Nikolai 1854-1918 Russky

Russian Retirement on Liao-Yang.

This was the only manifestation of the offensive spirit on Kuropatkin's part during the six months of marking time. It was for defence, sometimes partial and elastic, sometimes rigid and "at-all-costs," that he had made his dispositions throughout. His policy now was to retire on Liao-Yang as slowly as possible and to defend himself in a series of concentric prepared positions. In his orders for the battle around his stronghold there is no word of counter-attack, and his central mass, the special weapon of the commander-in-chief, he gave over to Bilderling and to Zarubayev to strengthen the defence in their respective sections or posted for the protection of his line of retreat. Nevertheless he had every intention of delivering a heavy and decisive counterstroke when the right moment should come, and meantime his defensive tactics would certainly have full play on this prearranged battlefield with its elaborate redoubts, bomb proofs and obstacles, and its garrison of a strength obviously equal (and in reality superior) to that of the assailants. The Jap anese, too, had effected their object, and as they converged on their objective the inner flanks of the three armies had connected and the supreme commander Marshal Oyama had taken command of the whole. But instead of boldly pushing out the 1st Army to such a distance that it could manoeuvre, as Moltke did in 1866 and 187o, he attached it to the general line of battle. It was not in two or three powerful groups but in one long chain of seven deployed divisions that the advance was made.

Battle of Liao-Yang.--On

Aug. 25 the 2nd and 4th Armies from Haicheng and the 1st Army from the Yin-tsu-ling and Yu shu-ling began the last stage of their convergent advance. The Russian first position extended in a semicircle from Anshantien (on the Liao-Yang-Hai-cheng railway) into the hills at Anping, and thence to the Taitse river above Liao-Yang; both sides had mixed detachments farther out on the flanks. The first step in the Japanese plan was the advance of Kuroki's army to Anping.

Throughout the 25th, night of the 25th-26th, and the 26th of August, Kuroki advanced, fighting heavily all along the line, until on the night of the 26th the defenders gave up the contested ground at Anping. Hitherto there had only been skirmishing on a large scale on the side of Hai-cheng Kuropatkin having already drawn in his line of defence on the south side towards Liao-Yang, the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies delivered what was practically i a blow in the air. But on the 27th there was a marked change in the Japanese plan. The right of the 1st Army, when about to con tinue the advance west on Liao-Yang, was diverted northward by Oyama's orders and ordered to prepare to cross the Taitszeho. The retirement of the Russian southern force into its entrench ments emboldened the Japanese commander-in-chief to imitate Moltke's method to the full. On the 28th, however, the ist Army made scarcely any progress. The right (12th) division reached the upper Taitszeho, but the divisions that were to come up on its left were held fast by their opponents. The 29th was an unevent ful day, on which both sides prepared for the next phase.

The Russians' semicircle, now contracted, rested on the Taits zeho above and below the town, and their forces were massed most closely on either side of the "Mandarin" road that the ist Army had followed. Opposite this portion of the line was the Guard and the 4th Army. Oku was astride the railway, Kuroki extending towards his proposed crossing-points just beyond Kuro patkin's extreme left (the latter was behind the river). On the 30th the attack was renewed. The Guard, the 4th Army and the 2nd Army were completely repulsed.

On the night of the 30th the first Japanese troops crossed the Taitszeho near Lien-Tao-Wun, and during the 31st three brigades were deployed north of Kwan-tun, facing west. The Russian left

wing observed the movement all day, and within its limited local resources made dispositions to meet it. Kuropatkin's opportunity was now come. The remainder of the Japanese 2nd Division was following the 12th, leaving a nine-mile gap between Kuroki and Nozu, as well as the river It was not into this gap, but upon the isolated divisions of the ist Army that the Russian general pro posed to launch his counterstroke Reorganizing his southern defences on a shorter front, so as to regain possession of the re serves he had so liberally given away to his subordinates, he began to collect large bodies of troops opposite Kuroki, while Stakelberg and Zarubayev, before withdrawing silently into the lines or rather the fortress of Liao-Yang, again repulsed Oku's determined at tacks on the south side. But it was not in confidence of victory that Kuropatkin began the execution of the new plan—rather as a desperate expedient to avoid being cut off by the 1st Army, whose strength he greatly overestimated On the morning of Sept. 1—the anniversary of Sedan, as the Japanese officers told their men—Oyama, whose intentions the active Kuroki had somewhat outrun, delivered a last attack with the 2nd and 4th Armies and the Guard on the south front, in the hope of keeping the main body of the Russians occupied and so assisting Kuroki, but the assailants encountered no resistance, Zarubayev having already retired into the fortress. North of the Taitszeho the crisis was approaching. Kuroki's left, near the river, vigorously attacked a hill called Manjuyama which formed part of the line of defence of the 17th Corps from Europe. But the right of the 1st Army (12th Division) was threatened by the gathering storm of the counterstroke from the side of Yentai mines, and had it not been that the resolute Okasaki continued the attack on Manjuyama alone the Japanese offensive would have come to a standstill. Manjuyama, thanks to the courage of the army commander and of a single brigadier, was at last carried af ter nightfall, and the dislodged Russians made two counter-attacks in the dark before they would acknowledge themselves beaten Next morning, when Kuroki (who had conceived the mistaken idea of a general retreat of the Russians on Mukden) was preparing to pursue, the storm broke. Kuropatkin had drawn together s wen divisions on the left rear of the 17th Corps, the strength of the whole being about 90,000. On the extreme left was Orlov's bri gade of all arms at Yentai mines, then came the 1st Siberian Corps (Stakelberg), the ioth Corps, and finally the 17th. But Orlov, perplexed by conflicting instructions and caught in an unfavour able situation by a brigade of the 12th Division which was exe cuting the proposed "pursuit," gave way—part of his force in actual rout—and the cavalry that was with him was driven back by the Kobi (reserve army) brigade of the Guard The fugitives of Orlov's command disordered the on-coming corps of Stakel berg, and the outer flank of the great counterstroke that was to have rolled up Kuroki's thin line came to an entire standstill. Meantime the ioth Corps furiously attacked Okasaki on the Manjuyama, and though its first assault drove in a portion of Okasaki's line, a second and a third, made in the night, failed to shake the constancy of the i5th Brigade Misunderstandings and movements at cross-purposes multiplied on the Russian side, and at midnight Kuropatkin at last obtained information of events on the side of Yentai mines. This was to the effect that Orlov was routed, Stakelberg's command much shaken, and at the same time Zarubayev in Liao-Vang, upon whom Oku and Nozu had pressed a last furious attack, reported that he had only a handful of troops still in reserve. Then Kuropatkin's resolution collapsed, although about three divisions were still intact, and he gave the order to retreat on Mukden.