him that "it was not the custom of a knight of the Order of St. George to retreat," and Kuropatkin did not use his authority to recall the general, who, whether competent or not, obviously misunderstood his mission. Thus, whilst the detachment was still disposed as a series of rearguards, the foremost fractions of it stood to fight on the Yalu, against odds of four to one.
'Not, as is often assumed, the fortress itself.