Both sides stood fast in the old posi tions up to the verge of the last and greatest battle. Kuropatkin was reinforced, and appointed Kaulbars to succeed Grippenberg and Bilderling to the command of the 3rd Army vacated by Kaul bars. On the other hand, Nogi's 3rd Army, released by the fall of Port Arthur, was brought up on the Japanese left, and a new army under Kawamura (5th), formed of one of the Port Arthur and two reserve divisions, was working from the upper Yalu through the mountains towards the Russian left rear. The Russian line covering Mukden was 47m. long, the armies from right to left being 2nd (Kaulbars), 3rd (Bilderling) and 1st (Linievich) ; a general reserve was at Mukden. On the other side from left to right, on a line 4om. long, were Oku (2nd Army), Nozu (4th), Kuroki (1st) and Kawamura (5th), the general reserve in rear of the centre at Yentai and the 3rd Army in rear of Oku. Each side had about 310,000 men present. The entire front of both armies was heavily entrenched. The Russians had another offen sive in contemplation when the Japanese forestalled them by advancing on Feb.
The 5th Army gradually drove in Kuropat kin's small detachments in the mountains, and came up in line with Kuroki, threatening to envelop the Russian left. The events on this side and misleading information induced Kuropatkin to pay particular attention to his left. The Japanese 1st and 5th Armies were now engaged (Feb. 25), and elsewhere all was quiet. But on the 27th the fighting spread to the centre, and Nogi (originally behind Oku) was on the march to envelop the Russian right. He was held under observation throughout by Russian cavalry, but it seems that little attention was paid to their re ports by Kuropatkin, who was still occupied with Kuroki and Kawamura, and even denuded his right of its reserves to rein force his left. With a battle-front exceeding two days' marches the wrong distribution of reserves by both sides was a grave mis fortune. Kuropatkin was at last convinced, on Feb. 28, of the danger from the west, and did all in his power to form a solid line of defence on the west side of Mukden. Nogi's first attack ( March
had not much success, and a heavy counterstroke was delivered on the 2nd. Fighting for localities and alterations in the interior distribution of the opposing forces occupied much time, and by the 3rd, though the battle had become severe, Kuropatkin had merely drawn in his right and right centre (now facing west and south-west respectively) a little nearer Mukden. His centre on the Sha-ho held firm, Kuroki and Kawamura made but slight progress against his left in the mountains. Nogi and Oyama were equally impressed with the strength of the new (west) Russian front, and, like Grant at Petersburg in 1864, extended farther and farther to the outer flank, the Russians following suit. The Japanese marshal now sent up his army reserve, which had been kept far to the rear at Yentai, to help Nogi. It was not before the evening of March 6 that it came up with the 3rd Army and was placed in position opposite the centre of the Russian west front. On the rest of the line severe local fighting had continued, but the Russian positions were quite unshaken and Kuropatkin's reserves—which would have been invaluable in backing up the counter-attack of March 2-had belatedly returned to face Nogi. He had organized another counterstroke for the 6th, to be led by Kaulbars, but this col lapsed unexpectedly after a brief but severe fight.
Kuropatkin now decided to draw in his centre and left towards Mukden. On the 7th, the various columns executed their movement to the Hun-ho with complete success, thanks to good staff work. The Japanese fol lowed up only slowly. Nogi and Kaulbars stood fast, facing each other on the west front ; after the arrival of the general reserve, Nogi was able to prolong his line to the north and eventually to bend it inwards towards the Russian line of retreat. On the 8th the fighting between Nogi and Kaulbars was very severe, and Kuropatkin now made up his mind to retreat towards Tieling. On the 9th, by Oyama's orders, Nogi extended northward instead of further swinging in south-eastward, Oku now occupied all the original line of the 3rd Army, Nozu alone was left on the south front, and Kuroki and Kawamura began to engage Linievich se riously. But Nogi had not yet reached the Mukden-Tieling rail way when, on the night of the 9th, every preparation having been made, Kuropatkin's retreat began. On the loth, covered by Kaulbars, who held off Nogi, and by strong rearguards at and east of Mukden, the movement continued, and though confusion was prevalent and the rearguards suffered very heavily, the Russians managed to draw off in safety to the northward. On the evening of the loth, after all their long and hardly contested enveloping marches, Nogi's left and Kawamura's right met north of Mukden. The circle was complete, but there were no Russians in the centre, and a map of the positions of the Japanese on the evening of the loth shows the 17 divisions thoroughly mixed up and pointing in every direction but that of the enemy. Thus the
further pursuit of the Russians could be undertaken only after an interval of reorganization by the northernmost troops of the 5th and 3rd Armies. But the material loss inflicted on the Russians was far heavier than it had ever been before. It is generally es timated that the Russian losses were no less than 97,00o, and the Japanese between 40,000 and 5o,000. Japan had had to put forth her supreme effort for the battle, while of Russia's whole strength not one-tenth had been used. But Russia's strength in Europe, with but one line whereby it could be brought to bear in the Far East, was immaterial, and on the theatre of war a quarter of the Russian field forces had been killed, wounded or taken.
It remains to narrate briefly the tragic career of the Russian Baltic fleet. Leaving Libau on Oct. 13-15, 1904, the fleet steamed down the North sea, expecting every night to be attacked by torpedo-boats. On the 21st, in their excitement, they opened fire on a fleet of British trawlers on the Dogger Bank (q.v.), and several fishermen were killed. This incident provoked the wildest indignation, and threatened for some days to bring Russia into conflict with England. A British fleet "shadowed" Rozhestvenski for some time, but eventually the Russians were allowed to proceed. On reaching Madagascar, Rozhestvenski heard of the fall of Port Arthur, and the question of returning to Russia arose. But a reinforcement under Rear-Admiral Nebogatov was despatched from the Baltic via Suez early in March 1905, and the armada proceeded by the Straits of Malacca, Nebogatov joining at Kamranh bay in Cochin China. The united fleet was formidable rather in number than in quality; the battleships were of very unequal value, and the faster vessels were tied to the movements of many "lame ducks." Rozhestvenski had, moreover, numerous store-ships, colliers, etc. Nevertheless, the Japanese viewed his approach with considerable anxiety, and braced themselves for a final struggle. Of the vari ous courses open to him, Togo prudently chose that of awaiting Rozhestvenski in home waters. The Russians left Kamranh on May 14, and for a time disappeared into the Pacific. It was assumed that they were making for Vladivostok either via Tsushima strait or by the Pacific. Rozhestvenski chose the former course, and on May 27 the fleets met near Tsushima. By supe rior speed and handling the Japanese gained an increasing ad vantage, and by the following day the whole Russian fleet, with few exceptions, had been captured or sunk. (See TSUSHIMA for battle.) The Peace of Portsmouth.—After the disasters of Mukden and Tsushima, and being threatened with internal disorder in European Russia, the tsar, early in June, accepted the mediation of the president of the United States, and pourparlers were set on foot. The war, meanwhile, drifted on through May, June and July. Linievich,• who succeeded Kuropatkin shortly after the battle of Mukden, retired slowly northward, reorganizing his forces and receiving fresh reinforcements from Europe. A Jap anese expedition occupied Sakhalin ( July 8-3o), and another, under General Hasegawa, advanced through Korea towards Vla divostok. But the fighting was desultory. The peace negotia tions were opened at Portsmouth (N.H.), on Aug. 9, and by the end of the month the belligerents had agreed as to the main points at issue—that Russia should cede the half of Sakhalin, annexed in 1875, surrender her lease of the Kwantung peninsula and Port Arthur, evacuate Manchuria, and recognize Japan's sphere of influence in Korea. The treaty of peace was signed on Aug. 23, 1905.
the first-hand narratives the most important are: Ian Hamilton, A
Officer's Scrap Book; and the British Officers' Reports, War Office, 1908. Also Reports of Military Observers, General Staff U.S.A.; Major v. Tettau's 18 Monate beim Heere Russlands; von Schwarz, Zehn Monate beim Heere Kuropatkins, and Kuropatkin's own work (part of which has been translated into English). Of detailed military histories the principal are the semi-offi cial series of narratives and monographs produced by the Austrian military journal "Streffleur" (Einzelschriften fiber den russ.-japanischen Krieg) ; the volumes of lectures delivered at the Russian staff college after the war, French translation (Conferences sur la guerre russo japonaise faites a l'Academie Nicolas) ; British official History of the Russo-Japanese War; German official Russisch-japanischer Krieg (Eng. trans. by K. von Donat) ; Li5ffler, Der russisch-japanische Krieg (Leipzig, 1907; French trans.) ; L. Gianni Trapani, La Guerra russo giapponese (2908) ; E. Bujac, La Guerre russo-japonaise (1909) . Of critical studies one of the most important is Culmann, Etude sur les caracteres generaux de la guerre en extreme-orient (1909). One naval narrative of absorbing interest has appeared, Semenov's Rasplata (Eng. trans.).