Naval Actions.—At this time the siege of Port Arthur had progressed only so far that the besiegers were able to realize the difficulties before them. Their exertions and sacrifices were not crowned with success until the year had run its full course, and meantime the repeated frustration of their hopes had a moral reaction on the main struggle in Manchuria, apart from keeping one of their armies away from the decisive theatre. At sea, how ever, the Japanese navy scored two important successes. After months of blockade and minor fighting, the Russian Port Arthur squadron had been brought to action on Aug 10. Admiral Vitheft, Makarov's successor, had put to sea shortly after the appearance of the 3rd Army on the land front of Port Arthur. The battle opened about noon, 20M. south of the harbour; the forces en gaged on each side varied somewhat, but Togo finally had a superiority. As the Russians became gradually weaker, the Japanese closed in to within 3m. range, and Prince Ukhtomsky (who succeeded to the command on Vitheft being killed) gave up the struggle at nightfall. The Russians scattered, some vessels heading southward, the majority with the admiral making for Port Arthur, whence they did not again emerge. All the rest were either forced into neutral ports (where they were interned) or destroyed, among the latter being the third-class cruiser "Novik," which had already earned a brilliant reputation for daring, and now steamed half round Japan before she was brought to action and run ashore. The victors blockaded Port Arthur, until near the close of the siege when, after going ashore and examining the remnant of the Russian fleet from 203-Metre hill, Togo concluded that it would be safe to return to Japan and give his ships a com plete refit. Kaimura's squadrons, after various adventures, at last succeeded on Aug. 14 in engaging and defeating the Russian Vladivostok squadron (Admiral Jessen). Thus the Russian flag disappeared from the Pacific, and thenceforward only the Baltic fleet could hope seriously to challenge the supremacy of the Japanese navy.
The remainder of the war on land, although it included two battles on a large scale and numerous minor operations, was prin cipally a test of endurance. After Liao-Yang there were no widely extended operations, the area of conflict being confined to the plain of the coast side of the Hun-ho and the fringe of the mountains. Japan had partially accomplished her task, but had employed all her trained men in this partial accomplishment. It was questionable, even in Oct. 1904, whether she could endure the drain of men and money if it were prolonged much further. On the other hand, in Russia opposition to the war, which had never been popular, gradually became the central feature of a widespread movement against irresponsible government. Thus, while the armies in Manchuria faced one another with every ap pearance of confidence, behind them the situation was exceedingly grave for both parties. A state of equilibrium was established, only momentarily disturbed by Kuropatkin's offensive on the Sha-ho in October, and by the Sandepu incident in the winter, until at last Oyama fought a battle on a grand scale and won it. Even then, however, the results fell far short of anticipation, and the armies settled down into equilibrium again.
Battle of the Sha-ho.—After the battle of Liao-Yang Kuropatkin reverted for a moment to the plan of a concentration to the rear at Tieling. Politically, however, it was important to hold Mukden, the Manchurian capital, and as the Japanese, as on previous occasions, reorganized instead of pursuing, he decided to stand his ground, a resolution which had an excellent effect on his army. Moreover, growing in strength day by day, and aware that the Japanese had outrun their powers, he resolved, in spite of the despondency of many of his senior officers, to take the offensive. He disposed of about 200,000 men, the Japanese had about 170,000. The latter lay entrenched north of Liao-Yang, from a point 9m. west of the railway, through Yentai station and Yentai mines, to the hills farther east. There had been a good deal of rain, and the ground was heavy. Kuropatkin's intention was to work round the Japanese right on the hills with his eastern wing (Stakelberg), to move his western wing (Bilderling) slowly southwards, entrenching each strip of ground gained, and finally with the centre—i.e., Bilderling's left— and Stakelberg, to envelop and crush the 1st Army, which formed the Japanese right, keeping the 4th Army (Nozu) and the 2nd Army (Oku) fixed by means of Bilderling's main body. The manoeuvre began on Oct. 5, and by the evening of the loth, after four days of advanced-guard fighting, Stakelberg was in his assigned position in the mountain ous country, facing west towards Liao-Yang, with his left on the Taitszeho. The advance of Bilderling, however, necessarily me thodical and slow in any case, had taken more time than was anticipated. Still, Bilderling crossed the Sha-ho and made some progress towards Yentai, and the demonstration was so far effectual that Kuroki's warnings were almost disregarded by the Japanese headquarters. The commander of the 1st Army, how ever, took his measures well, and Stakelberg found the greatest trouble in deploying his forces for action in this difficult country. Oyama became convinced of the truth on the 9th and loth, and prepared a great counterattack. Kuroki, with only a portion of the 1st Army, was left to defend at least 15m. of front, and the entire 2nd and 4th Armies and the general reserves were to be thrown upon Bilderling. On the nth the real battle opened. Kuroki displayed the greatest skill, but he was of course pressed back by the four-to-one superiority of the Russians. Still the result of Stakelberg's attack, for which he was unable to deploy his whole force, was disappointing, but the main Japanese attack on Bilderling was not much more satisfactory, for the Russians had entrenched every step of their previous advance and fought splendidly. The Russian commander-in-chief states in his work on the war that Bilderling became engaged a fond instead of gradually withdrawing as Kuropatkin intended, and at any rate it is unquestioned that in consequence of the serious position of affairs on the western wing, not only did Stakelberg use his re serves to support Bilderling, when the 12th Division of Kuroki's army was almost at its last gasp and must have yielded to fresh pressure, but Kuropatkin himself suspended the general offensive on Oct. 13. In the fighting of Oct. 13-16 the Russians gradually gave back as far as the line of Sha-ho, the Japanese following until the armies faced roughly north and south on parallel fronts. The fighting, irregular but severe, continued. Kuropatkin was so far averse to retreat that he ordered a new offensive, which had fair success on the 16th-17th. Kuropatkin wished to continue the offensive, but his corps commanders offered so much oppo sition to a further offensive that he at last gave up the idea. The positions of the rival armies from Oct. 18, the close of the battle of the Sha-ho, to Jan. 26, 1905, the opening of the battle of Sandepu (Heikoutai)—a period almost entirely devoid of inci dent—may be described by the old-fashioned term "winter quarters." In Jan. 1905 the Russians, 300,00o strong, were now organized in three armies, commanded by Generals Linievich, Grippenberg and Kaulbars; the total strength of the Japanese 1st, 2nd and 4th Armies and reserve was estimated by the Russians at 2 20,000. Towards the end of January Kuropatkin took the offensive. He wished to inflict a severe blow before the enemy could be rein forced by the late besiegers of Port Arthur, and sent Grippen berg with seven divisions against Oku's two on the Japanese left. The battle of Sandepu (Heikoutai), fought in a terrible snow storm on Jan. 26 and 27, 1905, came near to being a great Russian victory. But after two days' severe fighting, although Grippen berg had not been checked, Kuropatkin, in face of a counterattack by Oyama, decided to abandon the attempt.