From this point to the culmination of the advance at Liao Yang, the situation of the Japanese closely resembles that of the Prussians in 1866. Haicheng represents Miinchengratz, Liao Yang Gitschin, and the passes east of Liao-Yang Nachod and Trautenau. The concentration of the various Japanese armies on one battlefield was to be made, not along the circumference of the long arc they occupied, but towards the centre. Similarly, Kuro patkin was in the position of Benedek. He possessed the interior lines and the central reserve which enables interior lines to be utilized, and a stroke of good fortune prolonged the period in which he could command the situation, for on June 23 an unex pected sortie of the Russian Port Arthur squadron paralysed the Japanese land offensive. In the squadron were seen the battle ships damaged in the February attacks, and the balance of force was now against Togo, who had lost the "Yashima" and the "Hatsuse." The squadron nevertheless, tamely returned to har bour, Togo resumed the blockade and Nogi began his advance from Nanshan, but the 2nd and 4th Armies came to a standstill at once (naval escort for their seaborne supplies being no longer available), and the 1st Army, whose turn to advance had just arrived, only pushed ahead a few miles to cover a larger supply area. On July I the Vladivostok squadron appeared in the Tsu shima straits, and then vanished to an unknown destination, and whether this intensified the anxiety of the Japanese or not, it is the fact that the 2nd Army halted for 11 days at Kaiping, bring ing the next on its right, 4th Army, to a standstill likewise. Its next advance brought it to the fortified position of Tashichiao, where Kuropatkin had, by drawing heavily upon his central re serve and even on the eastern detachment, massed about two army corps.
The 1st Army, after its long halt at Feng-hwang-cheng, which was employed in minutely organizing the supply service—a task of exceptional difficulty in these roadless mountains—reopened the campaign on June 24, but only tentatively on account of the discouraging news from Port Arthur. A tremendous rainstorm imposed further delays, for the coolies and the native transport that had been laboriously collected scattered in all directions. The Motieniing pass, however, had been seized without difficulty, and Keller's power of counter-attack had been reduced to nothing by the dispatch of most of his forces to the concentration at Tash ichiao. But Oku's 2nd Army was now at a standstill at Kaiping, and until he was further advanced the 1st Army could not press forward. The captured passes were therefore fortified (as Feng 'The occupation of Siu-yen was chiefly the work of the brigade pushed out to his left by Kuroki. Only a portion of the Toth Division from Takushan helped to drive away Mishchenko's Cossacks.
'The 5th Division of the 2nd Army had been sent to join the Toth as the latter approached Hsimucheng. The Guard brigade of Kuroki's army which had served with Nozu in the advance had now returned to Fene-hwane chene.
hwang-cheng had been) for passive resistance. This, and the movements of the 4th Army, which had set its face towards Hai cheng and no longer seemed to be part of a threat on Liao-Yang, led to the idea being entertained at Kuropatkin's headquarters that the centre of gravity was shifting to the south. To clear up the situation Keller's force was augmented and ordered to attack Kuroki. It was repulsed with a loss of nearly 1,000 men in the action at the Motienling (July 17), but it was at least ascertained that considerable forces were still on the Japanese right, and upon the arrival of a fresh army corps from Europe, Kuropatkin an nounced his intention of attacking Kuroki. And in effect he suc ceeded in concentrating the equivalent of an army corps, in addi tion to Keller's force, opposite to Kuroki's right. But having secured this advantage he stood still for five days, and Kuroki had ample time to make his arrangements. The Japanese general oc cupied some 2om. of front in two halves, separated by 6m. of impassable mountain, and knowing well the danger of a "cordon" defensive, he met the crisis in another and a bolder fashion. Call ing in the brigade detached to the assistance of Nozu as well as all other available fractions of his scattered army, he himself at tacked on July 31 all along the line. It was little more than an assertion of his will to conquer, but it was effectual. On his left wing the attacks of the Guard and 2nd Divisions (action of Yang tzu-ling) on the Russian front and flank failed—the frontal attack because of the resolute defence, the flank attack from sheer fa tigue of the troops. Count Keller was killed in the defence. Mean time on the Japanese right the 12th Division attacked the large bodies of troops that Kuropatkin had massed (Yu-shu-ling) equally in vain. But one marked success was achieved by the Japanese. The Russian 35th and 36th Regiments ( loth European Corps) were caught between two advancing columns, and, thanks to the initiative of one of the column leaders, Okasaki, destroyed. At night, discouraged on each wing by the fall of Count Keller and the fate of the 35th and 36th, the whole Russian force retired on Anping, with a loss of 2,400 to the Japanese i,000 men.